Working [lab] scientists can't be expected to have a familiarity, background, or interest in the issues debated in philosophy of science; and accordingly a concern about the support for or inter-consistency of a particular view and argument if they did so rigorously hold such to begin with. That could even be the case with most theoretical physicists, though that degree of apathy may seem a stretch. Robert Crease once conducted a poll of physicists (in general) over at physicsweb.org, regarding their stances about realism. This was provoked by John Polkinghorne having claimed that scientists were overwhelmingly critical realists like himself. In many cases, after receiving their responses, Crease had to interpret what their positions were, since some lacked a formal understanding of or classification for what they held. Some had never even scrutinized before the territory they were being asked about: Robert Crease... "Still more significantly, a large fraction of respondents cannot be classified as critical realists because they recognized, while answering the poll, that their answers were philosophically indeterminate. Indeed, the most heart-warming letter I received said: 'At the end of [your original] article, you said that a low response will indicate either that you have no readership or that scientists don't care about the issues raised. After 48 hours of discussions we have to suggest a third category - those who would like to reply but in attempting to answer the questionnaire have found their *gut* philosophical position to be wholly inadequate and inconsistent.' Her poll, too, was blank - but it seemed a product of a sensitivity to the seriousness and significance of philosophical issues rather than a repudiation of them." After presenting a common quote of Einstein's about how the scientist appeared to be an "unscrupulous opportunist" to the philosopher, Crease elaborated further: "...Einstein implied that one need not have a consistent philosophical position to be a good scientist. Philosophers may suppose that scientists, being rigorous and conceptually savvy, must have fully worked out positions. Scientists, meanwhile, may assume that the views they hold about reality correspond to the positions that philosophers have found to be the most rational. But fully articulated positions are only for those being needlessly rigorous and consistent. "Furthermore, it would be difficult to translate everyday assumptions into such positions, just as it would be difficult to translate an average person's political and religious views directly into a systematic political programme or theology. Even philosophers may not commit themselves to worked-out positions, for philosophers are less holders of positions than examiners of them. Nevertheless, as in politics and theology, a position does not need unconditional subscribers for there to be value in formulating and examining it."