Nations, like bulldozers, don't exactly have motives.
That's a complicated statement. I can't go along with a nation as mere tool: the operator literally cannot steer it against its will. But popular opinion
can be manipulated; opposition
can be eliminated; dissent
can be intimidated into silence. The leadership always has motives, and they are rarely moral.
Nations, as such, seem to go to war by accident almost.
That just means you can't always tell what's really going on.
If breaking down motivation by person, the individual soldier's motives count.
Only to the extent that they feel strongly enough opposed to face a firing-squad. The only way soldiers can actually affect a war is by mass desertion. Other than that, they're not judged on the war itself, but on their particular part in it: what they each do.
The point being that the reasons for war - however cumulative and obscure in their origins - are
not moral reasons. For both the population and the leadership, there is always something to fear, or something to gain, or both. They
don't mobilize exclusively to stop another nation doing wrong.
[accidents can't be evil]
"Collateral damage". There's even a term of law: "Depraved indifference".
There may be evil somewhere, in someone, at work in the making of an accident. But that evil isn't at work on causing an accident; the accident is a byproduct of attitudes and actions that
may contain evil. If so, the evil won't stop with one accident: it will go on to cause
intentional damage, at which time it will be manifest, rather than merely suspected.
One common pattern: an initial draw of minor and easily rationalized wrong for worthwhile gain, getting one sucked into a situation of major wrong to avoid heavy loss as much as acquire major gain. Joining a gang as a teenager. The question then becomes the severity of threatened loss or promised gain that will bring a given person to do a given wrong. The odds. How big a risk or inconvenience will one absorb to save a baby.
I don't see a definition of evil in there. Yes, wrong is often cumulative. People are fallible, gullible, suggestible, corruptible.
That's the reason we've devised scales of wrongness to inform our legal systems, as well as having a personal set of principles.
One can identify cowardice without projecting heroism by oneself.
I think one is often tempted to do so on insufficient information, or according to an unexamined definition of cowardice. I merely warn against being too facile in judgment.
Hiroshima, say: there are times when avoiding evil takes unusual courage.
I don't understand the reference. Who avoided evil in that situation? Certainly, the top decision-makers did not: they knew; they planned; they gave the order. The pilots, I don't know about. The common people were never consulted, but going by the retrospective apologists, there would have been no great outcry against.
That would exclude, from the evildoers, those who harm as a regrettable necessity of getting what they want - as a means to an end, that they would rather not bother about if they didn't have to. I would not want to exclude all of them from the orchestra of evil - some of them earn first chair status.
I don't think it does exclude material gain, or the quest for power and status. I would, however, put them on a comparative scale.
It also excludes the My Lai's, the pogroms, much terrorism - not coldblooded, not sane, not sober, and clearly (?) evil.
I would have to know the circumstances of each incident; can't form a blanket judgment.