Exterminate The Taliban

Discussion in 'Politics' started by Read-Only, Jul 10, 2012.

  1. spidergoat pubic diorama Valued Senior Member

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    You can't fall if you are already at the bottom.
     
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  3. Xotica Everyday I’m Shufflin Registered Senior Member

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    Many Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan - especially in the eastern provinces bordering Pakistan and the southern Korengal Valley - detest all outsiders and modernizing influences. This traditional resistance applies to the Kabul government and foreigners alike.
     
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  5. Buddha12 Valued Senior Member

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    Let me think, how many terrorist organizations have been in the news over the past 50 years or so, probably 20 to 30 at least. They start up for one reason or another, I remember the terrorists that were hijacking planes to have their leaders freed or demanding the removal of the US from some country and on and on. So they come and go from all points of the world and as I have stated trying to eliminate them so they never happen won't ever come to fruition for there's always someone out there with a beef against someone. Russia also had them as well so it isn't just America that terrorists are against it is anyone from anywhere. After one is extinguished another comes along and this has been repeating itself quite allot in recent history.

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  7. Peter Dow Registered Senior Member

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    Newbie alert!

    Greetings fellow scientists. Newbie here!

    Not to mention that the Taliban demand that we "withdraw our soldiers from Afghanistan and leave them to retake Afghanistan to be used as before as a client state and base for global jihadi terrorism, never mind about the attack on the USA-9/11, the attack on London 7-7, forgive and forget that the Taliban killed our soldiers and civilians in Afghanistan and hey, how else do we expect to be treated being infidels in Muslim lands?" etc.

    Yup, I'd say we cannot be convinced to accept the Taliban's demands, ever.

    The world, since it includes me, must include the alternative answer - YES WE CAN!

    I'm glad you asked. Here is my rejection of the idea of peace talks with the Taliban and an outline of my proposed strategy to beat the Taliban (and win the war on terror).


    [video=youtube;aXMHnu-7ZZk]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXMHnu-7ZZk[/video]

    Transcript from the video -

    Oh there's more.

    Well it is a fair point to complain that the war in Afghanistan has dragged on so it is worth analysing why that is.

    So why would the US want to encourage "peace talks" with the enemy Taliban? Why not simply crush the enemy? What's the political or military issue here that might mean "peace talks" would be part of an exit strategy for the US and allies?

    If I may be permitted to answer my own questions.

    Weak strategic thinking and planning by US and then NATO generals has dragged out the Western intervention in Afghanistan since 2001 and caused far more casualties to our soldiers than was ever necessary.

    The military general staff has lacked vision about the enemy and failed to comprehend and react appropriately to intelligence reports that Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other jihadi terror groups are proxies for hostile states, typically managed from Pakistan and funded from Saudi Arabia.


    [video=youtube;6_SkNUorWhc]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_SkNUorWhc[/video]


    Military strategic essentials have been neglected, such as - when occupying territory, always ensure secure supply routes from one strong point to another.

    Instead NATO-ISAF forces in Afghanistan have been deployed in isolated bases, deployed more like tethered goats as bait for the enemy than a conquering or liberating army.

    Some combination of military incompetence by the generals and a preference for appeasement on the part of the civilian political leadership has perversely left the West bribing our enemies within the Pakistani terrorist-proxy-controlling state and continuing business-as-usual with our enemies in the Saudi jihadi-financing state.

    How to beat the Taliban and win the war on terror

    It’s never too late to learn lessons and adopt an alternative competent and aggressive military strategy.

    Now since I am a newbie here and don't know the moderation practices here, I think I'll stop there and wait for questions, or an invitation from a forum regular or moderator to continue.

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  8. spidergoat pubic diorama Valued Senior Member

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    But neither Pakistan nor Saudi Arabia are considered hostile states. Neither is it possible to kill all the Taliban.
     
