Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?

Not sure why you felt the need to amend the quote that way. It doesn't speak to whether that output is free for the given input. Thus it merely speaks to what I wrote.

My mistake, I thought you had an understanding of what determinism is, given how eager you are to talk about the argument from determinism. The "one-to-one" mapping should also have given you a clue, but I guess not.

It is simply the notion that something isn't free if it can only operate in one way for a given input. But once again you are exampling the case where there is a change in inputs, and you're looking at the change in output and going "Ooh, free!" But if that output is still strictly determined by the input, how is that output free? It could only be what it ended up being, based on the input. That doesn't sound like free.
But once again you are disputing that it lacks the notion of "free" that I am using by showing how it doesn't lack the notion of "free" that you are using. Do you realise how irrelevant you're therefore being here?

Well, I guess if you see a deterministic system as being free then perhaps you do. I don't do the former, and I don't the latter either.

Noone is disputing that there is a process. Noone is disputing that we can observe that process. The question is whether that process is free. You think it is because you have a notion of what it means to be free. Others think it is not because they have a different notion of what it means to be free. Under this different notion, the process makes us feel that we can do something that is contrary to the logical conclusion that the notion leads to. Thus the illusion. If you think that calling it an illusion is to say that the process somehow doesn't exist then quite frankly you haven't been listening to anything I've been saying in that regard.

I've never said anyone is arguing about that. It's how that relates to the notion of "free" that we disagree on. Different notions, different conclusions.

Wow. Yes! Now you mention it! It reminds me of me, given it's what I posted in #538. How foolish of me not to notice before! Was there more of a point to your question?

 

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That reads like the same old muddle, yes. There remains only the description of "input" - physical, in this case - and the observation that this notion in this case - "free" means supernatural - is an assumption.

I think there are degrees of freedom involved in human decisionmaking, and thus in the exercise of human will.
I don't think the concept of a "free system" makes sense.

That is confused. Under that "different notion" the illusion of a process makes an illusion of "us" believe they have a feeling about something, that they have perceptions, that they have performed logical analysis, and that they have reached conclusions according to that analysis.

Your exclusion of actual choice or decision excluded both of those.

The hash you made of the language there is quite similar to Musika's posting, and Jan's. May I suggest a common cause?

 

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That is because no human brain is programmed the same. The freedom does not lie in the action, it lies in the mental process of each individual. This is why each is free to act in accordance with their own program (character, knowledge), but needs not necessarily be the same as another.

 

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And that's a problem when you consider infinite regression. the same inputs can not deliver the same outputs.

 

The input would be the starting conditions. I'm trying not to yawn about the other. Oh, no, too late. :yawn:

Okay.

It really isn't, although you might be confused about it.

Why is it an illusion of "us"? How is "us" contrary to the logical conclusion that follows from the notion of free? Free will is considered to be an illusion because it feels as if we can make different decisions (outputs) from the same inputs to the system and have control over that, but the logic suggests otherwise. Hence the feeling is merely an illusion of control, an illusion of being able to make different decisions from the same inputs.

There is still a process, though. That process exists. It is what that process does that is in question. Does it enable us to make different choices from the same input to the system, or does it only enable us to feel as if we can? If the latter then it is producing an illusion of the former. But a process still exists.

What hash in particular are you referring to? I'm not saying there isn't one, I'm just curious as to which one you think is similar to theirs - and if you could point me to their offending posts, please?

 

But the same inputs means all extant conditions exactly the same. If there is any kind of change the question "IF" the person could have acted differently, becomes moot.
The problem lies in the exact replication of conditions, could the result have been different?

 

I'm sure in your head that meant something, so care to elaborate so that we can actually understand your point, please?

 

Which as you already know is impossible.

 

As I attempted to explain earlier, the determinism argument only functions in hind sight but never in foresight.
There for it is impossible for the outcome to be exactly replicated even if the inputs are the same. (infinite regression applies to ALL inputs)

The religious analogue is :
"But for the grace of God go I"
"Grace" being the freedom offered and is analogous to the deterministic confusion due to infinite regression that can allow freedom to self determine.
Determinism is the scientific version of God
Sarkus only has to add intelligence to the mix and an omni potent God is ever present.
Never figured Sarkus to be a religious evangelist!

 

if you remove freewill from the discussion and just focus on the validity of determinism., science will tell you that determinism, in absolutum, is actually impossible.

 

That's really interesting. Can you explain why that is logically so.

 

That's nice. And they are what, exactly?

And the perception that one is having that feeling because of some illusion is likewise an illusion, by those criteria.

Meanwhile, you are wrong about the nature of the feeling in many cases - by assuming that the observer thinks they could have made a different decision from exactly the same information, reasons, dream memory residue, sudden noises, and in all ways identical "inputs" including their own nature, you are assuming everyone is taking freedom of will to be supernatural.
An observer like me is thinking no such thing - having discarded the supernatural long ago, our observations of decisions being made and the acts of will that follow involve no such assumption. And so no illusion.

