Billy T. "Genuine Free Will is Possible"

I object to this point on the foundation that Quantum Mechanics is not a resolved set of theories and mutually exclusive presentations of the system are at war with one another to this day. Bohm's theory, for instance, is rigidly deterministic, and the multiple universe one is also deterministic, but a "branching determinism". In essence, the probablistic nature of Quantum Mechanics is itself up to debate and therefore, I find this argument supremely unconvincing.

I'd also note that there is nothing in the macroscopic brain and mind which would admit of quantum probability.

What aspect of an inner simulation allow us to experience the world from a perspective that has a distinctly first-person characteristic, yet is found no where in the brain itself in such imagery?

What evidence do you have for it lasting .3 seconds? Also, how could we remain paused for such a relatively long period of time and nonetheless react, and often have many reactions, in that time?

You will note, however, that simulations on computers do indeed follow strict deterministic processes. No Turing Machine follows anything but a formal system so composed to be anything worse than computationally irreducible. Randomness does not play into it and, in the end, the information processing is rigidly deterministic like everything else. Accordingly, saying that a simulation only simulates what is real and thus is not deterministic, is ridiculous as the system beneath it is deterministic, whether or not the physical laws so simulated work on the same foundations, or are just simulations of the behaviour as capable of being experienced.

The human brain being a Turing Machine - be it linear or parallel - is controversial, specifically in light of its semantic content.

Subjective idealism, in line with Berkley's thoughts, is an unsupportable hypothesis. See my "A Refutation of Non-Transcendental Idealism" (available here on Sciforums) for my arguments in regards to that.

I'd also ask how a formal system can produce "wishes and choices" which are not direct correlates to that formal system's deterministic processes?

Imagination allows us to experience, as thoughts, all sorts of violations. But this does not mean we are experiencing true violations.

Brain information need not be "non-physical". Indeed, it remains quite physical, if we accept the premise that the mind is a Turing Machine. There exists no Turing Machines which are non-physical.

I must say: Interesting essay, Billy T. I also did not quote its full extent here, in order to allow you to present your own work.

 

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Have you heard of Roger Penrose's theory of quantum consciousness?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Penrose

 

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Yes, I have both heard of, and read a bit on, the matter.

I'm also aware that it is widely discreditted. The majority of theorists - although, admittedly, I disagree with them as well - are more likely to conclude the brain as a Turing Machine, rather than one as a quantum mechanical influenced macroscopic organ.

 

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Free will is only possible if you are God, otherwise you arent free, because God is free will.

Ok athiests, respond to that.

 

If anything, God is the least free. As he is both omniscient and perfect - all of which limits his choices to perfection and pre-knowledge of all his actions.

 

If anything, that sentence, applied to humans, basically proves that free will is not possible for humans. Even the tiniest bit of knowledge limits our free will ....a newborn baby, perhaps only hours old, might, just might have free will. But within a few days, it, too, is beginning to lose free will by learning things about it's environment and it's parents.

Only the perfectly ignorant, the totally ignorant, have free will. All the rest of us must suffer the loss of free will with every single thing that we learn.

Baron Max

 

Wow, what's it like?

 

Oh, I'm ignorant, Nick, that's a fact .....but even as ignorant as I am, I do know a little bit about things. And therefore, I ain't got no free will.

But you, being one of the most intelligenct, knowledgeable people on the planet, have even less free will than me! Sorry, but that's just the way it is.

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Baron Max

 

How can you have less than none?

 

I'll let you ponder that for a while, okay?

Baron Max

 

if god is omnipotent, he can be unlimited and limited at the same time.
god chose to become prince_james so that he could feel free.

 

No, no, no. You cannot claim both properties for an entity. It's plainly self-contradictory and nonsense, as in "makes no sense". The very rules of logic dictate... oh forget it.

 

He could choose limitations, though.

Gimme that old time rationalism.

I believe in Free Will though, primarily because of random error. Now, you might have non-randomization in the residuals, which is probably indicative of the fact that your model is, in some arbitrary way, fucked.

 

To Prince_James:

I will try to get back to you in 2007. I am finally trying to keep my 2006 resolution (not be serious all the time) See "Ban Billy T" thread now in cesspool and the other links posts related.

Thanks you the review. yes the main weak spot (MHO) is that the simulation must have a logic that is not deterministic. (fuzzy logic will not do as really is) I think it is some self referencing logic such as:

"This sentence is false." (I.e. no "truth value" logic.)

but I do not know much in this area.

Damn, I never could keep resolutions, even with lots of procrastination!

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Hmm. Random error just means that what you expected to happen didn't happen.

That it turned out to be an "error" at all indicates that you knew or thought you knew BEFOREHAND what the end result would be. Which automatically means that you took the action NOT of your own free will, but you took it only after analyzing the possible results of the various choices. Hence, you've effectively proven that there is no free will.