  9. Peter Dow Registered Senior Member

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    Well watch the 2nd video I posted. I know you have not watched it because it is 2 hours long. That will explain that Pakistan is indeed hostile, even though some are unaware of the hidden hostility. It's called being "double crossed". Have you ever met someone who told you a lie? It's like that, only more important.

    What part of ...

    ... did you not understand?

    The US government keeps a list of all the countries which are considered state sponsors of terrorism. All the countries on that list had to have their names added to that list, right? So I am suggesting that new names of countries are added to that list.

    Ever written a list of things? You know when you added an item to that list, that wasn't on the list before you added it, but was after you added it? Yeh? OK, like that but more important.

    Not the way the US are fighting the Taliban it isn't. Fighting my way will kill or arrest enough of them to crush their organisation.

    Certain wars have been won and the enemy defeated. OK, you don't know any history of any wars that were ever won. Fair enough. It's not your fault you are not a historian. OK well sorry but I don't have time to explain history to you. It's an education thing. You know when you learned to type? It's like that, only more important.
     
  10. youreyes amorphous ocean Valued Senior Member

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    I am pretty sure this thread qualifies as hate speech...
    Taliban are people, just as CIA is. Everyone got their own agendas, everyone does it differently. Some pay the media tons for good shoes image and some do not. Some pray for Ramadan and some pray to latest iphone 5 models.
     
  11. Read-Only Valued Senior Member

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    That seems a very thin and thoughtless statement to me.

    The only "hatred" involved is the natural anger and disgust that any normal civilized individual would have toward such a group. A group who's ONLY agenda is their own benefit at the expense of the people they exploit by terrorizing them, keeping them in submission through violence, threat of death, actual death, and denying them the very basic human rights - especially women! - in order to maintain their position of exploitation and control.
     
  12. spidergoat pubic diorama Valued Senior Member

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    It's a little more complicated than that Peter Dow. What is your plan anyway?
     
  13. spidergoat pubic diorama Valued Senior Member

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    People who should die.

    I just don't see how it can be done. Even if you invade all the countries you want, you cannot separate out the extremists. They aren't all proxies who will go away when their masters are gone.
     
  14. Read-Only Valued Senior Member

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    Yes, that's a problem. I readily admit that I don't have a workable plan. But I know there are *many* people out there who are smarter than I am and I hope some of them are working on one or more plans.
     
  15. youreyes amorphous ocean Valued Senior Member

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    Taliban is a strong opposing force and a highly successful one as well. The fighters of Afghanistan and their strategists have fought on and will many centuries in past, future, and present. Their only wrong is that they are your enemies, now. Should Friends of Taliban be exterminated too? Well than let's start with USA that financed them to begin with.

    Again a call for extermination of Taliban is a call for genocide.
     
  16. RedStar The Comrade! Registered Senior Member

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    462
    We (the Soviets) couldn't even take out the Taliban. What makes you think you can do it?
     
  17. S.A.M. uniquely dreadful Valued Senior Member

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    Exterminate the Taliban. Yes always promote genocide. Especially of people who have done nothing to you.

    There is a civil war brewing in your own neighborhood. All this war and destruction that people like you have been promoting for years is going to make itself felt. Hope you figure out a better way than the Taliban when it reaches your doorstep.

    Yeah all you have to do is subvert yourself to their local councils and adopt their culture, language and religious society, Basically act like an immigrant. But, they have a low ecological footprint. So their society is more sustainable for the long term
     
  18. Peter Dow Registered Senior Member

    Messages:
    215
    Thank you for your question. I have already mentioned the outline points of my plan but I will explain a little more here and then provide more details in subsequent posts.


    1. The US and Western allies ought to name Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as "state sponsors of terrorism". We ought to name in addition, the other oil-rich Arab kingdoms who are also financial state sponsors of terrorism. This has implications such as ending bribes and deals with back-stabbing hostile countries and instead waging war against our enemies with the aim of regime change or incapacitating the enemy so that they can do us little more harm. The war could be of varying intensity depending on the enemy concerned and how they respond to our initial attacks, whether they wish to escalate the war or surrender to our reasonable demands.

