I would argue that the example does not show "free agency" or "free choice" but rather just "agency" and "choice". And if one defines "free will" along the lines of the ability to select between different possible outcomes that were more than counterfactual examples of such, then Frankfurt's example above doesn't show that such a free will exists. What it does show, and I tend to be in aligned, is that moral responsibility could be considered compatible with a deterministic universe (in which everything is predetermined and nothing is able to do otherwise). Does this mean that freewill (as defined above) exists? No, I don't think so. Maybe it's a half-way house between the compatabilist and incompatabilist... the view that at least moral responsibility is compatible with a deterministic universe where there is no ability to do otherwise, even if free will isn't considered compatible. I've certainly never adhered to the incompatabilist view that moral responsibility is not possible in a deterministic universe.