Think about it; If you choose not to jump off of a cliff because you might get hurt, that's not free will ....because you have some knowledge of what might happen, which influences your will, your choices.

Only a new-born baby has free will ...because it has no knowledge about any consequences of its actions. After only a few minutes, perhaps days, the baby will begin to lose its free will, because it will begin to recognize, say, that if it cries, mommy will come play with it. See?

Baron Max

 

God is not an entity.

Baron Max

 

Baron Max:

In essence, you are correct: Knowledge compells us more than ignorance.

Billy T:

Can a logic work that is so "fuzzy" and non-deterministic? Moreover, as you mentioned the Liar's Paradox, check out a thread I made about a month ago: "The Liar's Paradox and Truth" (or something like that).

C7ityi:

Certainly am I God, but that is -supposed- to be a secret. I mean, truly, thanks for letting THAT one out of the bag...Ugh!

 

I know that Baron. I just mean in a theoretical sense. That being that even a theoretical "entity"... oh forget it.

 

I did not intend this to be an argument, only a “stage setting” introduction to problem of relationship of free will (if existent) to physics. I think Bohm's version of QM is very appealing but not quite as you understand it. Bohn's QM produces all the results of the more std Copenhagen School POV, (specifically including all of the results associated with the uncertainty principle or QM's intrinsic uncertainty of the results of an "observation" on a system in a "mixed state"), but by introduction of "the guiding wave" he can conform to human experience better as in BQM the particles only go thru one slit in the double slit experiment, etc. I will not now explain why I think BQM is not consistent with the identity of all electrons, and this is well established by both experiment and the fact that the statistics related to conceptual exchange of a pair in their equations would be different if they were distinguishable and "undistinguishable" results are what nature confirms. I have tried (and failed) to prove this problem with BQM exists with a gedanken experiment, made some post here related and exchanged many Email with a BQM support / advocacy group (in Holland, if memory serves.)
As far as the multiple universes model of what happens when a QM system is "observed" - that is too "mind boggeling" for me to believe. For example, consider a K40 atom deep inside the Earth, which At t = noon today, in our universe, A, decays and universe B it has not. How can it be that instanteously its gravitational interaction with the Ca atom a couple of cm away ceases? Is this lessor impulse on that Ca atom not detectable and a faster than the speed of light influence / signal that the decay has happened (Do not confuse with distant observation on a spacially distributed, but ALREADY LINKED in one mixed state, system, which does not tell something has happen with information transfer FTL.) How about the very weak, not not zero gravitational interacton with an He+ ion on the sun, 8.5 minutes away? This and the fact that in each nanosecond "zillions of zillion" of QM events are occurring in our universe A means "zillions and zillions" of non-interacting universes are being created, without any Big Bang of their own as each differes from "A" by a single QM event out come. - Where does all that matter come from? The first person to think this up was smoking something too strong, and those who believe in it are now smoking that stuff too, MHO.

I think you are wrong here. There are QM scale structures, called "micro-tubules" (sort of "hairs") on almost all cells. Someone has already mentioned R. Penrose and I will mention Sir John Eccles, now dead. He was one of the world's most knowledgeable physiologist, and probably the last Dualist well qualified to relate spirit and matter. I read his book (The Self and its Brain, is title if memory serves.) (I have done unpaid work with electrodes in Rhesus money brains. - One of our smarter monkeys, we called "Sir John," but I did not give him that name.)

Certainly it seems we can form "mental images," but the existence of them is by no means certain. I have (packed away) at least one book one this subject / question. There was a rather vigorous debate in the cognitive science literature on the question for a few years about 20 years ago. As far as I know, neither side "won" and finally just agreed to disagree. You are looking at an image as you read this, but the informational content was a stream of bits. - I know of no reason why anything that should be called an "image" MUST exist in the brain, but neither side of this old argument convinced me the other side was wrong. I sort of lean towards the side that states after the 'visual cortex" there are no images and the main job of it is to tear the retinal pulse pattern (image) into its "elements," which never come together again.
In my concept, the "self" is sort of a two-component "subroutine" of the main simulation. The "body part" of "self subroutine" is made by / in the main parietal neural activity, just like the chair I think I am sitting on now. I think the "memories" and "psychological" part of the self subroutine is supplied to the main simulation from neural processes elsewhere, (frontal lobes being very important in the latter’s production - trans orbital lobotomies prove this.) sort of like a "call" in old Fortran program language. The "distinctly first person" aspect does not seem to any special problem to me, especially as only I have my memories and the neural structure making the "psychological" component of the "self subroutine" in the over all simulation. [More related later on the problem of "QUALIA" and "Intentionality."] (What you called "semantics" but nothing to do with "intentions", as I sure you know, but others here may not know this technical term's very limited use).

