Does the self persist through time?

[Doreen]

i assert no such thing
i however feel the same way when you guys assert that a physical system will magically produce mental events given sufficient complexity

i mean where are the precedents for such a claim?

Just wanted to add here that the complexity levels have been moving down to less complex levels? Essentially animals were not considered to have these traits - by the scientific community (in their official capacity) - for a long time. But this changed in recent decades as more and more animals were granted this emergent property. Where might this trend lead?

 

[Sarkus]

Will it be me who experiences my birthday party in twenty years or will it simply be a matter of tradition and habit that we refer to this person as 'the same'.

I really can see little room for an empirical materialist to think the consciousness will be the same one. Since there are no immaterial things and all the material has changed -not to mention the volume, nerve connections, behaviors, levels of various hormones and other chemicals in the blood, lymph, cells, opinions, memories, etc. - there is no reason to assume or even think it is the same experiencer, the same consciousness.

But it depends on how you view consciousness.

Imagine an athlete on a run.
Is the "running" that the athlete exhibits when they start their run the same "running" that they exhibit toward the end of their run?

You seem to be looking at the "running" and seeing the athlete's legs in a certain location - and then seeing that from moment to moment the legs change position - and that the positions are never the same throughout the journey. Also, as the athlete tires the gait might shorten, the pace slacken etc. To you the "running" that the athlete has at one moment is different to the next - and thus the "running" does not persist.

Some of us are looking at the "running" as a general pattern of activity - and as long as that pattern continues to occur, the "running" could be said to persist.

As you say above the personality is the clothes the self wears. Well, this changes and so does the body in the clothes.

What is this self made of that persists?

Neurons, chemicals, etc. Nothing that isn't in the brain of a non-conscious working brain. The only difference is the pattern of activity that a conscious brain exhibits compared to a non-conscious one.

Occam would therefore go with consciousness being strongly related to that pattern. And if the pattern persists - why not the "self"?


The next issue, though, would be what happens when we are "unconscious" - e.g. asleep. Is the consciousness that kicks in when we wake up the same as when we went to sleep?

Well, if the athlete stops for a breather and then starts running again - is this the same "running" as when they began?

(I hope the analogy doesn't confuse?)

 

[Gustav]

No - I'm saying that consciousness might very well be a pattern of activity within the brain - but one that could possibly be replicated external to the brain - e.g. within a computer.

Are you going to expand on that?
i.e. What is incompatible between having this discussion and such an approach (not that I necessarily agree that what is being touted is merely an epiphenomic approach).

why not? your "pattern of activity" merely translates to a bunch of circuitry aligning itself in particular configurations to produce a conscious experience in some mental space

epiphenomenalism holds that physical events cause mental ones but not vice versa. therefore if this theory is true, one is not in a position to have an opinion on it. you cannot think about it. you are not in a position to even express the idea of epiphenomenalism. its truth is ineffable

so i ask..... who am i addressing this post to?

(not that I necessarily agree that what is being touted is merely an epiphenomic approach).

well? should i guess or will you elaborate?

 

[Gustav]

Just wanted to add here that the complexity levels have been moving down to less complex levels? Essentially animals were not considered to have these traits - by the scientific community (in their official capacity) - for a long time. But this changed in recent decades as more and more animals were granted this emergent property. Where might this trend lead?

monism? consciousness as a fundamental force in the universe?

/chuckle

 

[takethewarhome]

monism? consciousness as a fundamental force in the universe?

/chuckle

Hehe

 

[Gustav]

Just as an aside: I always find it amazing how the ONLY source of information for an empiricist - consciousness - and thus the source of all evidence for any theory can become epi.

thats nothing
watch in awe as the zombies deny the subjective experience and free will while simultaneously utilizing them. its an eminently pitiable pathology

 

[parmalee]

What, in your view, is usually intended by "conscious"? I was under the impression that consciousness referred to, well, phenomenal experience. Leaving the "conscious aspect" out of that doesn't make sense to me.

i simply meant the level of awareness which one can recollect, IOW your caveat re: "lapses" like sleep, etc. wouldn't have to be accounted for.

i'm curious what you make of this: i have seizures which i recall; i have seizures which effect a sort of amnesia; and then i have seizures lasting anywhere from seconds to (on a few occasions) days, during which i carry out routines (not just the "routine" variety: i've traveled hundreds of miles, played shows, recorded--and "engineered" the basic tracks for an album, etc.), but--according to others--"i" am not there: it's not a different personality which manifests, but rather NO personality. according to dozens of neurologists i've asked specifically about this matter, i do not experience amnesia of these "episodes," rather i am not sufficiently conscious enough to even form memories. does this make sense to you? it seems a little odd, to put it mildly, to me.

