Perhaps I should have asked a question rather that stating "you're doing the same thing you say I'm doing" in an indirect way. How do you presume: "Semantics, semantics. Semantics and arguments from assumed authority." without doing exactly what you're accusing. Further, what specifically do you mean by "assumed authority" in reference to what I presented. I stated my opinion on something rather than asserting authority, but I do presume the authority of my own opinion and frankly don't see a problem with it. Because they either can or can't be related to, or if an apparent relation is made, are seen as "inconsistent" by the objecting party, though in the construct of the perveyor, they may not be at all. Of course things can be discarded. "I have no idea what you mean", is really the underlying reason that things are discarded. Someone perveying meaning certainly knows what they mean, no? Do you? If you did, would it be wrong in the context that existed when they said it, no matter how riddled with what you'd think of as inconsistency it may be? If they are dishonest, then okay, that's a whole extra layer to this, but if they aren't, then there is nothing to reject except that you can't relate, or you find their reasoning to be flawed, which by your mind it IS of course, but that has no bearing on THEIR mind unless you motivate them to change it.
easy. heaven on earth it is a piece of cake to conjure up a theology without the conventional "mystical" crap that is typically associated with them what is more to the point chris, is that you guys have (so far) failed in denying the existence of a soul/consciouness in a manner that prevents the theist from wrapping a storyline around it what has been offered so far? *a brain, when reaching a certain "mystical" level of complexity, gives rise to phenomena of conscious experience *we are all zombies.....cognitive abilities and functions explain consciousness and volition it it no wonder why the fundies are running riot. boris's post might have worked in bygone centuries. now however, humans tend to be a bit more sophisticated in their philosophical meanderings.
Throughout the higher-level sciences, reductive explanation works in just this way. To explain the gene, for instance, we needed to specify the mechanism that stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next. It turns out that DNA performs this function; once we explain how the function is performed, we have explained the gene. To explain life, we ultimately need to explain how a system can reproduce, adapt to its environment, metabolize, and so on. All of these are questions about the performance of functions, and so are well-suited to reductive explanation. The same holds for most problems in cognitive science. To explain learning, we need to explain the way in which a system's behavioral capacities are modified in light of environmental information, and the way in which new information can be brought to bear in adapting a system's actions to its environment. If we show how a neural or computational mechanism does the job, we have explained learning. We can say the same for other cognitive phenomena, such as perception, memory, and language. Sometimes the relevant functions need to be characterized quite subtly, but it is clear that insofar as cognitive science explains these phenomena at all, it does so by explaining the performance of functions. When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of explanation fails. What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open. There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. If someone says "I can see that you have explained how DNA stores and transmits hereditary information from one generation to the next, but you have not explained how it is a gene", then they are making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is to be an entity that performs the relevant storage and transmission function. But if someone says "I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced", they are not making a conceptual mistake. This is a nontrivial further question. This further question is the key question in the problem of consciousness. Why doesn't all this information-processing go on "in the dark", free of any inner feel? Why is it that when electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. There is an explanatory gap (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it. A mere account of the functions stays on one side of the gap, so the materials for the bridge must be found elsewhere. Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness so ahh why are we so special?
I think mankind just really, really badly *wants* to be special. Because we are afraid we are not. The universe is, after all, a big place.
No. Hence the lustful attachment to whatever the human mind creates, be it religion, science, art, whatever.
Sorry, but science is a method for understanding how things work. Religion is a method for denying the understanding of how things work and replacing it with ignorance and fantasy. Science has helped us understand that we are *special* in that we exist as lifeforms in a vast universe. Religion has decreed we are *special* in that the universe was placed here for our entertainment. Quite silly, really.
Quantum principles instead of psychophysical laws The current physics is on its way to solve one of the biggest mysteries: the nature of consciousness. If the argument following from the hard problem analysis is correct then consciousness is a fundamental ingredient of reality. However we have seen that introducing psychophysical laws hides the risk to turn such fundamental ingredient into epiphenomenon. Then, how we could insert consciousness at the fundamental physical level without violating the physical laws? The possibility to merge neuroscience and physics is offered from the quantum theory, which is 'battle tested' and for now there is no experimental evidence that it fails in its predictions. What will be final form of the quantum mind philosophy is still unknown but physicists agree that there is no need the mathematics (basic laws) of the quantum theory to be reformulated in order to accommodate consciousness, nor explaining consciousness using the quantum physics will lead to breaking of the physical laws. *Indeed the quantum coherent systems manifest free will in their evolving in time. *Such systems could be in several physical states at the same time satisfying the principle of superposition, and what is most important all the subcomponents are entangled so that the physical correlations are enforced faster-than-light. *Entanglement is experimentally verified phenomenon that explains why the quantum coherent systems behave as unitary objects i.e. the quantum system is not mere sum of its parts. The quantum wave function (or simply the quantum wave denoted as ?) of a quantum coherent system evolving in time is nonmaterial physical entity and itself may represent the conscious state (experience) of the system. *Here nonmaterial means outside the 4D space-time continuum originally proposed by Einstein while formulating the theory of relativity. That is why with the use of the quantum theory the epiphenomenalists' reasoning could be bypassed i.e. mind may be nonmaterial (outside the space-time) but is still physical (therefore fully causal). *What is more important is that the quantum wave ? analogous to experience is intrinsic and unobservable, because any attempt to measure it directly collapses the wave function of the system and destroys the superposition of states. The resultant philosophy could be called quantum dualism since mind is nonmaterial (the term physical monism used by Chalmers is not appropriate since we can adopt by definition that everything not physical is non-existing). Danko Dimchev Georgiev heh if this indeed turns out to be the case, we will be treated to a spectacle where the religious fundies and einsteins's nazi brigade..... "There shall be weeping there, and gnashing of teeth" sooo! pardon me while i go chat to a rock Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image!
Gustav, I'm with you. I can relate, but am I winning? Hmm. *sigh* Hey I've got an idea. Maybe, just maybe if we gain understanding - we all win? Am I talking crazy? I am a crazy talker, so...
Why do you want to understand? Trying to satisfy the urge to understand is to act on lust, eventually. It never ends, it is never satisfied. Hence the pissy arguments.
It's my function. My my water, quite revealing. It's quite apparent you don't understand. Can you say "cycle"? Think a bit please. LOL. Then how do you explain your pissy arguments?
Are you explaining your insanity to yourself, is this a joke? I was joking. Maybe you are too? Meh. Do you think I'm crazy water? Really?
he grabbed the definition from descartes descartes pineal gland theory must have really pissed off dr boris So without attempting to resolve all the problems, he simply stated that there is a dualism of mind and body, and their interaction is clearly real. The brain is the major locus for the mind or consciousness of the soul, yet mind or consciousness is distributed throughout the whole body. The point of interaction between the two is the pineal gland. (Cartesian Dualism: Mind and Brain Interaction)