    2. There ought to be drone strikes on the University of Jihad. (Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak, Pakistan) In addition, we ought to employ aerial bombing of all other bases for the Taliban in Pakistan. This may have to be extended to include certain Pakistani state bases which are supporting the Taliban - such as the Pakistani ISI headquarters mentioned a lot in the BBC documentary "SECRET PAKISTAN". If this is not handled very carefully, it could escalate into open war with the Pakistani military. I will explain how to manage Pakistan later.

    3. We ought to seize control of Pakistani and Saudi TV satellites and use them to broadcast propaganda calling for the arrest of all involved in waging terrorist war against the West. These satellites are made, launched and maintained by Western companies and should be easy to take over. Other satellites provided to the enemy by non-Western countries could be jammed or destroyed. Air strikes against the enemy's main terrestrial TV transmitter aerials is another option to silence enemy propaganda.

    4. When occupying territory, always ensure secure supply routes from one strong point to another. I will provide some details about how this is done militarily.
     
    Last edited: Aug 7, 2012
  19. Peter Dow Registered Senior Member

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    215
    2. Bomb the enemy in Pakistan

    More on point 2 of the plan. Air strikes, bombing raids, missiles, drone attacks on enemy bases in Pakistan.

    Bomb Taliban Jihadi indoctrination bases in Pakistan.

    I am suggesting that our forces bomb the Taliban Headquarters known as "the University of Jihad" or Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak, 50 kilometres (31 miles) east of the provincial capital, Peshawar.

    More about the place in this BBC webpage

    BBC NEWS | South Asia | The 'university of holy war'

    The significance of this place is that it is the main recruitment and command centre for the Taliban which must be known to our military intelligence officers and so it is a mystery why they have not advised our generals to bomb this place before now or if they did advise our generals to bomb it why they didn't actually bomb it?

    It makes no sense in a war to give the enemy headquarters a free pass and immunity from being targeted. It just makes their commanders feel untouchable which is not how we want them to feel. We want them arrested or dead or in great fear that soon they will be arrested or dead and bombing their HQ gives them that idea.

    Our forces do not have ground forces close enough to use artillery to destroy this target so that leaves NATO to use its aerial power - drones and bomber planes, to bomb the target from the air.

    So apart from not wanting to use nuclear weapons on such a weak target which would be over-kill, I think bombing using the very heaviest conventional bombs, MOABs or heavy bombing from B52s or C130s is appropriate.

    So a "MOAB" would be one of those.

    [video=youtube;ZX5h2fjhKyQ]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZX5h2fjhKyQ[/video]

    Ultimate Weapons- Mother of all Bombs (YouTube)

    Which has a blast radius of 450 feet or 137 metres.

    Heavy bombing could be used to totally level such targets, or turn the target site into one huge crater field - obliterate it. Give the Jihadis a demonstration that they won't ever forget!

    Then if the Taliban and Jihadi leaders relocate to a new recruitment, indoctrination and command base, blast that to pieces as well.

    Our forces will have to establish air superiority over the target areas to allow not only unmanned drones but piloted heavy bombers with a much heavier bomb load to over-fly the area reasonably safely.

    If and when Pakistan objects to our plans to aerial bomb these enemy indoctrination bases we should tell them that because our view is that Pakistan does not control the ground there to our satisfaction - because Pakistani police or military have not arrested and handed over the likes of the Darul Uloom Haqqania and other Taliban leaders operating on the ground for removal to Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp and not closed down the University of Jihad and other Taliban bases then the Pakistan military don't deserve control of the air space over that ground which they don't satisfactorily control.

    So we can say "Sorry" if the Pakistanis don't like this violation of their sovereignty but the needs of war mean this is something we must do. We wouldn't intend to permanently deprive Pakistan of control over its air space; this would be a temporary measure until the war on terror is won.

