Do we have freewill ? is it biblical ?

Do you believe you have freewill

  • yes

    Votes: 5 45.5%
  • no

    Votes: 6 54.5%

  • Total voters
    11
See, I dont think you can confidently draw that conclusion until and unless you can demonstrate a physical mechanism by which one can *know* the future. Without that, you can't conclude that free will is constrained.
The thing is the claim has been made that "god" does know the future. I.e. it's a given for this argument.
If the future is known (i.e. the foreknowledge is infallibly true) then there is, and can be, no choice.
We're all following (unkown to us) a pre-written script which only "god" has read.
Here's a spurious example: God observes his multiverse in which you make all possible choices. He knows your actions yet you are not constrained.
If "god" knows your choices then can you choose other than what "god" predicts?
If yes then, by definition, he/ she/ it didn't know.
If no then then there wasn't actually a choice.
 
The form that it takes is in the output being the only possible output that it could ever have been.
But who said there's only one output? We have posited a multiverse where all outputs are possible and happen.

It was the only possible output the day before the "choice" was made.
It was the only possible output a billion years before the "choice" was made.
No alternative equates to constraint.
In what way do you think that having but one genuine path is not a constraint, even if the individual is not aware of the constraint?
You're dancing around the issue.


If there is foreknowledge, predetermination, whatever you want to call it, whether the mechanism is known or not by which it is achieved, then there is constraint, as per above, whether one is aware of it or not at the time.
Sorry, it just does not follow.
 
The thing is the claim has been made that "god" does know the future. I.e. it's a given for this argument.
If God sees all universes in which we pick a flavour of ice cream then it does not constrain us. Like rolling a die - the fact that the results are predictable does not mean the die had any constraints on any given roll. Every single roll was a 1-in-6 chance.

If the future is known (i.e. the foreknowledge is infallibly true) then there is, and can be, no choice.
That is simply an argument that future knowledge is logically impossible.



Just because you can make an argument that "I know what will happen means you have no choice" doesn't mean it must happen that way.

Like hypothesizing the ramifications of time travel, you'll have to posit a mechanism by which it happens before you can state what effects are observed. You can't just hand wave it and say "... ergo you won't be capable of killing Hitler".

And if the mechanism is simply "God magically sees all, therefore God can see the future", then the counter-mechanism is simply "God gave us free will, so God magically gifts it without constraint."
 
If God sees all universes in which we pick a flavour of ice cream then it does not constrain us. Like rolling a die - the fact that the results are predictable does not mean the die had any constraints on any given roll. Every single roll was a 1-in-6 chance.
Not. Even. Close.
If there's a chance (that the choice could be other than predicted) then it wasn't knowledge when the prediction was made.
That is simply an argument that future knowledge is logically impossible.
Maybe you missed the other option...
Just because you can make an argument that "I know what will happen means you have no choice" doesn't mean it must happen that way.
Really?
If I KNOW (i.e. my prediction is true) then you cannot choose otherwise.
Like hypothesizing the ramifications of time travel, you'll have to posit a mechanism by which it happens before you can state what effects are observed. You can't just hand wave it and say "... ergo you won't be capable of killing Hitler".
You keep missing the other half of the argument I gave.
And if the mechanism is simply "God magically sees all, therefore God can see the future", then the counter-mechanism is simply "God gave us free will, so God magically gifts it without constraint."
If "god" does know then free will is an illusion. The two are logically incompatible.
 
Not. Even. Close.
If there's a chance (that the choice could be other than predicted) then it wasn't knowledge when the prediction was made.
So then how can God know it?
It's simply an argument that aforeknowledge is logically impossible.
Unless you can posit a mechanism by which the person/die is physically constrained.


If I KNOW (i.e. my prediction is true) then you cannot choose otherwise.
You KNOW Schrodinger's cat dies. You predicted its death, and lo! it did occur. But that does not mean it cannot also live. The cat can die and live. It is not constrained to one or 'other.
 
While we're at it: God is all-powerful. Therefore he can make a rock so heavy even he cannot lift it.

But is that actually true? Just because I can state it logically to be true, doesn't mean it constrains the universe or God.

You cannot draw sweeping, categorical conclusions about phenomena for which the mechanisms are unknown. Therefore it does not follow that God's aforeknowledge actually constrains free will. The answer is undefined.
 
