Is it possible to think without language?

I found arguments for an against also, which makes me think that some think without language more than others as for me, I require no proof. I know I think without language (not always of course) and Absane says the same. So maybe some do and some don't?

 

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In order to resolve the discrepancies in details which now lead to disagreement, we should do well to define (even in general terms) what is meant by 'think'.

It is very clear to me, from the evidence of feral children, that the answer is a resounding yes. There is anthropological evidence for this, including the material theoryofrelativity suggested (but I am not familiar myself with the book).

Does a venus flytrap think?

 

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Only conscious beings are able to think. Anything that has a conscious awareness is capable of thought. Not necessarily involving language, or pictures, or anything. Thought can come in abstract forms free from any human-defined structure.

 

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Can there be any empirically verifiable evidence of this? And if not, is there any line of reasoning to support this? It is difficult to say where consciousness begins and where consciousness is not. I would argue that it is not demonstrable that anyone you know of is conscious (especially in the sense in which you understand the word).

You might be thinking anyhow that this is a philosopher's stubborness so I will ask you: do you know which physiognomic faculties are related to giving you your conscious knowledge. It is safe to say the computer screen has no part in this but I am even more curious to know what you think. Anyway, my point was that venus flytraps can also "trap and snare their own food" and yet most people (very anthropocentrically, I must add) do not consider this to be an example of 'reasoned thought'. That is fine with me. But where is the empirical justification for such an assumption? Is there any, apart from anthropocentrism?

For if we say that it's an axiom that 'only conscious beings are able to think' (so that I don't question it), you have not specified any criterion for determining conscious beings and so how can we then know which beings are "capable of thought" according to the axiom?

 

This is a topic for invert nexus

 

These are some theories on the effect of language on thought

* The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in linguistics states that the structure of one's mother-tongue influences the way one's mind perceives the world. It has found at best very limited experimental support, at least in its strong form. For instance, a study showing that speakers of languages lacking a subjunctive mood such as Chinese experience difficulty with hypothetical problems has been discredited. However, another study has shown that subjects in memory tests are more likely to remember a given color if their mother language includes a word for that color.

* According to Cognitive therapy, founded by Aaron T. Beck, our emotions and behavior are caused by our internal dialogue. We can change ourselves by learning to challenge and refute our own thoughts, especially a number of specific mistaken thought patterns called "cognitive distortions". Cognitive therapy has been found to be effective by empirical studies.

* In behavioral economics, according to experiments said to support to the theoretical availability heuristic, people believe more probable events that are more vividly described than those which were not. Simple experiments asking people to imagine something led them to believe it to be more likely. The mere exposure effect may also be relevant to propagandistic repetition like the Big Lie. According to prospect theory, people make different economic choices based on how the matter is framed.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Language_and_thought

 

Theoryofrelativity:

"There are many people who don't have language for one reason or another, are you suggesting they do not think? I can recall my early thoughts before I had language and they were in terms of 'feelings' and impressions of what was occurring. I don't speak to my self either when I think, I think now without language. Thinking with language is extraordinarily slow. "

Precisely.

Chatha:

"Language comes in many forms- symbols, numbers,letters, you name it. Its basically a representation of pattern. Thinking without language is NOT even thinking at all. Anybody that manages to think without language is chaotic and belongs in the Psychiatry ward. "

You cannot think in terms pruely of images? Of sensations? Of imagings?

Theoryofrelativity:

Excellent commentary on Helen Keller and on new cognitive research.

RubiksMaster :

"A thought can come in numerous forms. It doens't have to be a "verbal" thought. Some of my thoughts are just a string of pictures or abstract ideas (sort of a low level awareness, really). Also, how can dogs or monkeys think, if they can't speak? Do they simply exist like machines? I think not."

Precisely.

"This is where you are wrong. It is the conveyance of a thought or idea that requires language. Simply having a thought requires no language. "

Yes.

Zephyr:

"It is incredible, but I'd imagine a lot of critical development can take place in the first 1.5 years. I haven't heard of what happens to people born blind and deaf; presumably they utilise neither language nor pictures for thinking... "

If they cannot think, how then can they communicate concepts and produce original thoughts in a way that is demonstratable?

samcdkey:

"I suppose their concept formation is different; based on touch and texture"

Precisely.

