Platonic Realism Debates about realism are generally about universals, numbers and mathematical concepts, and propositions. For example: 1) Universals: "A universal is something which is conceived as common to many things, something that is or may be attributed to many things in our judgements, something that is conceived as common to all the members of a class" e.g. "Triangularity" is a universal (and a form) applicable to all triangles. 2) Numbers or mathematical concepts: The truth of 2+2=4 or the Pythagorean theory or the number 55 are mathematical entities and/or numbers. 3) Propositions: Logical statements which are true or false irrespective of whether we exist or not. For example, it is true that it is impossible to get a "Married bachelor" or a "square triangle" and it is true that two circles of equal diameters are equal. The story goes that Socrates famously challenged the Sophists of Athens by constantly asking them "what is justice?", "what is good?", "what is right?" etc. as he was seeking the essence or nature of these concepts and not just some sophist's subjective opinion. Plato developed his Theory of Forms. A Form from Plato's point of view is just an essence or a nature, the sort Socrates was looking for. For example, to know the nature of justice is to know just what distinguishes it from everything else that is not justice and this is just to know the Form of Justice. Several questions then arise for example: A) What kind of thing is a Form? B) How does one know it? C) Is it some physical object that is observable through our senses? D) Is it just something subjective and just something we pick up from the use of language? E) Where does it exist? How a person answers these questions plays role in determining what kind of realist a person is. Take the example of a triangle. Consider the fact that in the universe there exist several triangles e.g. one drawn on a chalk board, one drawn on a piece of paper, on a computer screen. Some are large, some are scalene, some are equilateral, some are red, some are black etc. For Plato, the essence or nature of a triangle is something that distinguishes it from everything else and in this case it is just three connected straight lines to form a closed plane figure. This is "triangularity". It is something that is universal to every particular instance of a triangle. However, every particular physical triangle is going to have some sort of feature that is not part of its essence, for example, it might be red, or badly drawn, or some other kind of imperfection. Physical triangles also come into existence and go out of existence and change in other ways (for example colour). The argument goes as follows: 1) Our senses discover physical things. 2) Our intellects are capable of grasping the essence or nature of things (for example triangularity). 3) But every particular physical thing has an imperfection that is not part of its nature. 4) The essence of triangularity stays the same and is simultaneously universal to all triangles, but physical triangles change and have imperfections. 5) A physical thing cannot simultaneously exist in many physical things. 6) Therefore an essence or nature is not something physical or material, but non-physical or immaterial. From a Platonic view the first three questions are thus: A) A Form is an immaterial thing B) One can know a Form via the intellect and not the senses. C) No, it is an intellectual abstraction. A further argument is that that Forms are not subjective and not mere cultural or mental inventions, but brute, objective facts. It is not a subjective opinion that the Pythagorean theorem is true or mere subjective mental phenomena that triangles are just three connected straight lines to form a closed plane figure. Plato was a realist and argued that essences are real and objectively true irrespective of whether we think about them or not (answer to question D). From this it is argued that Forms are not physical (they are immaterial), they are not mere subjective mental inventions, but have an existence separate from the mental and the physical. Platonists refer to this abstract existence as the "third realm" (answer to question E). Ultra- or extreme-realism is the term given to realists who follow Plato's idea of this "third realm". Any Platonic realists around?
Extreme Mathematical Realism Max Tegmark promotes a kind of realism that has been described as Extreme Mathematical Realism or Mathematical Monism. From wiki: As the articles states, Tegmark seems to go further than Plato's ultra-realism by postulating that numbers and/or numerical entities are real physical entities and that reality JUST IS a physical mathematical structure. Plato's three realms seem to collapse into one physical, mathematical realm. The answers to these questions (as asked here): A) What kind of thing is a Form? B) How does one know it? C) Is it some physical object that is observable through our senses? D) Is it just something subjective and just something we pick up from the use of language? E) Where does it exist? ... are thus something as follows: A) A physical, mathematical entity. B) By sensing it. C) Yes. D) It is an objective and mathematically physical object i.e it has objective existence or it is an objective fact. E) In the mathematically physical universe. Any extreme mathematical realists around?
