I don't exist

At least you acknowledge it

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Cogito ergo sum.

I think, therefore I am.

Accordingly, you must exist, as I am thinking you do - and as such, you must exist, at the bare minimum, in intellectus.

Whether I can prove you exist in physical existence is another thing all together. As you are presumably not a necessary being, I cannot deduce your existence from first principles. I can, however, point to the fact that, as noted, a non-existent thing cannot type. Whether you are human, sapient, or whatever, I cannot say.

 

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Maybe he's referring to the fact that the self is not what we experience it to be.
But rather the result of complex biochemical and electrical processes of specific brain structures.

 

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Enmos:

Regardless of the foundation for our experience of a self, our self retains all phenomenological consequences of it. Accordingly, there is nothing "at stake".

 

What are these phenomenological consequences ?

 

Enmos:

First person perspective and qualia, primarily.

 

Ah ok, I guess I agree then. Although I'm left guessing about the 'there is nothing at stake' bit, but no matter what that should hold.

 

Enmos:

Nothing substantially would differ in one's experience whether one has an immaterial mind or a mind emergent from or consisting of matter so long as the phenomenological content is kept the same.

If all of a sudden you start saying "consciousness as experienced doesn't exist" (a ludicrous proposition) then we have a problem.

You get into different things at stake when you talk about how dualism is far more open to the idea of spiritual life after death.

 

Enlighten me ?

 

Enmos:

If one were to deny conscious experience (I.E. the phenomenonological content of consciousness) then one would be faced with someone with a mind v. someone with a mind. That would be a substantial difference.

The proposition is ludicrous because we are eminently aware and in direct perception to our consciousness. One cannot deny that we are conscious non-facetiously and validly.

 

I am not denying that we are conscious, I am saying that what we experience of it (being conscious) does not include the underlying processes.
Hence people often tie it to some sort of divine whatever.

 

It seems like you are making the assertion that people have beliefs in the divine because they are not conscious of the process underlying consciousness.

Could you back this up. Also could you show how you concluded this was the source of all religious beliefs, if it is the case that you believe this.

 

I am not saying that, but ignorance of the fact seems to be a factor with people today.
All you have to do is skim the threads in philosophy and religion.

 

Enmos:

Which is a perfectly fine position. But pragmatically speaking, the difference between the two hypotheses is null so long as the conscious experience is retained.

That is to say, whether we have a chemical and material brain producing a mind or a a mind brought out of a mind substance, so long as they both produce the same thing, is a subject which is entirely useless as such. It is one of interest, of course, and I am not going to William James the debate, but I am just saying that it lacks "stake" and it has nothing to do with the question "do I exist?".

For the sake of honesty, I'm a property dualist/emergent materialist.

 

Ok, let me explain.

"I" is "the self".
If the self is 'just' the product of complex biochemicla and electrical processes of particular structures in the brain, then the self is not experienced as it really is. It, as an independent something, does not exist.
Maybe an analogy with a computer game is relevant. We experience the computer game, for instance a racing game, as a car the we can manipulate etc.
In reality however the game is nothing more than code.

So in a sense we can say that the self does not exist, at least not as the independent something we experience.

 

Enmos:

You Kantian kookamunga, you.

Water is made up of H2O. Do we experience it incorrectly by relating it to a blue-tinged non-flavoured liquid that quenches our thirst? Or are we appreciating its sensory perceptions? Does it make sense to refer to water as "not existing" because we do not appreciate it as H20 in experience?

If it doesn't make sense, then clearly we must admit of consciousness being validly experienced as conscious awareness. Moreover, if the properties of consciousness are emergent, understanding it as neurons and a soup of chemicals and fats would be to not appreciate the effects which stand above and beyond the parts. Accordingly, the charge that the reality of the brain is being ignored would be placed squarely on the neuroscientist. A position which I'd say that Frank Jackson in his famous "Mary's Room Argument" is tacitly supporting.

 

I can see you have been away for a while

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Yes, in fact, we do not experience water as it really is. We can't.
Water exists though, but it is impossible to experience the essence (for lack of better words) of water. Our senses and interpretations won't allow it.

 

Enmos:

So you would say our perceptions of water do not matter whatsoever to its essential nature?

Well, let us ask this: If those properties only emerge at a certain state, are we not appreciating water on a level which cannot be appreciated at its prior level?

The same thing with consciousness: Opening up a brain will not reveal a person. But being that brain will make one that person.

As such, these emergent qualities are real and perhaps even "higher" in terms of experience - especially when everything meaningful in consciousness, at the very least, is found in experiencing consciousness.

 

No, I'm saying that our perceptions are based on objective reality.
But at the same time objective reality cannot be perceived as it really is.
Our senses do not pick up everything, our brain interprets sensory data according to acquired experience and knowledge, and also differently depending on the situation.

Can you rephrase that please ?

Being that brain means you were that person all along..

I don't think I agree with this but I'll await your rephrasing of the second part of this post

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Enmos:

So basically you're making the pseudo-Kantian claim that the structure of the mind imposes a certain degree on the picture of reality we gain, yes?

Well let me throw a bit of an inductive argument your way:

1. An inaccurate picture of the world would be ill-condusive to survival.
2. Life, especially human life, has a picture of the world.
3. Life, especially human life, is good at surviving.
4. Ergo, the picture of the world is likely accurate within reasonable limitations.

As such, we may admit a certain discrepancy between "world as seen" and "world as is" but reduce that discrepancy, again, to virtually nothing. We also experience qualities which we would be unable toe xperience if we focused purely on the atomic structure, for instance.

Presumably many of the qualities of water do not exist on an extremely microscopic state. A single molecule of water is unlikely to be thirst-quenching blue-tinged liquid. But a "heap" of these molecules will be. As such, we get an emergent property. Or even if we allow a single molecule ofw ater to have all its emergent properties, we still have something beyond the atoms involved.

Tentatively agreed.