Theoryofrelativity:

""If you are very interested in this kind of cognitive development - it would be an excellent idea to find a copy of "The Wild Boy of Aveyron". Harlan Lane / Paperback / Published 1979. This boy was deprived of social contact from birth and survived for years in the wild. It became apparent that he acted and behaved as an animal. His ability to acquire and use language was irreversibly destroyed, and yet he possessed many characteristics which suggested a high level of intelligence. It's a thought provoking account.""

Fascinating.

leopold99:

"but in my opinion yes you can have thought without language.
my reasoning is thus:
the earliest cavemen had no language but yet they were able to hunt and trap and snare their own food, these actions require reasoned thought. "

Assuredly. As must animals have thought for their actions.

§outh§tar:

"Does a venus flytrap think? "

Is the action of closing its mouth reflexive?

That being said, as all live creatures have sensory preception, all must be able to think in part. Sensory preception being the foundation of thought and in order to react to it, one must have a type of consciousness, even if a dim one.

§outh§tar:

"Can there be any empirically verifiable evidence of this? And if not, is there any line of reasoning to support this? It is difficult to say where consciousness begins and where consciousness is not. I would argue that it is not demonstrable that anyone you know of is conscious (especially in the sense in which you understand the word)."

Indeed one can justify this statement through recourse to the fact that, were it not for conscious awareness, the capacity to have thought would not be present. For what is is an unperceived thought? And what is consciousness but the internal perception of thoughts both created and molded by itself and awareness of external stimuli as presented to the mind through the senses? And in the absence of such conscious awareness, do not we find the absence of a mind?

"You might be thinking anyhow that this is a philosopher's stubborness so I will ask you: do you know which physiognomic faculties are related to giving you your conscious knowledge. It is safe to say the computer screen has no part in this but I am even more curious to know what you think. Anyway, my point was that venus flytraps can also "trap and snare their own food" and yet most people (very anthropocentrically, I must add) do not consider this to be an example of 'reasoned thought'. That is fine with me. But where is the empirical justification for such an assumption? Is there any, apart from anthropocentrism?"

Was it necessary for Benjamin Franklin to understand the nature of electrons in order to discover the electrical qualities of lightning? Or did the ancients require a thorough understanding of photon exchange in order to appreciate the magnetic properties of the lodestone, or of the rubbing of amber with cloth? Indeed, were the physics of combustion necessary to be understood by primitive man in order that they might make fire? Surely not. Similarly, we can evaluate many aspects of consciousness without understanding the workings of the brain. For we are, if anything, more intimately experienced with consciousness than anything else, by virtue of primarily being conscious entities. For what is man but his mind? What is personhood by a mind?

"For if we say that it's an axiom that 'only conscious beings are able to think' (so that I don't question it), you have not specified any criterion for determining conscious beings and so how can we then know which beings are "capable of thought" according to the axiom? "

I propose that all beings with sensory preception are by necessity conscious. For if a being has sense, then there must be a senser, as it were, to appreciate the information and to act upon it. This can be found, moreover, in any volitional action, that cannot be accorded to a reflex by virtue of its complicated nature, nor to the following of the laws of nature. Even a rock may fall, but only a creature may jump.

 

If you can observe, you can think. If you can't think without language, clear a few things up for me. How can dogs be loyal? How can bears, cheetahs, and every animal that hunts tactically hunt? How can an orangutan use leaves as a cup? How can the red squirrel comprehend the process of making maple syrup? I'll conttinue when these are answered.

 

anyone bilingual? I think its a prime example of thinking in a pre-linguistic language, when you have more than one mother tongue, and still experience that tip of the tongue feeling. If you actually think in a spoken languange, how is it possible that you have a thought that you can't describe in words?

I'm not sure if that makes sense, it works for me though.

 

I'm not bilingual. However, as I have said I am a pure 100% visual thinker. I have the problem with not having the right word to describe something. I can "see" a connection between two things and I know exactly what kind of word I need.. but I don't know it. And I wouldn't know how to find it. Sometimes I get lucky and can make a work around but it's hard enough writing things for various things. I am a notoriously slow typer. I'll type half of a sentence and stop because I cannot think of how to finish it.

Pure verbal thinkers should not really have a problem with finding the words they need to say something, but they might have a problem with seeing the possibilities of a thought.

However, most people are a mix of the two. You'll find very few verbal-only thinkers and very few visual-only thinkers. We are born visual thinkers but language and schooling take away from that mode of thought... so most people end up being a mix of the two.

