Why is this all about me, all of a sudden?
Because it's your post I'm responding to?
Honestly, I would expect you capable of figuring that out; sorry to treat you so poorly in that regard.
No, really: Look at the topic title. You chose to respond. You chose to offer
your thoughts. Why is this about you? Because it's your post. "All of a sudden"? Okay, then; whatever you say, James.
Anecdotally: The other day I happened to be talking to a friend who said this weird bit about the oughts of educated people being able to talk about something without getting triggered, and while I admit what stood out in the moment was this guy who always pretends that he isn't this or that manner of politic, but seemingly can't fail to read off antithetical screeds as if by rote; it was easy to focus on the word trigger, since he really was. But something else stands out as I recall it, an intersecting vector I know exists as a potential: Ostensibly educated people, without a known language limitation or facultative reason accounting certain miscommunication, utterly failing to grasp the obvious. I have long borrowed Spock's analysis, that they are either unable or unwilling. In the long history of things, sure, some behavior becomes habitual and just is, and sometimes it looks very much, to the point that Ockham and LaPlace aren't just drinking but competing, like a willful effort suggestive, over the course of years, of dysfunction—
i.e., an appearance of psychological inability resulting from habituation of deliberate will, including ego defense and the ossification thereof.
To the one, it's perfectly human behavior. To the other is the question of how to address the circumstance when confronted with such behavior. We might wonder what constitutes a
pretty mystery.
Why is it about you? Because it's
your post. Because it's a strange, gloss post. Because the point at hand, that you still let theists lead you around by the nose, is actually relevant. To wit, I just searched the term,
anti-identification, under my own, and not only can I see the term emerge in my posts in late 2001, and in 2002 I explicitly used the term in reference to atheistic discourse at Sciforums; it's a classic tumbleweed or cricket moment.
A little over
fourteen years ago↗, you can find me pitching a version of your line:
• I do wonder about the [atheistic] anti-identification at that point. Something suggests it's not worth putting up with Christian arrogance and anti-communication. But religious issues quite obviously still insert themselves into otherwise-rational considerations of the human endeavor, and tend to screw things up. Atheists have a vested interest in understanding the religions nearest them, yet find no help from the faithful in that quest.
The difference 'twixt then and now is a certain lack of difference. Consider:
Your accusation that I don't think for myself is just your opinion, and a rather typical kind of back-handed insult that you like to hand out to people.
Anti-identification seems to be all anyone has left in these discussions. If the question is what we know about what we (pretend to) discuss, the answer seems to be, approximately, that we discuss it.
There is, of course, inherent comparison in the underlying question, but we also see outright rejection of knowledge, information, evidence, or however we might go about it: "What's all this esoteric knowledge that's supposed to make a shit-ton of difference to the basic question?"
asks one of our neighbors↑, and sure, people liked that point, but there are a couple vagaries to resolve. What, for instance, is the basic question; and from there we might simply point out that, sure,
some of the historical record is esoteric, but not all of it.
The question of the basic question stands out. We do get some definition on that point, and also a hint after what this all really comes down to. Again, see
#9↑ above; this time our neighbor makes an important point: "There is nothing about rejecting the idea of God that prevents sexist, racism, or knee-jerk irrational tribalism."
One thing that happens in rational discourse is that affirmative arguments are subject to scrutiny, while anti-identification flees such consideration. The rejection of the idea of God is what it is, and if that is all there is then no wonder people don't know how to discuss religion except as a political—and, therefore,
class—struggle. Uninformed class struggle is prejudice, and obstinate or intolerant devotion thereunto is, pretty much by definition, bigotry.
Rejection of the idea of God. Good for them.
Last year I botched the Nativity; I wasn't paying close enough attention when rattling off an annoyed line. That was embarrassing. Not long ago, one of our neighbors fired off an easy line that says what it says by its colloquial formulation, but would be principally read, according to its words, as asserting or acknowledging the historicity of a particular person, which would be a tremendous change compared to the current resolution of the historical record. Whoops. Those bits, subjected to scrutiny, fell apart for the easy point that the historical record we have is the historical record we have, which in turn is as axiomatic and tautological as it is useless, but it is actually a fact. The record I have informs me I was reading the fandom into the original script; our neighbor knows well we would have heard about it if the record turned up actual proof of a particular individual.
But if we return to what the one said, that nothing about rejecting the idea of God prevents sexist, racism, or knee-jerk irrational tribalism, this is really, really important. One need not be Anarchist to want to break certain historical cycles; failing to learn just means repeating the disaster. But if the point of the revolution is just to play King of the Hill, as such, then, no, nothing is going to get better.
Looking back fourteen years, we see an inquiry that becomes, over time, a description of amorphous neurotic conflict,
i.e., fear.
†
Certain word games I have encountered recently only reinforce notions of tribalism. Again, that another is wrong does not mean one is right, so we might consider an example of A being wrong because of B, but B itself being wrong as well. Insisting on a modern definition of an English-language word, neither of which existed at the time a record was originally recorded, in order to skip past defining themes cultural and linguistic, is not an exercise conducive to rational thought or discourse. Nor is rational discourse the purpose of these word games. That much, generally speaking, is obvious. One recent version went with cynical insistence on an English-language result insisting on a politically-framed definition of a Greek rendering of a phrase long-known in two other languages in the same damn book, and since-used without anybody really having any trouble understanding what it meant; the question wasn't really much for an inquiry, but it sure did depict religious people as really, really stupid, and, well, y'know, that is, by Ockham, the most likely explanation of purpose.
The problem is that affirmative argument requires having a modicum of a clue, and some people just can't be bothered with such distractions from purpose. After all, what about theists, or, y'know, whatever.
†
One of the longtime ways of looking at the question is according to the prospect of conversion,
e.g.,
#18↑ above. Over the course of years, here, the prospect of converting a religious person to atheism has generally been a what-if; the greater purpose seems to be complaint, condemnation, and denigration.
A little over fourteen years, maybe, but how about
a little over eight↗?
• A question that I sometimes put before atheists: If you were to witness the conversion of a Christian away from faith, what moral structures could you advise him toward in order to fill the void where God once existed? After all, to turn one's back on God is to forsake the linchpin of a moral configuration. How does one replace that structure? How does one define moral priorities, or arrange moral components? What is the foundation for understanding the difference between right and wrong, once God's say-so is no longer valid?
One would think the question would be easy enough to recognize. True, it's a tough one to answer. But I've encountered surprising resistance from my atheistic neighbors to even acknowledging the question. It's almost as if their response to, "Because God says so," is, "Because I say so."
And it is a tough one to answer. Basic acknowledgment can be found in the record, and even here in this thread, but if the larger effect we might observe is the state of atheistic discourse at Sciforums, it is unfair to say things haven't changed over the years; they've gone downhill. But Hitchens is gone, Dawkins is, well, Dawkins, and Sullivan has been busy elsewise; the number of publicity stunt videos worth reposting is its own question; the dearth of original study and thought stands out. By the time we get to asking theists to say something so you can tell them they're wrong, your identity politic apparently
needs them. One does not think for self when proposing another say what one should think in order that one might protest by rote. It's a tough answer, which is why they flee and hurl stones.