 

One of the common problems with theoreticians is demonstrated in this thread.
This can be demonstrated by the use of the language used.
Example:
"Matter obeys the laws of physics."
The above statement is false because the word "obey" is a human personification or value being projected on an inanimate, incapable of obeying anything, object of mass.
It may seem trivial but it and many others like it has enormous influence on the processing of ideas and thoughts.
Matter doesn't obey anything. Humans can obey, matter doesn't.
Empirically Matter appears to conform with what we as humans consider to be derived laws from the observation of matter.
While the Matter may stay the same the laws may change as our ability to derive from our observations improve.
It all part of the logical falacy Reification posted earlier by CC:

 

Every single molecule, atom, quark, iota of energy, their position, their motion, their energy level, etc.

No it's not. The illusion lies in the comparison between how something seems (appearance, sensation, feeling) to operate compared to how it does operate. If one runs contrary to the other it is reasonable to consider the appearance an illusion of what it appears to be.

No, I am talking about this being the view from the determinist position. It is quite clear that you don't see it as an illusion, because you have a different view of what it means for free will to be free.
Once again, you can't refute a conclusion using one notion of "free" by using a different notion. You simply end up with different conclusions based on different views. One does not negate the other.
So I do not assume the observer to have the same view of "free". But for those that do have that view of what it means to be "free" it is reasonable for them to consider the feeling in themselves and in other people to be an illusion of what it otherwise seems to be.

Once again, for the hard of hearing: different views --> different conclusions. You are simply saying "you're wrong because if you change what you mean then the conclusion is different!" Well, dur!

As for what I also asked last time: you said that what you quoted of mine didn't make sense. Which part of it were you struggling with, as I have reread it and, other than a typo, it seems eminently understandable. You then claimed it was similar to something Jan and Musika had posted, suggesting a common cause? Care to elaborate further? Care to show examples of their handiwork to which you're comparing it?

 

So the substrates defines and determine the patterns - bottom up determinism, just as you denied earlier.
And the observed, recorded, established "causes" of the decisions made - the dreams, new information, reasoning between choices according to criteria held in the conscious mind, etc, are illusions. That entire level of pattern is epiphenomenal - determined by substrate several levels below.

But hold on: how did molecules get in there? How did "energy" get in there? Atoms? These are all illusions as well, epiphenomena completely determined by quantum level events and entities, or maybe quarks and such if QED seems shaky. The observation of a molecule is just as much a creation of the conscious human mind as the observation of an act of will, fully as illusory.

You can point out that some notions of "free" - such as supernatural ones - exclude freedom from natural systems by definition, which is an empty argument.

Exactly. Mine's not supernatural. And yet I otherwise share your "determinist" position, as you describe it. A puzzle, no?

 

I think some people might think that, but I don't. I see the two operating as a single whole, and I don't think you can necessarily separate them into two things. Bottom up determinism suggests a causal heirarchy, but my view (not that I've examined it too deeply) is that you need to consider determinism simply as state A leading to state B.
It might be an interesting thing to explore further, but here, with the question of free will and determinism, it is a side-issue, as it is enough to know that we are considering determinism.

No, not illusions (at least not as I have been using, and repeatedly explaining my use of, the term) as that term is reserved for where the feeling of operation (i.e. being "free") runs contrary to the actual operation. It's therefore not applicable where there is no such contrary behaviour between feeling and actual operation, and I do not see such contradiction with those other things you mention. If there is, if you can argue for there being so, then perhaps I might reconsider whether I refer to those things as illusions as well.

As above.

That notion of "free" is only concluded as being supernatural - or at least as not compatible with determinism. It is not an assumption that one begins with. Of course, if one does begin with it then you really are just begging the question, but that is not what is done here, despite your protestations to the contrary.

Not a puzzle. I didn't begin with "oh, let's choose a notion of 'free' that is supernatural" as you imply (through assertion that it is an assumption). Rather I took a fairly reasonable understanding (along the lines of "able to do otherwise") and applied it to the case of determinism.
The conclusion appears to be that such a notion is not compatible with determinism. Yet we have the feeling that we are able to do otherwise. I certainly have that feeling. So how can the two be reconciled? Some use a different view of "free" such that they can conclude that free will is still "free" (using the new notion), but others stick with their original notion and conclude that, relative to that original notion of "free", the freedom we experience as part of our free will is illusory.
Different notions, different conclusions. Neither seem to be wrong. Just different perspectives.

 

Question: Does "able to do" otherwise ever lead to actually "doing" otherwise?

Seems to me that all motile organisms are able to do otherwise than what they do. But is what they actually do by choice or per deterministic imperative?

Physical ability is not equatable with "will", is it?