 

I hope you will see the seriousness of the circularity here. 'Without consciousness there would be no thought, and without thought, there would be no consciousness (in the sense that there would be no knowledge of consciousness)'

I must also be quick to point out that your last question about the absence of a mind follows from your circularity. What exactly are your criterion for determining the absence of a mind, for example?

I want to assure you that the parallels from Franklin and ancient man are unrelated to the mind: what is empirically observable in our milieu we find to be distinct from ourselves and our perceptions (empiricism again) are reinforced by the like observations of others. This is not the same with consciousness. No one but yourself (even you will agree) is experiencing what you are conscious of (at least let us assume so) or in other words, sharing your qualia. (Either way, even if someone was to be doing so, this would be unverifiable by definition). A neurophysiologist might uncover properties of the brain (or the mind, whatever that means) but his dependence is on empiricism and his weapons are the criterion of the scientific method. No one who has read my posts has of yet provided any of the criteria I asked for. What faculties, such as those of taste, touch, smell, etc, do we find to aid us in 'evaluating the many aspects of consciousness'? Are you aware of any? I suspect you are not. On what then, do tell, (save for speculation and assumption), can we base any positive statements about consciousness? The fact that others merely claim to be conscious? Absurd. The word is not given a meaning - why assume all parties are talking about the same thing?

Now that I have demonstrated that your premise that 'we are primarily conscious entities' is without empirical foundation (I suspect it is an assumption taken for granted), let us inspect in what manner a man might evaluate his own consciousness. In order to evaluate your consciousness, you must first know you are conscious (I think you will agree). What criteria do we use for this? Thought, you say. Let us accept that thought is ineffable; its process and quality cannot be described. This is a safe axiom.

Now I must ask you again, since you insist it is possible to 'evaluate' consciousness (I must admit that I don't know what exactly you meant by that phrase): Outside of thought, what 'reliable', 'intimate', empirical (or whatever you characterize it) way is there to 'evaluate' consciousness? I suspect you know of none. In that case, let us then infer that for every individual thought is the only nexus to consciousness. I might stop here and point out that we have reached the same brutal circularity of above but I am still curious and wish to explore the flaws of such reasoning.

I will ask you a few very simple questions. Judging from the confidence in thought and consciousness in your previous post, I expect they will be very easy for you to answer.

1) How do you know that you think?

If you say by thinking then you have reached circularity. If you say by consciousness then you have again reached circularity since you yourself have accepted that without thinking we cannot know we are conscious. If there is a third alternative, please state it. However, I suspect you know of none.

2) Let us assume that the circularity I highlighted briefly in response to the first part of your reply is not actually a fallacy (ie. I made a mistake). That is, there is no circularity in the two statements: You have to be conscious in order to think and Without thinking we cannot know we are conscious. I believe the latter statement is difficult for anyone to justify (although you are free to try to) but I must ask you to justify the former statement. Just how do you know that you have to be conscious in order to think?

Do you then accept that a venus flytrap is 'by necessity conscious'? Perhaps not; perhaps you are an anthropocentrist

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, and mean to say that only touch, taste, smell etc are to be considered 'senses'. In either case there is the ignominious contradiction involved in calling 'touch' a sense when speaking of humans but not in speaking of the venus flytrap.

Let us backout of your axiom "I propose that all beings with sensory preception are by necessity conscious" since this may lead to an uncomfortable (or merely a misanthropic) conclusion. Let us then ignore it and allow that volitional actions are properties of conscious beings. Of course, this leads to absurdity in the case of quadriplegia or some defect of the motor system. I must then ask you a very simple question:

What are your criterion for distinguishing 'volitional action'?

Note: This part of the exploration was meant to examine the notion that a venus flytrap might not be conscious. Let us instead accept that it is. That is, as you say, it has a 'dim consciousness'. I must ask you two very simple questions:

By what criterion can we distinguish gradations of consciousness such as the dimness of the faculty in venus flytraps as compared to 'normal/regular' consciousness in 'us'? And why?

I am also curious to know what criteria you distinguish between 'reflexive' and 'volitional' activity (you have implied a difference).

 

I think the reason some are having trouble accepting you can think without language is because as humans we have language. We have language thus we use it, so perhaps for some the natural ability to think without it has diminshed some what or they are unaware it takes place.

If we as humans were raised from birth wearing roller blades we may well be unaware of the process of walking on our own two feet, but that does not make it any less possible.