Moderate Realism Moderate realism is the view taken by Aristotelians and Scholastics. Like Platonic ultra-realists, modest realists agree that forms are real and have an objective existence irrespective of what we intellectually apprehend (answer to D). Platonic realists affirm that these forms have an abstract and real existence distinct from our intellects and that they exist apart from the world revealed to us by our senses. They exist in a "third realm" and constitute what is in fact the only real world and the world we perceive is but a shadow. In contrast, moderate realists affirm that a form (a kind of universal) is something that is common to many things and fundamentally present and inherent in the concrete objects (or substances) of our senses (answer to A and C). Universals on this view exist formally in the intellect and has a foundation in the objects of our experience. Contra Platonic realism, universals only have their reality in the individuals. In other words, a form (being a kind of universal) is a fundamental part of a substance (like prime matter is fundamental part of a substance) but abstracted apart from the a substance it is merely an intellectual abstraction or only exists as an object of the intellect. The answers to these questions (as asked here): A) What kind of thing is a Form? B) How does one know it? C) Is it some physical object that is observable through our senses? D) Is it just something subjective and just something we pick up from the use of language? E) Where does it exist? ... are thus something as follows: A) A form is a universal that exists formally in the intellect and fundamentally present and inherent in the concrete objects of our senses. B) One can know a form via the intellect as a result of the observation of particular concrete substances. C) No, it is an object of the intellect. D) It is an objective extra-mental reality. E) It exists as an object in our intellect that has a foundation in the objects of our experience. These, in a nutshell, are a few kinds of realism. A few links for those interested to learn more about moderate realism: Ontology, or, The theory of being; an introduction to general metaphysics The science of logic; an inquiry into the principles of accurate thought and scientific method (vol 1) The science of logic; an inquiry into the principles of accurate thought and scientific method (vol 2) Principles of logic Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide Real Essentialism Any moderate realists around?
Realism with regards to the question asked in this thread is generally about universals, numbers and mathematical concepts, and propositions. For example: 1) Universals: "A universal is something which is conceived as common to many things, something that is or may be attributed to many things in our judgements, something that is conceived as common to all the members of a class" e.g. "Triangularity" is a universal (and a form) applicable to all triangles. 2) Numbers or mathematical concepts: The truth of 2+2=4 or the Pythagorean theory or the number 55 are mathematical entities and/or numbers. 3) Propositions: Logical statements which are true or false irrespective of whether we exist or not. For example, it is true that it is impossible to get a "Married bachelor" or a "square triangle" and it is true that two circles of equal diameters are equal. The story goes that Socrates famously challenged the Sophists of Athens by constantly asking them "what is justice?", "what is good?", "what is right?" etc. as he was seeking the essence or nature of these concepts and not just some sophist's subjective opinion. Plato developed his Theory of Forms. A Form from Plato's point of view is just an essence or a nature, the sort Socrates was looking for. For example, to know the nature of justice is to know just what distinguishes it from everything else that is not justice and this is just to know the Form of Justice. Several questions then arise for example: A) What kind of thing is a Form? B) How does one know it? C) Is it some physical object that is observable through our senses? D) Is it just something subjective and just something we pick up from the use of language? E) Where does it exist? How a person answers these questions plays role in determining what kind of realist a person is. A Platonic Realist would answer as described here. Roger Penrose can be argued to be a Platonic realist. An extreme mathematical realist would answer as described here. Max Tegmark can be argued to be an extreme mathematical realist. A modest realist would answer as described here. Aristotle was a moderate realist. Anti-realists generally deny the existence of mind-independent numbers, universals and propositions. Conceptualists for example think they are real but they only exist in the mind. Nominalists on the other hand deny that they are even real and that the numbers and universals and propositions we as humans intellectually abstract by observing reality are meaningless and does not signify anything real. Are you a realist? If so, what kind (feel free to describe your own kind if these three views do not fit your view)? Feel free to explain why.
techne ignore the trolls and welcome to sci yes seems like that is frowned upon in phil no matter. free thoughts can be your home less fragile egos to contend with and whatnot
Sheesh, they don't even like to do homework for others Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image!Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! j/k. Oh well, I tried to improve on the form and dampen my enthusiasm. Now after all the threads have been merged I am afraid the form might be lost and discussions might go awry since it is probably too wide in scope. There is always hope I guess Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image!. Have fun.
Hmm...I haven't heard of this "Ideal Form" thing that Plato had in mind. Seems a bit silly, arguing that something you can neither see, measure, nor quantify has absolute existence. Err...well, considering my Paganism...I guess it's not something I find conducive, anyway. We will never be exploring space and find an Ideal Triangle, in other words. Or Nuit, holding the sky up, for that matter.