    Pakistan had their chance to arrest or kill the Taliban leaders in their Pakistan bases but now it is too late so we are going to flatten the Taliban bases in that part of Pakistan from the air and we need total air superiority over the target area in order to protect our pilots.

    The Pakistan government and military has complained about drone strikes in parts of Pakistan but Pakistan has not gone to war with us about it, thankfully.

    Hopefully, the Pakistanis will not want to contest air superiority with their military but if they do decide to fight to resist our air-superiority where we need it to bomb the Taliban then we must be prepared to take out all nearby Pakistani ground to air missile batteries and any air fighters they send against us to contest air superiority.

    If the Pakistanis decide to fight us over control of Pakistan's air space then of course there is a risk this could escalate to all-out war if the Pakistanis really want to make a casus belli out of the sovereignty issue and the matter of us requiring to destroy the Taliban so possibly we should make it clear to the Pakistanis that the US President or the NATO supreme commander have the option to use nuclear weapons against Pakistani military bases anywhere in Pakistan if that was necessary to win an all-out war with Pakistan.

    That's not our aim to escalate to an all-out war with Pakistan here but Pakistan should be careful not to escalate the situation from one where we need to go after the Taliban only into one where the official Pakistan military gets dragged into a war with us unnecessarily.

    This risk of having to fight and win an all-out war with Pakistan is a lesser risk than failing to defeat the Taliban, withdrawing from Pakistan having achieved little to secure Afghanistan and thereby giving encouragement to Jihadis the world over to commit more acts of terrorism and war elsewhere in the world including in our homelands. So Pakistan should not force us to make that choice of two risky options because their defeat is preferable to our own defeat in our opinion.

    Pakistan should avoid war with the West by stepping back and allowing us to destroy the Taliban in Pakistan because it is the Taliban and the Jihadis who are the true enemies of the Pakistani and Afghan people. We are the friends of the people of Pakistan and we will prove that by defeating their and our enemy, the Taliban and associated Jihadis.

    Hopefully the Pakistanis will back off and let us bomb the Taliban without threat from Pakistan's air defences. We should tell Pakistan that we are doing them a favour which they will thank us for in the long run though we appreciate the embarrassment for them in the short term.

    Targeting the University of Jihad, Akora Khattak

    Here are the co-ordinates for Akora Khattak.

    Geohack - Akora Khattak

    34° 0′ 2.17″ N, 72° 7′ 18.06″ E
    34.000603,72.121683

    and if you look on Google Maps the co-ordinates for Akora Khattak seems to be centred right on the Darul Uloom Haqqania / University of Jihad.

    That location is in a built-up area (of course the cowards would use civilian human shields) so using the MOAB is bound to do a fair amount of collateral damage to surrounding buidings and people. So the word should go out now - evacuate Akora Khattak and don't live within 5 miles of any such jihadi university otherwise you could be seriously inconvenienced.

    The target area of the campus of University of Jihad looks to be about 100 metres x 100 metres. Hard to guess from the satellite photo.

    Here is the Jihadis' own website for the base International Islamic University: Darul Uloom Haqqania which has a number of photographs and is helpfully in English.

    Anyway a MOAB on that lot is certainly going to spoil their day and their terror-war plans.
     
  20. superstring01 Moderator

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    12,110
    There's a saying: "We tend to become like the worst in those whom we oppose." And it would (and is) true in "exterminating" the Taliban/Al Qaeda/Whatever. They deserve destruction, but the problem is in carrying out said destruction. We'd have to become them to destroy them. And in becoming them, you merely inspire the next "them". It's better to walk away from Afghanistan now and keep our eyes and ears fine-tuned in ways that we did not do before 9/11 so that we can eliminate such a threat before it happens.

    The wrong way is to sit and occupy a nation that doesn't want us there and -- frankly -- that uses our presence as a recruiting tool for the next terrorist strike.

    ~String
     
  21. superstring01 Moderator

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    It's a bit more complicated than that. The Soviets were up against obvious Saudi and American dollars being funneled in to oppose them. No such opposition from Russia and China against the US.