I can recall a series of thoughts from childhood before I had the language to describe it as I can describe it to you now. I require language to describe the story but not to feel it inside my head.

My father has made me a swing in the garden, it hangs from the branch of a tree. He has made one for my brother also. I am annoyed, very annoyed. My father who I consider stupid at this point has made me a swing too high for me to get on by myself and the seat is too wide for me to swing myself as I cannot bend my legs at the knee (you can tell I was very small!) thus I am frustarted as I always need help to enjoy this swing amnd help is not often available. My reaction to this swing at the time was mostly likely tears. My father would not have understood them and I could not explain them. The fact I can recall us this some 34 yrs+ later is that I was thinking about it all at the time, there would have been some rudements of language but not enough to convey my 'thoughts' on this matter verbally.

You do not need language to experience something, interpret it and forumlate (process of thinking) a response to it.

Language is not required for that.

If you do not consider that a process of thought can take place without using a learned language then you are perhaps missing a tool that will greatly assist you in 'thinking ' quicker, reading quicker and analysing data and problem solving quicker.

I admit that I am often accused of solving problems or knowing answers without giving any perceived time (as perceived by them)to consider the question. Yet when called upon to do so I can 100% explain where my answer came from and the problem solving that took place. What befuddles people is the speed, moments, as oppose to minutes or hours. This is perhaps becuase I do think without language and thus the process of problem solving is not slowed down by having to use syntax and grammar etc when thinking about things.


Try it.

(Impressive contributions from prince James and southstar - note from considerable research on this yesterday the jury really is out! hence IMO some recognise they can and do and some don't recognise they can and either don't or are unaware that they do )

 

Doesn't the fact that we can learn language suggest that we can think without using language?

 

of course

I only think with language when 'talking to myself' in my head by way of company. The rest of the time it is silent and rapid.

 

Theoryofrelativity,

A lot of this I already went over in a 12+ page debate on consciousness I had with water and invert_nexus and a host of other good posters a year ago (when sciforums used to be exciting!). So I'm pretty familiar with a lot of the assertions involved and how to shoot them down.

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I'll bring out some of my links on feral children later tomorrow, hopefully. The phenomenon of feral children is very important in anthropology; it helps us to understand important concepts of self and consciousness and intelligence from a challenging perspective. I might as well since there's little reason for anyone to still insist that thought without language is 'not possible'. So stay tuned for a derailment to consciousness and thought and eventually.. free will!

 

I shall look forward to that.

Meanwhile we are talking manily of what we understand to be conscious thought but what of unconscious thought. Hence your discussion eh on what is consciouness?

The unconscious thought that allows us to formulate a judgement of soemone wihtin an instant by reading various clues, a rapid process of thought without language and that we are not even consciously aware of? Non the less this is a thought process. An unconscious thought process.

Savants can perform mathematical problems without them being aware of any calculations taking place on their part, yet their brains are indeed calculating. The answer does not appear by magic. It is arrived at by a process of thought, subconscious thought.

Some can access this rapid unconscious thought tool and let it speak to their conscious mind no doubt to do with brain chemistry and structure of frontal lobes or something.

Hence your evaluation of what is consciousness and free will and whom is speaking to whom, conscious to subconscious or vice versa. Two minds in one body. Fascinating.

 

§outh§tar:

"I hope you will see the seriousness of the circularity here. 'Without consciousness there would be no thought, and without thought, there would be no consciousness (in the sense that there would be no knowledge of consciousness)'"

I never said that without thought there'd be no consciousness. Consciousness creates thought, perceives it, but is not thought fully. Consciousness may be considered the awareness of that thought and/or sensory stimuli and the thinker of thought, that is, the computator, the calculator, the concluder, the imaginer, et cetera. An individual thought is a product of the consciousness, but is not consciousness itself.

"I must also be quick to point out that your last question about the absence of a mind follows from your circularity. What exactly are your criterion for determining the absence of a mind, for example?"

To determine whether a mind is present, we must test:

1. For sensory awareness.

2. For actions done which cannot be exchanged for exertion of natural laws. I.E. to jump rather than to fall if disturbed by an exterior force.

Other tests, for intelligence and the like, can be made up, also.

