A multiversal paradox.

DJ Erock

Resident Skeptic
Registered Senior Member
The theory of the mutliverse as I know it is this. There are an infinite number of universes, containing an infinite number of possibilties. For example, there is a universe that is exactly like this one, only instead of this being called 'sciforums' its called 'philforums' or something like that. There are an infinite number of universes exactly like this one, except each one has a different name for sciforums. There are also an infinite number of universes where everything is exactly unlike this one, and infinite in-betweens.

This would mean that in half of the infinite universes (I know you can't have half of infinity, I guess I mean one in every two), the multiverse doesn't exist. If you have a different universe for every possiblity, then a lot of universes contain the possibilty of not having a multiverse, just being a singular universe.

Does this undo the idea of multiverse? Or do I have the wrong idea of multiverse? Or does the multiverse exclude its own existence from the possibilites? It seems that the multiverse cannot be all-encompassing if it contains all possibilites, as many possibilites are that it doesn't exist, or doesn't all-encompass.
 
The theory says that everything that can possibly happen does happen in the various universes. Non-existance is an existance that is not happening; how's that possible if everything that can happen does happen? The only way a universe can non-exist is if it does exist for a while and disappears. Sounds perfectly plausible to me.
 
Nope, thankfully for multiverse fans you're wrong.

Here's the mistake:

"This would mean that in half of the infinite universes (I know you can't have half of infinity, I guess I mean one in every two), the multiverse doesn't exist."

The multiverse is not inside of that universe.

Think of it another way. I have an infinitely long list of numbers, with the number one appearing before each one:

1. 2345
1. 32323
1. 21354265
1. 5654745
1. 865345

and so on, and so on.
Now I define my list as saying "the sequence of numbers to the right of the one expresses each of the infinite possibilities of ordering whole digits".

That doesn't mean that somewhere on my list one of the sequences won't have a one next to it. My rule only discusses what happens to the right of the "1."

Essentially the multiverse is external, not internal, to the universe. What exactly this means could be thoroughly confusing, of course, but such is the theory.
 
My example may seem misleading. Or, it may seem like it's wrong (which I don't think it is), but just to make it even more simple...

Let's make an infinitely long list of 'stuff'. Pretend that directly to the right of you is an infinitely long list of 'stuff' comprised of all the possible 'stuff' that can exist. By your logic, somewhere along that list, there must be a space that has no 'stuff' in it because 'no stuff' is part of the set of 'stuff'. But that's completely ignoring the definition of the set.

Okay...
By any chance do you have a thorough understanding of set theory? This would be much easier to express if I could refer to real math instead of stuff.
 
Wow I just can't get enough of trying to find a way to answer this!
It seems that the multiverse cannot be all-encompassing if it contains all possibilites, as many possibilites are that it doesn't exist, or doesn't all-encompass.
This is exactly why you're thinking about it in the wrong way.

The idea is that the MULTIVERSE holds many (infinitely so) universes inside of itself. Now, each universe has variables. In the MULTIVERSE there will be every single possible arraingment of these variables.

The problem is that you think "belonging to the MULTIVERSE" is a variable under the scope of the universe in the understanding of this theory. It isn't.

In multiverse theory, they simply say that every possible arraingment of the variables solely relating to the universe and the universe itself is expressed. Membership to the MULTIVERSE calls into play something outside the universe.
 
Although this does provide an interesting way to talk about Russell's Paradox with Frege.

Your mistake is in thinking that variables outside the simple scope of the universe would come into play. You then parlayed that into conjuring up a universe that isn't part of the multiverse.

There are tons of other contradictions you can find if you make the first mistake you did.

For instance, you could start adding to the lis of universes all the universes which stand in certain relation to the other universes. However, this doesn't add new AND different universes to our infinite list; it simply expresses the old ones in a new way and adds them to the list. By that logic you could arrive at adding a universe which doesn't have a relation to any other universe. Of course, this is impossible.

In fact as long as you're willing to make the misake you did in your first post, there about a gazillion ways to express why multiverse theory would be fucked.

Man, I love Russell.
 
DJ Erock:

"The theory of the mutliverse as I know it is this. There are an infinite number of universes, containing an infinite number of possibilties. For example, there is a universe that is exactly like this one, only instead of this being called 'sciforums' its called 'philforums' or something like that. There are an infinite number of universes exactly like this one, except each one has a different name for sciforums. There are also an infinite number of universes where everything is exactly unlike this one, and infinite in-betweens."