    None of which speaks about the rationality or ethics of being there.

    ~String
     
  22. Peter Dow Registered Senior Member

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    215
    4. Secure supply routes for Afghanistan. Overview from 'Warlord Inc.'

    There's a lot of information here so I will start with a post presenting an overview of the issues and problems starting with this CBS news story which identifies a critical weakness in our military configuration - poorly defended supply lines whose vulnerability the enemy exploits to gain funds for its insurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

    [video=youtube;HbqAampl5pA]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HbqAampl5pA[/video]

    "U.S. funds our enemy Taliban's Afghan war" (YouTube)

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    Download Warlord, Inc. Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan - Right-click, Save Target As ...


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    Map inserted by Peter Dow

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    Supplemented by Subcommittee staff

     
    Last edited: Aug 7, 2012
  23. Peter Dow Registered Senior Member

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    4. Secure supply routes for Afghanistan. Land routes.

    Supplying along a land route (road and/or railway) through friendly territory is easy enough. Supplying through a war-zone, or bandit country requires a military approach, something like this.


    Secure supply route border defences plan diagram

    My plan is to establish a secure wide border either side of the supply route to keep enemy mortar and rocket launcher teams out of range of the supply line.

    Apparently, the Taliban are being supplied indirect fire weapons from Iran so defenders need to be prepared to expect attacks using weapons such as 120 mm heavy mortars, with a range of 6200 metres and 107 mm rocket launchers with a range of 8500 metres.

    So regretfully there is no avoiding the requirement for compulsory purchase of land and eviction of occupiers along a 19 kilometre or 12 mile wide corridor, the whole length of the supply route.

    More aggressively NATO might like to consider long-range missile attacks against Iranian weapons productions facilities in Iran to dissuade the Iranians from supplying the Taliban.

    Secure border for a supply route - 19 kilometres or 12 miles wide

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    Secure supply route border defences plan diagram (large - 960 x 1374 pixels)

    As can be seen in the diagram, the border perimeter defences are much the same whether you are securing a railway or a road.

    Diagram features. Explained for secure Afghanistan supply routes.

    • Dangerous ground Enemy forces such as the Taliban, Afghan warlords or Iranian proxies may be attacking the supply route from here
    • Vehicle barrier - deep trench / giant boulders / steep slope - so that truck bombs cannot be driven onto the route
    • STOP - Police check-point - police check civilians are unarmed and those in police or military uniform are genuine. Needs to be very robust so as to survive an enemy truck bomb.
    • Barbed wire - enough to keep out people and larger animals - so more than a horse can jump or cattle can trample over
    • No Pedestrians! Cleared ground Target zone for the machine gunners. A hostile intent should be assumed if an intruder is seen here and the intruder should be shot. The ground needs to be cleared of cover so that intruders can be easily spotted and cannot sneak their way past the machine gunners.
    • GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes 3 man crew. Armour should be able to withstand an RPG hit and contains one machine gun with an effective range to 1000 metres, such as PKM or better. One every 1000 metres on both borders should be manned 24/7. Binoculars, automatic rifles such as AK47 and night vision for 3. Two or more other gun positions per 1000 m on each border are normally unmanned and don't need the expense of real guns sitting there all the time. Such extra positions confuse attackers and serve as firing positions for mobile reaction teams to occupy in emergencies and who can bring additional weapons with them.
    • Access road Where authorised traffic and people can access or leave the supply route.
    • Mortar teams' ground Defender mortar teams arriving from mobile response depots should set up somewhere here to fire at the enemy in the dangerous ground. The mortar teams' ground should have features to help to win mortar duels with the enemy such as observation points on higher ground or tall structures to serve as observation towers.
    • Safe building ground Somewhere relatively safe to build a heliport, runway, supply store or other facility or base.
    • Supply route The road and / or railway we are defending
    • Crossing Where the access road crosses a supply route railway
    • Station - Railway station to load and unload supplies and people onto and off the supply trains.
    • Cross-roads - A four-way junction where the access road crosses the supply road.
    • Mobile reaction depot - contains single armoured fighting vehicle. This is also where the off-duty mess is so that soldiers are available to react to sustained attacks anywhere along the supply route. One every 2km. Contains additional infantry weapons and ammunition such as additional machine guns, automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortars and the rest.
    • Armoured personnel carrier Such as an up-armoured humvee. Most mobile reaction depots have one of those. To transport soldiers to the proximity of the enemy attack where soldiers dismount to fight.
    • Infantry fighting vehicle or armoured combat vehicle. With stronger armour and able to fire on the enemy from enhanced weapons mounted to the vehicle, as well as able to perform the soldier transport role of the APC. Ideally the defenders would prefer the more powerful IFVs to the battle taxi APCs but fewer mobile reaction depots house IFVs because IFVs cost more and so fewer are available to the defenders than the lower performing APCs.