"I want to assure you that the parallels from Franklin and ancient man are unrelated to the mind: what is empirically observable in our milieu we find to be distinct from ourselves and our perceptions (empiricism again) are reinforced by the like observations of others. This is not the same with consciousness. No one but yourself (even you will agree) is experiencing what you are conscious of (at least let us assume so) or in other words, sharing your qualia. (Either way, even if someone was to be doing so, this would be unverifiable by definition). A neurophysiologist might uncover properties of the brain (or the mind, whatever that means) but his dependence is on empiricism and his weapons are the criterion of the scientific method. No one who has read my posts has of yet provided any of the criteria I asked for. What faculties, such as those of taste, touch, smell, etc, do we find to aid us in 'evaluating the many aspects of consciousness'? Are you aware of any? I suspect you are not. On what then, do tell, (save for speculation and assumption), can we base any positive statements about consciousness? The fact that others merely claim to be conscious? Absurd. The word is not given a meaning - why assume all parties are talking about the same thing?"

The Cartesian Theatre has only private showings, you are correct. Our consciousness is not directly open to the experience of others, although if such a thing as mind readers do exist, I wager that it would not be difficult, so long as the mind-reader was relatively accurate, to so conceive a test that it would be irrational to presume he did not have direct access to the mind of the other. If you would like details on some theoretical ones I could think up off hand, do ask. But going past such a thing, let me address your other points.

Now you say that we have no means whereby we can guage, beyond the word of another, whether they are conscious. I counter this via recourse to language. For in language, we find a complex system whereby both concrete and abstract concepts are codified in sound-groupings (and later in writing that symoblizes said sounds) for conveyance. Now clearly, the sounds themselves are meaningless. If I say "tree" and do not speak English, I am not saying anything whatsoever. So the word "tree" holds no inherent meaning in it and to someone that speaks only Mandarin Chinese, it would be as nonsensical as if I barked like a dog. So I cannot induce in another human understanding in a cause-and-effect manner, by saying "tree". However, if that human and I both know the language, I can convey meaning and information to that person through means of language, and in reply, they can do such things as ask questions, bring up relevant topics, et cetera. All this necessitates that something - and this something we call the mind - be present within them that allows them to comprehend what is being said and to react so that it is also comprehendable to me what they are trying to put forth. Indeed, one can even discern such necessity of consciousness in just listening to two other people speak and in seeing their responses to one another by virtue that the exchange is similar and necessitates the same things as the exchange with us. Furthermore, in that such language can be facillitated on the spot, by mimicing the methods by which we learn language (drawing connections to things) and doing such things as, imitating an action of a bird to indicate that we are speaking of "bird" and adding to this "bird", or drawing a picture which shows us in the middle of a certain activity such as eating, that we are capable of so conveying a message that they, in return, following our lead, can convey a message to us back, which is not simply a rehash of what we have done, but can add new information, and can return with insertions in their own language. That is to say, that two people, not knowing one another's language, can create a basic language in order to communicate some vital ideas to one another.

To summarize the above, we find that something we have, language, necessitates minds in others and in ourselves. Unless, of course, you can tell me how such things could result other than as I have here presented?

I would also say that we do not need to directly sense another's consciuosness through one of our five senses in order to come to an awareness of it. For indeed, though the information of such is -conveyed- through the senses, we shall not pinpoint their consciousness say, with sight (we shall not see a person's consciousness), but only through the evaluation of the information which we gain from the senses. That is to say, it is our mind which allows us to realize in others their minds.

I would further like to point out that you have set up consciousness as a prerequisite for empirical knowledge, by virtue of placing empirical knowledge in the "common milieu", where "others" validate what you affirm through their own observations. If we cannot say that they have a means whereby they can do this, how then can we trust what they say? How are we aware that they are not simply lying to us, or simply reacting mindlessly so as to trick us? This would lead to absurdity and also to a crashing down of the scientific method, which apparently, you hold to be fruitful (as do I).

Also, to briefly return to subjectivity of experience, in what way can this said to invalidate it whatsoever? Though others cannot empirically justify the existence of my thoughts, if those thoughts can be manifested and other signs point to the necessity of consciousness, as well as positing that it is irrational to assume that another's perceptions are massively different than one's own if mutual intelligibility is a fact (which language clearly necessitates, as well as your own empirical observation), can not we find the existence of those thoughts nonetheless? That is to say, that we do not have to view those thoughts ourselves?

Moving on...