 

If free will is understood as the ability to do what you want I fail to see why I should need to further define want. It's good enough that I should know what I want and I certainly do.
To address your notion of "actually free", it's good enough to say that it is not only irrelevant to what most people ordinarily mean by free will but it's also inconsistant. If we are nothing but somehow a part of a deterministic nature, then I fail to see how we could possibly (actually) know anything at all. And if we don't, then how do we know we're a part of nature to begin with, or that we can only comply with its deterministic nature. That's a logical contradiction.
So, all we could possibly ever do, if we're just a part of a deterministic nature, would be to believe whatever nature's laws would somehow make us believe. And then, your beliefs, however justified nature would make them seem to you, would really just be as good as anyone else's beliefs. Including therefore your beliefs about free will, "actually free" and deterministic nature itself.
Me, I don't know that there's a physical world in the sense generally assumed. I in fact very much doubt it (although I'm confident there must something). So, I don't accept your premise that we would know we're subjected to the determinism of nature or even that whatever must be out there is actually, somehow, deterministic. The existence of my subjective experience is enough prima facie evidence that this premise couldn't possibly be justified in any rational way.
So, even if I tried to take your notion of "actually free" at face value, I would end up in a quagmire of logical inconsistency.
I'm sure there's a real world out there and reality can only be fundamental to my own existence. However, it seems we're not only real beings but also that we would need to know our actual nature if we were to discuss meaningfully whether we're actually free. As it is, I don't have any rationale for even feeling confident we know our own nature. I certainly don't. So, your "actually free" is just a metaphysical idea, and one again that's inconsistent as I've just explained. Against your metaphysics, I have actual knowledge. I actually know that I can do what I want, not all the time, if that can assuage you, but at least at the moment I'm doing it. In other words, even though ontology is fundamental, epistemology beats ontology: I don't know my own nature and therefore whether nature is deterministic or not. But I do know I can do what I want the moment I want it.
That should do.
EB

 

I suppose 'mind that has free will' is the cognitive analogy of 'brain in a vat'.

"What actual free will is" is meaningless, just like "what reality actually is" is also meaningless.

Both may or may not exist, but it's beyond our reach to know.

The best we can do - whether the world is physical or whether it is fed to us through wires - is to proceed on what we observe to be consistently the case. We gain no supplemental knowledge about the world by trying to answer the question 'is this real'?

Likewise, the best we can do - whether free will is "truly free" (whatever that means) or whether our thoughts are constrained by our biochemical nature - is to proceed on what we observe to be consistently the case. We gain no supplemental knowledge by trying to answer the question 'do I have "truly" free will'?

Like with all things, we have no way to know what is "true"; we can only observe and form working theories and move forward with those theories until and unless they are falsified.

In other words:
- we proceed with examining our world as if it is real. For all intents and purposes (except philosophical), it is.

- we proceed with behaving as free-willed as if it is true. For all intents and purposes (except philosophical), it is.

I guess that's a long-winded way of saying it's a purely philosophical question.

 

If that's what you understand and you're happy with that, great. Noone is saying it's wrong. Others just start with different perspectives.

How is it inconsistent to think of being free as being able to do otherwise?

I can't initially see why determinism should preclude knowledge, but perhaps you can enlighten me?

I think you have mistaken me for someone who says my view is the only view one can legitimately have. I think you've also confused me with someone who hasn't been stressing how the view one takes on free will is merely a matter of perspective, neither view (compatibilist or incompatibilist) any less correct than the other once you take into consideration what is meant by the terms each side use in their arguments.

I've never said we do know. But thanks for the strawman. The argument is if the universe is deterministic (or probabilistic - and evidence suggests it is probabilistic). If you don't think it is either then great, you can ignore the argument from that point on. If you don't know whether it is deterministic or not and don't want to explore the case of if it is then don't. Move on.

If the universe is deterministic then it is inescapable, regardless of what you think. If the universe is probabilistic then that, too, is inescapable, regardless of what you think, regardless of what your prima facie evidence might suggest.
But if you think that we can't possibly know what the universe ultimately is, that's great. If you think that the argument from determinism is thus unsound then that's great. But if you don't think the universe is deterministic, either strictly or probabilistically, then what do you think it is? If you are agnostic on the matter, that's fine. The deterministic argument still explores the deterministic scenario. If you want to reject it as a possibility because you dislike the conclusion, that's your call.

How so? Care to cite an example?

Alas, you haven't actually explained anything, but rather just stated your position.

If you think you have actual knowledge that you can do what you want it is because the definitions of the terms you have used to express that allow that to be the case. If you start from different views of what those words mean, you can end up with different conclusions.

But I need to ask again: why do you bother posting responses to someone who has no issue with your view (and I really don't), and you clearly have no interest in the position they're exploring, in the notion of the terms they are using? There are surely easier ways to get your post-count up?