So then how can God know it?
One more time: that's a given for the argument.
It's simply an argument that aforeknowledge is logically impossible.
Why do you persist in ignoring the rest of my post. I'll try again:
If "god" knows your choices then can you choose other than what "god" predicts?
If yes then, by definition, he/ she/ it didn't know.
If no then then there wasn't actually a choice.

It's an either/ or.
Unless you can posit a mechanism by which the person/die is physically constrained.
The "mechanism" is that IF infallible foreknowledge is possible/ given the the future is fixed. There are no choices.
You KNOW Schrodinger's cat dies. You predicted its death, and lo! it did occur. But that does not mean it cannot also live. The cat can die and live. It is not constrained to one or 'other.
Then my prediction was merely an informed guess, not knowledge.
The claim made is that "god" knows.
 
One more time: that's a given for the argument.

Why do you persist in ignoring the rest of my post. I'll try again:
I'm not. You are stuck in black and white, and this is not a black and white issue*.

(To be clear: you cannot say what colour it is (i.e. the mechanism), therefore any argument you make about it being black or white is unfounded.)

Then my prediction was merely an informed guess, not knowledge.
The claim made is that "god" knows.
No. You predicted the cat died.
It did.

The existence of a multiverse means that the cat was not constrained only to die. It also lived.
You had aforeknowledge of the cat's death, and yet that did not mean the cat did not live. They are not mutually exclusive.
And yes, you can also have aforeknowledge that it lived. And that still doesn't constrain its live/die fate. It did all possible things.


Don't forget, this is just one spurious way out of the trap. There could be many; you just don't know. Therefore, you can't state categorically that the issue is only black without first having a working model of the mechanism by which it works.
 
I'm not. You are stuck in black and white, and this is not a black and white issue*.

(To be clear: you cannot say what colour it is (i.e. the mechanism), therefore any argument you make about it being black or white is unfounded.)
Yeah right. Where's the supporting argument, or am I just supposed to take your word?
No. You predicted the cat died.
It did.
Really?
The existence of a multiverse means that the cat was not constrained only to die. It also lived.
You had aforeknowledge of the cat's death, and yet that did not mean the cat did not live. They are not mutually exclusive.
And yes, you can also have aforeknowledge that it lived. And that still doesn't constrain its live/die fate. It did all possible things.
Then - as you have stated - my prediction wasn't correct since the cat lived "elsewhere".
This is like me calling "6" before rolling a die and then, utterly regardless of what it actually rolls, claiming I was right becuse somewhere in the multiverse it DID roll a six, but just where we are currently observing.
 
Yeah right. Where's the supporting argument, or am I just supposed to take your word?
You are making a strong argument. That X cannot be true, no exceptions. The onus is on you to demonstrate there can be no exceptions.

I am making a moderate argument. That X might be true, and without a working mechanism, there's no way no draw strong conclusions. My burden is way less than yours. And your case is not made. You have not shown that there are no exceptions.


Then - as you have stated - my prediction wasn't correct since the cat lived "elsewhere".
You predicted the cat died. It did.
Those two facts are incontrovertible. We all agree these two things happened.


This is like me calling "6" before rolling a die and then, utterly regardless of what it actually rolls, claiming I was right becuse somewhere in the multiverse it DID roll a six, but just not in the we are currently observing.
No it isn't. Bad analogy.
 
You are making a strong argument. That X cannot be true, no exceptions. The onus is on you to demonstrate there can be no exceptions.

I am making a moderate argument. That X might be true, and without a working mechanism, there's no way no draw strong conclusions. My burden is way less than yours. And your case is not made. You have not shown that there are no exceptions.
And yet all you're doing is making the claim. No supporting logic.
You predicted the cat died. It did.
Those two facts are incontrovertible. We all agree these two things happened.
And you also stated "But that does not mean it cannot also live. The cat can die and live. It is not constrained to one or 'other." So if it can live then my prediction could have been wrong. Therefore it wasn't knowledge.
No it isn't. Bad analogy.
Another claim with no supporting logic.
 
And yet all you're doing is making the claim. No supporting logic.
False. I gave an example which we are discussing. The fact that you are not conceding the logic of my example does not mean I'm not supporting my claim.