"Now that I have demonstrated that your premise that 'we are primarily conscious entities' is without empirical foundation (I suspect it is an assumption taken for granted), let us inspect in what manner a man might evaluate his own consciousness. In order to evaluate your consciousness, you must first know you are conscious (I think you will agree). What criteria do we use for this? Thought, you say. Let us accept that thought is ineffable; its process and quality cannot be described. This is a safe axiom.

Now I must ask you again, since you insist it is possible to 'evaluate' consciousness (I must admit that I don't know what exactly you meant by that phrase): Outside of thought, what 'reliable', 'intimate', empirical (or whatever you characterize it) way is there to 'evaluate' consciousness? I suspect you know of none. In that case, let us then infer that for every individual thought is the only nexus to consciousness. I might stop here and point out that we have reached the same brutal circularity of above but I am still curious and wish to explore the flaws of such reasoning. "

You seem to ask more specific questions in a bit, so I shall focus on answering them rather than the above. If within them any questions are lacking, I shall quote the above section where such question is to be found specifically again.

"1) How do you know that you think?

If you say by thinking then you have reached circularity. If you say by consciousness then you have again reached circularity since you yourself have accepted that without thinking we cannot know we are conscious. If there is a third alternative, please state it. However, I suspect you know of none."

You have mistaken. I have not said that without thinking we cannot be aware that we are conscious. One can be, for instance, simply aware of sensory stimuli and still be assured of consciousness, although it would not strike one to question this without thought. It would in essence be an intuitional knowledge that one is conscious of stimuli. Similarly, one have no sensory stimuli at the present moment and be aware of thinking through thoughts.

But how do I know that I am thinking? Though internal perception of thoughts. Thinking necessitates a thinker - a cause, in other words - and as such can either come from oneself or from an external source. If it is from an external source, then my awareness of the thoughts is only an awareness of thought, but at the same time, were one to inquire of this, we'd find that at the very least, the inquiry would have to come from oneself, by virtue of being founded on that perception of thoughts and the resulting thoughts on whether or not that prior thought stemmed from myself.

"2) Let us assume that the circularity I highlighted briefly in response to the first part of your reply is not actually a fallacy (ie. I made a mistake). That is, there is no circularity in the two statements: You have to be conscious in order to think and Without thinking we cannot know we are conscious. I believe the latter statement is difficult for anyone to justify (although you are free to try to) but I must ask you to justify the former statement. Just how do you know that you have to be conscious in order to think?"

As I noted, we could be conscious and not have thoughts at the time, just awareness of sensory perception, but if we had neither, presumably we could not do any other thing the conscious mind can do (such as calculate, imagine, et cetera) and thus we'd be left with no mind to speak of.

But how do I know that we have to be conscious in order to think? Well let us go back one step further first. How do I know we have to be conscious in order to sense? What happens when we "day dream" or "sleep"? Do not we appear, for the most part, open to sensory perception, yet because our "mind is elsewhere", we neither have recollection, nor have any information, from said perceptions? That though we may have had the an physical possibility of such, our mental processes gained nothing from the exchange? That no information was taken? That in essence, we did not experience any sense, and did not then perceive it at all? We may have picked up the signals physically, but our mental capacities did not grasp any information from it. Now, what if thoughts were the same way? Supposing that thoughts could emerge from anything but our own minds (respective to the individual), if we were off thinking of something else, or absorbed in sensory preception, a thought that so occurred at that time would not be registered. That is to say, without a consciousness there to perceive and understand that thought, we'd be left with an occurrence that if it even exists (and there is no proof that it had) would not matter, nor could it be joined with other thoughts in the creation of more complex thoughts and ideas. So in essence, to be engaged in thinking demands a conscious perception of that act, and without consciousness, it could not be intergrated into anything else, least of all a response of any complexity.

"Do you then accept that a venus flytrap is 'by necessity conscious'? Perhaps not; perhaps you are an anthropocentrist , and mean to say that only touch, taste, smell etc are to be considered 'senses'. In either case there is the ignominious contradiction involved in calling 'touch' a sense when speaking of humans but not in speaking of the venus flytrap."

I do indeed accept that all living things - and venus flytraps are, of course, alive - are conscious. Moreover, I do not distinguish betwixt human, animal, or plant sensation. If there are differences, which they may well be, they'd nonetheless all be able to spoken about in the general category of "sensation".