    Secure supply route protection force organisation


    I am proposing a dedicated force within the Afghan army to secure main supply routes through Afghanistan.

    Organisation.

    Ranks in increasing order of seniority -

    1. Gunner
    2. Master Gunner
    3. Team Leader
    4. Shift Officer
    5. Depot Commander
    6. Reaction Captain
    There will be higher officer ranks yet to be specified.

    Duties of the ranks.

    1. Gunner - infantry soldier, serves as a member of a 3-man team which serves on one GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes position normally for an 8-hour shift.

    A Gunner performs other routine duties for an hour or two each day in addition to his 8-hour shift at the gun position at the nearest Mobile reaction depot under the supervision of his Team Leader, Shift Officer and Depot Commander at which location he has quarters in the depot mess.

    A Gunner can also be called to emergency duty when required.

    Gunners must be able to
    • see well
    • operate the machine gun
    • fire accurately
    • reload the machine gun,
    • change the barrel on the machine gun
    • use the guns' optical sights and night sights
    • use the binoculars and night-vision equipment
    • be comfortable in a GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes position,
    • point out where the No Pedestrians! Cleared ground is and where it ends and where allowed ground behind the gun positions is,
    • understand that he is forbidden to enter onto the No Pedestrians! Cleared ground on or off duty, even if ordered to do so by anyone in his team because he may be shot if he does so,
    • understand that he is ordered on and off his duty shift at the GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes position only by his own Shift Officer and own Depot Commander and he cannot be relieved of duty by his Team Leader nor by a more senior ranking Master Gunner, nor by any other Shift Officer nor Depot Commander nor by any more senior officer whom he does not know.
    • understand that while on duty he is not to surrender his personal assault rifle (such as an AK47) to any person, even to someone in his own team. Therefore his Team Leader cannot relieve him of duty nor demand that any Gunner surrender his personal weapon,
    • understand that it is the Gunner's job when on duty, his job, to shoot on sight anyone on the No Pedestrians! Cleared ground coming or going, even someone dressed in Afghan army uniform, of whatever rank who could be an intruder dressed in disguise or even be a colleague who is deserting in that direction. If he is not manning the machine gun at the time he is to use his personal assault rifle to shoot the person on the No Pedestrians! Cleared ground if they are in range, but he is not to follow in hot pursuit anyone onto the No Pedestrians! Cleared ground because again he may be shot.
    • understand pillbox defensive tactics as follows.
    • perform other duties as supervised by the higher ranks.
    2. Master Gunner - skills-based promoted ranks for Gunners with additional specialist skills such as
    • weapons maintenance,
    • binocular and night-vision maintenance,
    • vehicle driving and basic maintenance - checking and maintaining tyre pressure, fuel and oil levels, etc.
    • infantry fighting vehicle specialist
    • mortar team skills,
    • first aid,
    • communications - operating telephone (landline and mobile / cell ) and radio.
    Master Gunners get an appropriately and differently designed skills badge and salary increment for each specialist skill learned. So typically that would be a badge with a machine-gun icon for weapons' maintenance, a badge with an APC-icon for vehicle driving and basic maintenance and so on. A Master Gunner with more badges and skills outranks a Master Gunner with fewer badges and skills.

