In the example, whose choice was it to vote Democrat, if not Fred's? Explain to me why Fred's choice was not, therefore, "free" from Dr Brain's influence. Now, extend the example. Replace Dr Brain by the deterministic laws of physics. Does that straight substitution now mean that somebody/something other than Fred decided to vote Democrat, so that Fred's choice is not "free"? It seems to me that you can't say on the one hand that Fred's choice was "free" of Dr Brain and on the other hand say that it was not free due to the laws of physics. If you think you can, you need to explain what the relevant point of distinction is. But Fred did select among different possibilities: whether he would vote Democrat or Republican. We agreed that he made the choice, do we not? If not him, then who or what? Right, because moral responsibility is predicated on the ability to do otherwise. It would be wrong to hold people responsible for actions taken under duress. Doesn't that suggest to you that maybe your definition of what free will means is screwy? No. This is the heart of the question. If a person's actions are "free", then they are morally accountable for them. Do you agree? If they are not free, but rather are controlled or determined by external factors, then they cannot be held morally responsible for them. You seem to want to define the word "free" in "free will" to mean something other than a person being morally accountable for his actions. Specifically, you want to define "free" to require that a person's actions be undetermined, and the only way that can be is if they are supernatural (or governed by some hypothetical non-deterministic process nobody knows about). Recall once again that we're talking about the freedom that people have, not the universe as a whole. We aren't asking if the universe is morally responsible, or the atoms or the laws of physics. We're asking if people have free will. If you think we don't have free will, then why would you hold anybody responsible for his actions? Incompatibilities hold the view that the compatibilist position can't establish the existence of any genuine free will. At best, the incompatibilists would say, we observe an "illusion" of free will. As far as I can tell, this is exactly your position.