"Let us backout of your axiom "I propose that all beings with sensory preception are by necessity conscious" since this may lead to an uncomfortable (or merely a misanthropic) conclusion. Let us then ignore it and allow that volitional actions are properties of conscious beings. Of course, this leads to absurdity in the case of quadriplegia or some defect of the motor system. I must then ask you a very simple question:"

A paralyzed person may be said to have lost the ability to interact with the world around it, but is nonetheless retains a mental volition at least, of being able to think and various other things, without compulsion from scientific laws which would determine motion, et cetera. That is to say, volition needn't be manifested in the body in this case, although volition manifested in physical. action is a very easy way to test for consciousness. However, it is worthy to note that manifested action needn't be purely in physical action alone Were we to come upon a creature that could communicate telepathically with us, allowing us trigger within us a comprehensible sensation of its thoughts, we could find volition in the action of projecting those thoughts and in their qualities.

"What are your criterion for distinguishing 'volitional action'?"

As noted above, volitional action is those actions which which cannot be explained away by recourse to natural laws acting on an object, nor can be explained by recourse to reflex. Reflexes exhibit a (near) instanteneous and uniform response, usually through the triggering the release of muscle tensing and the like. Getting struck at the right place on one's knee cap is a common way of inducing such a reflex where it is basically a local physical reaction that induces movement.

"Note: This part of the exploration was meant to examine the notion that a venus flytrap might not be conscious. Let us instead accept that it is. That is, as you say, it has a 'dim consciousness'. I must ask you two very simple questions:

By what criterion can we distinguish gradations of consciousness such as the dimness of the faculty in venus flytraps as compared to 'normal/regular' consciousness in 'us'? And why?"

When I spoke of "dim" consciousness, I spoke of a consciousness that might perhaps only exist in one sense, that is to say, which would only know say...tactile sensation, and therefore be able to think in only these terms, and to experience the world only in these terms. On the other hand, we are possessed of five senses which have been augmented by linguistic capacity. This allows for us to have a "brighter" consciousness, by being able to think progressively more complicated thoughts and to think in terms of more than one sense both simulteneously and individually. That is to say, the gradient is to be found in how much information and how complicated that information can be thought of through the sensory awareness.

"I am also curious to know what criteria you distinguish between 'reflexive' and 'volitional' activity (you have implied a difference)."

See above.

Since some of the things you asked in those paragraphs I didn't respond to directly are not present in your subsequent questions, I shall discuss them here...

"In order to evaluate your consciousness, you must first know you are conscious (I think you will agree). What criteria do we use for this? Thought, you say. Let us accept that thought is ineffable; its process and quality cannot be described. This is a safe axiom."

I shall agree that in order to evaluate consciousness we must be aware that we are conscious, however, the thought to question this consciousness is usually not present to us before a situation brings up such a demand from us. That is to say, most of us go ahead in life without ever questioning our consciousness and this is because it is present to us in such a way as to be undoubted, that is, it is directly connected to our awareness, and thus so intuitive that is seems beneath (or above) questioning.

But yes, it is necessary that it is through thought that we evaluate our consciousness, or rather hought put into the action of perception wedded to the awareness of said perception and its information computed (a thought action). That we must also be conscious of our thoughts - though again, we probably would not ask this question normally - can be shown to be fine when we consider the Cartesian "cogito, ergo sum". That is to say, "I think, therefore I am" which, both Descartes and I shall argue, cannot be doubted, for so long as there is both or either thought or sensory awareness, it is necessary that if we are to be aware of that that we must perceive it. In essence, we justify and prove our own existence through being able to perceive anything, both or sense, and to think thought. So obvious is this to us, once again, that we do not even think to question it under normal conditions.

Now as to whether thought is ineffable, this seems to be absurd. For not only is thought knowlable, but it is the very topic of which we discuss now! Were it ineffable, we could not even begin to speak of it. It would be as Kant's presumption of noumenal realities beyond our purview. But as Hegel pointed out, to know of a thing is to know it, and thus if we know of a thought, we know thought. That is, it is most definitely knowable, and therefore not ineffable. Similarly, its qualities are clearly able to be defined through our awareness of it, as well as discussion of its properties and such.

"Now I must ask you again, since you insist it is possible to 'evaluate' consciousness (I must admit that I don't know what exactly you meant by that phrase): Outside of thought, what 'reliable', 'intimate', empirical (or whatever you characterize it) way is there to 'evaluate' consciousness?"

There is no other process outside awareness and thought that gives us insight into our own consciousness.