Your conception of the theory is a bit flawed and probably - and I do not mean this offensively, so please, take none - a little flavoured by Science Fiction. That is to say, you are presenting to us the "Sliders" approach to the concept.

In and of itself, the Everett Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (just MW for short henceforward) postulates that for every probalistic quantum calculation, each choice results in the formation of a separate universe, so if observer A was in universe A, and observer B in universe B, both would observe different things, but each would be -the only possible- result in their universe. That is to say, it is deterministic but convergent in different universes, as opposed to the strictly probablistic interpretations of other theories, and the consistant deterministic viewpoints of, say, Bohm's Theory. This, of course, does not translate into "there are a billion universes crewated when I move my hand", for hands are not suspectible to quantum effects, and there is a barrier where quantum effects, on all levels, seemingly become if not non-existent, irrelevant. In essence, the macroscopic world is all but immune to the weird behaviour of the Quantum Worlds, hence the discrepancy betwixt Quantum Mechanical models and Newtonian MOdels, although the latter almost completely explains macroscopic existence, excluding some aspects of Einstein's Theory of Relativity.

In essence: MW doesn't say that there exists parralel yous in other worlds doing slightly different things, but that in different universes, observations will be different of certain Quantum Observations, which may result in differences in what comes up, even to the point where parralel yous do not exist. Remember: We exist because of an pretty much infinite series of "happy accidents" that lead to our creation after billions of years of not existing. In essence, we are manifestations of a cosmic lottery.

"This would mean that in half of the infinite universes (I know you can't have half of infinity, I guess I mean one in every two), the multiverse doesn't exist. If you have a different universe for every possiblity, then a lot of universes contain the possibilty of not having a multiverse, just being a singular universe."

The traditional formulation of MW - which I am referencing - does not allow for there to be differences in the physical laws which govern universes, so that your result is impossible. Moreover, a possibility cannot be a possibility if it is not a possibility when that possibility is demanded to exist by prior possibilities. That is to say, if it is possible in our universes, and that possibility is manifest, then there cannot be a universe where it is not possible, and still that universe exists in the same "omniverse" as us. Either that or you pointed out one of the (many and varied) flaws of this (almost pseudo-scientifical) theory.

I am inclined to believe a bit of both.

I must also stress that there is no physical proof whatsoever of this theory being right at this persent time, and that besides that, that Quantum Mechanics and related topics (String Theories, et cetera) are possibly all wrong. That is to say, we must seriously consider that every single conjecture of theoretical physics is utterly wrong, and as it stands, all of them are, at least, would have something wrong in them, as only one model could be true, or another model not even thought of at the present time.

I postulate that we have at least 50 years to wait before any coherent theory will be presented that can be tested and shown to be true, and even then, I am skeptical. Specifically when scientists are abandoning many principles that have kept science going - consider that "dark matter" patches up holes in cosmological theory which do not account for the universe it is supposed to describe, or that scientists are throwing out the Law of Conservation of Energy in describing a universe which can spawn entire universes of created energy, or there being many different dimensions all bundled up and three expanded... - and we're somewhat at an impasse with scientific findings of certain things (we really do not have a clue how we can test some of these things), we might well be many centuries away from any true knowledge of the stuff we have happened upon and do not yet have an answer for.

But I digress...

whitewolf:

"The theory says that everything that can possibly happen does happen in the various universes. Non-existance is an existance that is not happening; how's that possible if everything that can happen does happen? The only way a universe can non-exist is if it does exist for a while and disappears. Sounds perfectly plausible to me. "

Wouldn't it more strictly be construed as "potential" or "possibility", not "non-existence" strictly?

Tyler:

"Man, I love Russell."

I do, too. Quite the good historian of philosophy and had some interesting philosophical and mathematical viewpoints, but I am afraid that his politics were terrible, and as a very public figure, somewhat make me dislike him as a man.

Of course, this is a tangent.
 
I think you gotta give Russell his politics. If not for the fact that every one of his ilk is a tiny bit insane, and the political/social aspect of his life fit this stigma. Keep in mind by that time he believed he had handed the torch to Wittgenstein.
 
Tyler:

True, true. But still, he made himself far too public of a figure in support of his beliefs to not find his image somewhat impacted by the whole thing.
 
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