The 0.3sec is just to give a number. It could be greater or less. there is time required for the impulse to travel down the axon. (BTW did you know that a couple of physiologist invented the oscilloscope to measure neural conduction speeds, more accurately?) In addition, the "signal" crosses the synaptic clef only by diffusion and that takes time. To make a decision, change the tension in a mussel reactively to an environmental change or only to perceive things, there will be many of these delays. Some times delays of 1 second occur. The fastest perception I know of uses only 6 sequential synaptic - A sheep can tell a displayed photo of wolf from another sheep very quickly - so quickly that no more than 6 synaptic delays are involved. I would bet that nothing new ("unexpected") a human can perceive is done in less than 10. The evidence is all by microelectrode studies - same way the "visual receptive field" of a neuron in V1 is defined /learned. I.e. one can define the "receptive field" in central brain instead of in the retina. I think it was Sir John Eccles who got way out into the temporal lobe and found some many synaptic steps away for the retina, which responded to "hand shape" - there has been a lot of work on face recognition by cats and monkeys many synaptic clefs away from the retina also.

I skip you next paragraphs with only the comment:
Yes, how to avoid a deterministic logic for the simulation is unknown, and the weak point of my POV. Fact that I cannot adequately defend the existence of such a logic does not mean it is impossible. I have been aware of this problem for more than a decade. Occasionally even pointing this out myself, without any “prompting.” In essence, I am hoping that your: "saying that a simulation only simulates what is real and thus is not deterministic, is ridiculous as the system beneath it is deterministic,..." is a "premature conclusion" based on the types of computation you and I (perhaps everyone currently) know about.
My one concept offers such a simple explanation for literally dozens of deep unexplained facts in many different fields (Not just many mental aberrations and physiological brain facts, but some historical ones as well and is to be an "expected development" in all sufficiently complex evolving organisms.) that I have some faith that this one problem will someday be resolved by someone, more knowledgeable than me about possible logical systems.
I am only guessing that "some sort of set of self referencing statements" is part of the solution. I guess this because, as I illustrated in four words, formal statements need not be either true or false and certainly a fantastic amount of "self referencing" interactions are occurring within the brain.

I definitely believe the brain is NOT a Turing Machine. Both "qualia" and "intentionality" certainly exist (not to mention "consciousness," whatever that might be) and could not in any Turing Machine.
Man may never know what it is like to be a bat, but I am damn sure no Turing Machine will ever know what anything is "like" or "means," yet humans constantly, and without obvious effort, unavoidable do this. The only alternative explanation I can see is Dualism and I find zero evidence for that.

Yes that is true, but there is no "logical flaw"* in Berkley's position as far as I can tell. I just believe that he, like Descartes, knew what the "correct" answer was to a difficult problem and then constructed his defense for that answer. (I found my "answer" quite by accident. I have given up on the free will etc problem years earlier. My strange and imcomplete solution, just "fell out" of what I believe is a better view, than currently accepted, of how visual perception is created. I.e. I was studying vision, and formed my own non-standard POV and then noticed that I also had an answer to many unsolved problems contained within my new version of how visual processing works. - The original paper has many more of these mechanism discussed at the neuronal mechanism level.)

This is the "mental states" problem the behaviorist tried to sweep under the rug. They have been shown, quite convincingly to be wrong. Metal states exist and I think they are possible, even in Turing machines, but without the associated qualias.
At APL, back in early 1950s, we had a little automous robot that wandered around in the halls until it got "hungry for battery recharge" then its behavior became focused on finding wall 110V AC outlets to plug into for a while. Of course it had no sense of "hunger" or qualias, it was just following its simple program. I sometimes wonder if I differ from it in any principled way (I.e. just a much more complex and evolved, not "written," program.)

I agree with you here except for the brain being a TM. Certainly the "information" is stored in some physical form, (but I include in this the nets of active neural pulses - I think they are very important and why no human will ever be "replicated" - my original publication (ref 1 of my post you read) even calls this the "biological uncertainty principle." - I.e. any attempt to determine these circulating neural currents, in a complex brain, will surely change them significantly.)
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*I think there are several 'logical flaws" in the current accepted version of visual perception, and gave three unrelated ones in the essay you have read. thus it would be easier for me to believe Bishop Berkley than the current "emergent" POV held by most cognitive scientists.


Happy New Year and thanks again for reading it all - few do, but it may be important.

 

No, I'm referring to random error incurred through deviance from an expected result. If I expect A, given B, and instead I get A +/- 1 standard error, on average, then we illustrate a lack of complete causality, which suggests that the universe is partially random, since there is always experimental error. One could say "well, there isn't free will since the outcomes are limited anyway", which implies a certain structure (so that if I use 1.2 mM MgCl2 in a reaction instead of 1.5 I get different DNA fragments, and not a rubber chicken), but I don't see this as being the same thing.

Ah! But I still can. That's free will. There are constraints on the coefficients of the likelihood of my doing so, but I can still do it.