    3. Team leader A promoted post. The most experienced and able Gunner in each team of 3 on a GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes position.

    Team leaders should have multiple specialist skills and in particular the communications specialist skills is one of the required skills to be eligible to become a Team Leader. Team leaders are always the senior ranking members in every 3-man team irrespective of badges and skills. So a Master Gunner with, say, 5 skill badges does not outrank a Team Leader with, say, only 4 skills badges.

    4. Shift officer - normally on duty back at the Mobile reaction depot and in command and in radio, mobile (cell) or land-line telephone contact with 4 teams, which is 12 men, on duty for an 8-hour shift. The shift officer acts as a deputy commander for the shift for 4 GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes and for the Mobile Reaction Depot.

    The Shift Officer is also in radio, mobile (cell) or land-line telephone contact with Shift Officers in neighbouring Mobile reaction depots. The Shift Officer decides whether or not to consult the Depot commander in response to a request for assistance from any of the 4 teams under his command or to a request for assistance from a Shift Officer in a neighbouring Mobile Reaction Depot.

    5. Depot commander - in command of one Mobile reaction depot , the vehicle, weapons and everything therein. Commands the 3 Shift officers and 12 teams which totals 39 men under his command. He can declare a depot emergency, and call the off-duty shifts in the mess back on emergency duty.

    The Depot Commander can order the depot's vehicle and men to attend and to defend the GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes under attack or order mortar teams into action from the Mortar teams' ground.

    In an emergency, the Depot Commander notifies his immediate superior officers, the Reaction Captains who are the reaction director and deputy reaction director assigned command responsibility for his Mobile Reaction Depot.

    6. Reaction Captain
    • has some command responsibility for the reactions of 8 neighbouring Mobile Reaction Depots
    • is the reaction director for the central 4 depots of these 8 neighbouring depots
    • is the deputy reaction director for the peripheral 4 depots of these 8 neighbouring depots.

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    Reaction Captains direct Mobile Reaction Depots

    The diagram illustrates how the command responsibility of neighbouring Reaction Captains is organised.

    Mobile Reaction Depots 1 & 2
    - the reaction director is Reaction Captain C
    - the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain A

    Mobile Reaction Depots 3 & 4
    - the reaction director is Reaction Captain A
    - the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain C

    Mobile Reaction Depots 5 & 6
    - the reaction director is Reaction Captain A
    - the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain D

    Mobile Reaction Depots 7 & 8
    - the reaction director is Reaction Captain D
    - the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain A

    Mobile Reaction Depots 9 & 10
    - the reaction director is Reaction Captain D
    - the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain B

    Mobile Reaction Depots 11 & 12
    - the reaction director is Reaction Captain B
    - the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain D

    Mobile Reaction Depots 13 & 14
    - the reaction director is Reaction Captain B
    - the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain E

    Mobile Reaction Depots 15 & 16
    - the reaction director is Reaction Captain E
    - the deputy reaction director is Reaction Captain B

    This overlapping organisation ensures that emergencies which are declared at any Mobile Reaction Depot can be supported if needs be by Reaction Captains with responsibility for the depot under attack ordering neighbouring depots on either side to react to the emergency.

    A vehicle is assigned to each Reaction Captain who routinely drives to visit the 8 Mobile Reaction Depots for which he has command responsibility for daily meetings with the Depot Commanders and with the other 2 Reaction Captains he shares depot command responsibility with.

    The Reaction Captains can arrange to receive a salute at attention from each off-duty shift twice a week with an opportunity for the Reaction Captains to boost morale by reminding the Gunners that every Reaction Captain has 8 Mobile Reaction Depots and 320 soldiers under his command and that the 2 Reaction Captains with command responsibility for a particular depot have between them 480 soldiers under their command.