And the burden is still on you to show there are no exceptions to your handwaving claim. Until you can, your case is not made.

you also stated "But that does not mean it cannot also live. The cat can die and live. It is not constrained to one or 'other." So if it can live then my prediction could have been wrong.

Therefore it wasn't knowledge.
It was knowledge. You predicted correctly. The cat died.

Another claim with no supporting logic.
I am not obliged to accept your analogy just because you post it.

In truth, I am typing some of this on my phone, so I have to choose brevity. I might be able to make a longer argument later but frankly the burden is not mine. You have a harder case to make, and your logic so far just doesn't clinch it.
 
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But who said there's only one output? We have posited a multiverse where all outputs are possible and happen.
That is what I'm running with.
The notion of an omniscient deity has also been posited, has it not?

A predetermined (foreseen, or however you term it) means that there is only one possible outcome for each universe.
Across the multiverse every outcome occurs.
But in each individual universe, the fact that it is predetermined means that there can be, could never be, any other option.for that universe.
Saying that, across the universes, all outcomes occur speaks nothing at all to an individual universe.

If you want to claim that all possibilities are genuinely available in a single universe, as opposed to the overall multiverse, then that is an argument, or at least a property of the scenario, that you need to make.
You're dancing around the issue.
I'm addressing the issue as I see it.
If it is not, from your view, addressing it then by all means explain, rather than just dismiss, please.

From my view, having only a single path equates, at least for the incompatibilist, to constraint.
If you could buy a car of any colour as long as it is black... etc.
Such "constraint" is not just a perspective from the individual's point of view but from a meta perspective.
From the "infinite" (although I suspect Tiassa's line is different than I initially suspected).

One could look at "constraint" as being from the pov of the individual: if they don't perceive only having a single possible outcome then there is no such constraint.
That would seem to be a compatibilist view.

Predetermination (or omniscience etc), however, irrespective of mechanism, irrespective of how it is allowed or happens, means that the action could not be, could never have been, other than what it was.

Wherever something is posited, the implications of what it means are also posited, even if one doesn't know the mechanism.

So I ask again: in what way do you think that having but one genuine path is not a constraint, even if the individual is not aware of the constraint?
Sorry, it just does not follow.
It does, for reasons given.
If you want a discussion, though, offer something more than just a dismissal, please.
Thanks.
 
The existence of a multiverse means that the cat was not constrained only to die. It also lived.
Omniscience would mean knowledge of what transpired in a specific universe, as well as the multiverse as a whole.
So claims of what might also have transpired in one of the other dimensions as if it has a bearing on the knowledge of what transpires in this specific universe is a red herring.
I.e. only what transpires in this universe is relevant.
And only one possible outcome is possible in this universe due to that omniscience.
If the omniscient being didn't know which universe would have the dead cat and which would have the live cat, then is it an omniscient being?
Across the multiverse all outcomes occur, but omniscience isn't just about knowing what occurs at a multiverse level, but at specific universe level.
So your argument seems to be lacking, unfortunately.
 
But in each individual universe, the fact that it is predetermined means that there can be, could never be, any other option.for that universe.
But who says each one is predetermined?

And who says there is only one universe per option?

6000 universes, each rolling a fair die will produce a predictable outcome, but that does not constrain any given die in any given universe.
 
Omniscience would mean knowledge of what transpired in a specific universe, as well as the multiverse as a whole.
So claims of what might also have transpired in one of the other dimensions as if it has a bearing on the knowledge of what transpires in this specific universe is a red herring.
I.e. only what transpires in this universe is relevant.
And only one possible outcome is possible in this universe due to that omniscience.
If the omniscient being didn't know which universe would have the dead cat and which would have the live cat, then is it an omniscient being?
Across the multiverse all outcomes occur, but omniscience isn't just about knowing what occurs at a multiverse level, but at specific universe level.
So your argument seems to be lacking, unfortunately.
Only because you keep moving the goalposts of what was initially simply "knowing what will happen".

I ask again: if God knows what my action will be, what mechanism do *you* posit actually constrains my action?
 
But who says each one is predetermined?

And who says there is only one universe per option?

6000 universes, each rolling a fair die will produce a predictable outcome, but that does not constrain any given die in any given universe.
Omniscience does constrain it, though.
And we have, have we not, posited an omniscient deity here?
If not, then we can fall back on determinism itself, and if not there then to the random (within a probability function) nature of our currently understood universe.
 
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