"In that case, let us then infer that for every individual thought is the only nexus to consciousness. I might stop here and point out that we have reached the same brutal circularity of above but I am still curious and wish to explore the flaws of such reasoning. "

No, not each individual thought, but also in the nature of awareness as noted. Of course if one does not then think about the process of awareness, we'd not come to think about consciousness, though we'd be participating it all the while.

But now, at long last, I pose to you questions not in response to questions you have given me, but one which I think illustrates a point which you have glossed over. That thought is demanded for any consideration of sensory discrepancy.

It is well known that the senses "trick" one. That is to say, distant towers are present to us as smaller than they actually are, as well as a straw appears bent and otherwise distorted in water. Now, supposing sensory awareness had no thought to go along with it to say "hey, that cannot be so..." we'd have no capacity to say that "the straw is not really bent, it is simply an illusion produced by the qualities of the water to magnify the image so that it appears to be bent to our perceptions", or that "because the tower at such a distant composes only a part of our field of vision, it appears to us smaller than when our proximity to it allows it to taker up a larger field of our vision". That is to say, without thought, we'd have to believe the moon really does disappear behind our fingers, and that towers grow to meet us. That we can decipher the discrepancies demonstrates the capacity for conscious thought.

 

I think this allows us to come to out first simple definition of thought:

thought is a change in mental image. in application, we might say that a person who sees the same thing in his head no matter what cannot/is not thinking visually. Note how this applies to the comatose, but not to one who is dreaming. This is consistent with the general distinction. Similar applications can be made to he who hears the same sound/no sound in his head continuously; he is not thinking auditorily. But when the mental image changes from 3 to 4 to 7 or from 'is 4723 a prime number' to 'yes (I'm making that up!)', we can see how that is thinking.
The only objection to this I can think of is to ask whether sodium chloride mixed with pyloric acid results in a solution with a ph of 2 (I'm making that up too!). In this case, anyone without any clue whatsoever will hit a blank (ie. there is nothing to think about). The same thing with having to verify a proof of Fermat's last theorem etc. When there is no mental content to go over, the mental image does not change. It might change to an 'I don't know' (note how this is a verbalization of what is already an understood feeling) but there is no experience of the mental image going from something reviewed in an advanced chemistry book to a 'yes' or 'no'. This is a simple confirmation of what Hume remarked:

"Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, in all the varieties of fiction and vision."

It seems only that we have been a little more vague in our own definition of thought about what this mixing, compounding, and separating is. I myself am hoping to bring in examples from neuroscience since science is something.. uhh.. unheard of in these forums of ours.

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I once thought multiple personality disorder offered clues on the plasticity of consciousness but the current agreement, from what I've read, is that MPD is 'not real'. Maybe if someone knows more about that.

Savants, from the little I remember, share a lot with 'normal' people actually. I read that a graduate student who practiced either calendar counting or multiplication tables (i forget) obsessively one day discovered that he was as proficient at it as even the savants! Someone pointed out that thinking in words is cumbersome and that certainly appears to be true. It's hasty to say practice alone, or even primarily, accounts for savant skills of course. But again, its difficult to get good data from savants since even people with 'regular' verbal skills have trouble articulating their thoughts. How can we expect savant test subjects to understand what we mean by 'thought'?

 

The simple answer is NO. Its like asking a computer to process data without any form of interface or sofware, its just not going to WORK. Language is not a simple thing to describe, its the basic vortex of our everyday life from waking up, eating breakfast in the morning, solving crossword puzzles, to scratching your bum. Language is what prevents the psysiological system from crashing,.i.e us from running crazy. It keeps things in order inside our brian even to the very smallest enviroment and unimaginable detail, in fact we are unawrae 90% of the time how much communication is going on simultenously in our body..we take it for granted. A psychiatric patient is someone who has fallen from this spectrum of cordination, and even though he or she may still develop thoughts, cannot "realize" or put together these thoughts. Language is basically communication between two or more entities, be it neurons, symbols, or signals, even being able to see is a form of communication. You simply have to communicate for anything to work much less develop a though.

 

Chatha - what you call language, I'd call 'thought' and obviously (?) no-one can think without thought. Whereas if you restrict 'language' to things like English, Japanese etc. it becomes obvious people can think without language, since mathematical symbols belong to no natural language. But symbolic mathematical thinking is still linear compared to geometric visualisation ... I think there are likely many possible ways to think.