    So in emergencies the Secure Supply Route Protection Force is well organised to defeat any attack the enemy dares to try against any part of the supply route. They shall not pass! (No passeran!)

    The Reaction Captain has a captain's office and quarters adjacent to one of the 4 Mobile Reaction Depots for which he is the reaction director and the Depot Commander of that particular Mobile Reaction Depot also serves as the Reaction Captain's secretary to take telephone calls to the Reaction Captain's Office if he is out of his office and quarters at the time.

    Being so mobile in his daily routine, the Reaction Captain must be contactable via radio or mobile (cell) telephone when he is out of his office.

    In the event of a major attack, the Reaction Captain will set up a tactical command headquarters at his office to direct the battle and call for further reinforcements from neighbouring Reaction Captain's offices if required.

    Staff numbers

    Reaction captain's office
    1 office every 4 depots

    161 men
    • four depots of forty men (4 x 40 = 160)
    • plus the Reaction Captain (160 + 1 = 161)

    Mobile reaction depot
    1 depot every 2 kilometres (1.25 miles)

    40 men
    • three eight-hour shifts of thirteen men, (3 x 13 = 39)
    • plus the Depot Commander (39 + 1 = 40)
    40 men per 2 kilometres = 20 men per kilometre = 32 men per mile

    Depot shift
    3 shifts per depot

    13 men
    • four three-man gun teams, ( 4 x 3 = 12)
    • plus the Shift Officer (12 + 1 = 13)

    Reserves
    Approximate numbers of infantry required including reserves.

    For a 25% reserve of 5 reserves per kilometre, 8 reserves per mile
    Force including reserves is 25 infantry per kilometre, 40 infantry per mile

    For a 50% reserve of 10 reserves per kilometre, 16 reserves per mile
    Force including reserves is 30 infantry per kilometre, 48 infantry per mile

    Support staff
    Infantry deployed in the field or on guard somewhere can require numbers of support staff (such as delivery and rubbish collection, engineers of all kinds, trainers, medical, administration, military policing etc.) which I am told can be multiples of the numbers of deployed infantry they support, depending on the support facilities offered, the quality and efficiency of the support organisation.

    I believe the support staff requirements for a static guard force are somewhat different to mobile infantry advancing (or retreating) in a conventional war because the guard force's requirements for fuel and ammunition deliveries are less but a guard force may expect more in terms of base facilities - running water, electricity and so on.

    I am not recommending figures for support staff because such numbers are more dependent on the infrastructure of the army and nation concerned and are independent of the details of how the infantry are deployed which is my concern here only. Numbers of support staff are to be filled in by NATO-ISAF and the Afghan government and army themselves later.

    How my plan solves the issues raised in 'Warlord Inc.'

    My plan can achieve the "Warlord, Inc." recommendations 3 and 6, not merely to stop extortion and corruption along the supply chain but to gain a further significant advance to NATO-ISAF mission goals.

    I propose secure supply route border defences and a dedicated Afghan protection force to man those defences which would achieve all along the main supply routes a level of security which is similar to the security inside a military base or fort.

    "Warlord, Inc." uses the NATO-ISAF parlance of "inside the wire" to refer to the security achieved within their own NATO-ISAF bases but to virtually nowhere else in Afghanistan.

    It is about time NATO-ISAF and the Afghan government and military were extending that true security "inside the wire" to more of Afghanistan. My secure supply route plan would bring more of Afghanistan "inside the wire" so to speak.

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    The secure supply route border defences require only authorised persons living inside the secure defences.

    The general population sadly may harbour enemy agents and so must be required to live outside the border defences.

    Where isolated houses and small villages can be relocated to use a suitable existing supply road then that should be done with compensation for the relocated residents and landowners.

    Where the settlements along the old supply route are too big to move then new roads should be built for a new supply route, by-passing those bigger settlements by at least 6 miles.
     

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