Plato's Forms are just the nature or essence of something, whether they are "Ideal" seems irrelevant as far as I understand. Plato did speak of an "Ideal state" as in a kind of government (ideal government) though. I stand to be corrected of course.
Plato's atomos (indivisible parts or particles) where mathematical objects or regular geometrical solids. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atomism-ancient/#3 http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/timaeus.htm
There are active realist/antirealist debates about many other things as well. Scientific realism about hypothetical theoretical entities like quarks or strings, about scientific 'laws', and so on. Antirealists have argued that these kind of things are just human-constructed conceptual conveniences for organizing our experience. Common-sense realism about objects like stones and the tables and the chairs. Their reality is denied by theories of perception that insist that what we really perceive are internal representations. Modal realism about whether unactualized possibilities are real in some sense. Ethical realism about the objective reality of good and evil. Aesthetic realism about whether beauty or artistic merit actually resides in a work of art or whether they are things that viewers project into it. I'm kind of attracted to a Platonic realism about numbers and perhaps more elaborate mathematical stuctures, in some of my moods at least. But I'm not 100% committed to it, and lean towards nominalism in some of my other moods. But I'm rather skeptical about the way that Plato extended his understanding of number into a paradigm for how he understood pretty much any general term. I'm not convinced that there's an ideal abstract form of 'cow' out there anywhere. There are just lots of individual cows that all share a family resemblance to one another.
Strangely enough, this might be the most "realistic" hope for quantitative metaphysics, IF Tegmark is referring to some kind of instantiation as higher dimensional structures. But OTOH, the fact that experience / perception is limited to three dimensions and a temporal flux might truly be the result of any extra degrees of freedom literally being abstract and non-spatial: Only of a purely intelligible, virtual, or nomological nature (engendering effects without ever being concrete circumstances or "objects" themselves). That is, I've never quite bought into the idea that extra dimensions would be hidden from us purely because they are curled-up micro or ultra-macro spaces. I doubt that we could sense them or their supposed content as an exhibited phenomenal hyperspace even if it were otherwise (slices of a tesseract [etc.] might arguably be perceived -- those effects translated into experiences -- but not a whole, higher abstract geometry manifested to us as such).
I kind of like the Sophists, though unfortunately few of their writings survive today. We mostly know them through the eyes of their opponents, like Plato. My suspicion is that Socrates might have been a lot closer to the Sophists than we think. It's hard to know today whether that kind of essentialism was Socrates' idea or Plato's. It seems to be kind of a hypostization, an ontologizing, of a particular kind of view of word meaning. Yes. All kinds of questions arise. Which might have pleased Socrates, who seems to have been a lot better at asking questions than answering them. (The prototypical philosopher!) Platonic realism is probably most convincing when it's applied to mathematical objects. At least it is for me. Mathematical entities do seem to have properties that are discovered, not created. Some mathematical properties are very unexpected and counterintuitive. So it seems to (maybe) follow that mathematical entities have some kind of independent being. What's more, if physics is inherently mathematical, and if physics applies to the universe even when we aren't looking at it, that seems to suggest that mathematical properties exist independently of us. Yeah, that's the Platonic argument. As I said, I lean towards Platonic realism in mathematics, at least some of the time in some of my moods. It seems to be very plausible in mathematics. I can't really follow Plato though, when he tries to extend this kind of analysis from mathematics to the meaning of just about every general noun. There may still be some plausibility (though I'm very skeptical) in the case of qualia terms like 'red'. 'Red' doesn't seem to possess the kind of discoverable qualities that 'triangle' does. It doesn't seem to enter into intersubjectively objective relationships and proofs in the same way. The plausibility of Platonic realism continues to drop off in the case of general terms like 'cow'. I think that cows, as a species, are a collection of creatures that all display a family resemblance, due to their evolutionary origins. But I doubt very much whether there's any transcendental essence of cow that they are all "participating" in. It may very well be the case that there isn't any single thing that all cows share and that's unique only to cows, which is at least partially definitive of 'cow'. So it seems that I've slid over into nominalism for cows. There are also the kind of abstract terms that Socrates asked so many questions about -- 'good', 'beauty', 'love', 'truth', 'justice', 'democracy'. I'm inclined to give these the same kind of analysis that I gave the cows. I don't think that there's any perfect transcendental essence of any of these things. Instead, they are words that have all kinds of uses in this and other societies. And those usages are bound together by family resemblance just as the cows are.