I don't see how this leads to an infinite regress. As you say, what is mine is what is a property of my experience... is there any reason why it shouldn't end right there? What requires us to take that next step?

but when you say "what is mine is what is a property of my experience," isn't the "my" necessarily "what is proper to my experience," IOW
"what is proper to what is proper to what is proper to... 'my' experience."

obviously, it's a semantic complication--but is it just a semantic complication?

"but is one's phenomenal experience necessarily defined by the limits of one's own nervous system? "
Right. Is this a problem for you...?

you're referring to that part, correct? honestly, i don't know if it's a problem for me--sometimes yes, sometimes no. insofar as what one does inevitably effects one's world, and one's world inevitably effects oneself (or one's "self)--this is where it becomes problematic for me: like i said, i often identify not only with, but as my world, or aspects of my world. and i think everyone does, to one degree or another--for some more, others less--and such would be informed by whether or not one cultivates such or makes efforts to quell such--and this would be a product of one's own disposition, but also one's culture and one's language. i don't think this "identification" is simply a linguistic issue, by any means (i.e. figures of speech, for instance).

To clarify, when I say that it has "intuitive" appeal, I admittedly mean it in a sort of unusual sense. Rather than meaning something like "it seems obvious on the surface," I gave the example of alien hand syndrome to point out that, in order for something like this syndrome to exist at all, people in general must have some sort of implicit, intuitive theory of what self is that is more-or-less in line with what I've explicated. Even if they've never given a moment's thought to what it means to be, once part of their physical body divorces itself from their conscious intentionality, they reject it as part of their self without hesitation. It is in this sense that the present definition of self is "intuitive" -- forgive me for any confusion. My background is in psychology, and when we say that something is intuitive, we typically mean something closer to "commonplace and implicit" (e.g., an intuitive theory of personality).

ahhh, ok--thank you for the clarification. still though: do you think this is universally implicit? if one is brought up within a culture which considers "self" very differently, and even the language itself carries a radically different notion of what is intended by "self," i would think it might be different--IOW notions of self aren't necessarily considered with relation to conscious intentionality in all cultures or languages.

still, it's difficult to consider such from the perspective of another with one's own language and cultural baggage. Sarkus remarked to me that in a sense, we (that is, the people posting in this thread) are all on the same page in the sense that none of us seem to be positing self as, say, a separate order of entity (spirit) accorded us by "god(s)." or, even if one is inclined to think in such a manner, no one is positing such here.

 

[glaucon]

Damn. Take a day off... miss too much.

This does not seem like a logical conclusion. We seem capable of wondering about all sorts of things, I am not sure this provides evidence of those things.

But you can only 'wonder' in certain ways; that is, in ways that are specifically limited by one thing: you. My point was, no matter how confused you might be, or aphasic, etc., your experience is continuous.

You don't? I do. I look back on what earlier 'mes' did and am shocked sometimes. That younger person seems like a different person. You really have never felt this or heard others say it with conviction. Let alone who 'I' was when I was a child. In fact I have nothing at all in my experience that fits with the notion

Ah but see, those aren't experiences of discontinuity: those are recollections.
Of course you're not going to 'recognize' yourself in that past; we all change. However, the very fact that you can recall those experiences, and recognize that they are your experiences, serves to demonstrate the continuity of the self.

I cannot imagine, however, a non-religious person claiming 100% identity with an earlier self.

I would hope not; that would be silly [yes, slight jab at the religious here...].

The problem here is that you're trying to equate the self with something fixed, something that stays the same, some sort of whacked out Monist essence [I used to think along these lines myself]. The problem is, not only does such a thing not exist [not in that sense anyways...], but it is also impossible.
What does persist in each of us [again, with certain atypical exceptions] is the fact that we are each the locus of our behaviour.

No. YOu have good enough copies of past experiences.

I think you miss my point entirely.
If the self did not persist, regardless of how well you can recollect the past [I think that was what you were getting at with the 'copies' line... ???] you would not necessarily be able to identify that past as being yours.

Again. I can see a claim to some degree of identity, but 100% seems very odd to me from empirical materialists. (if this term does not fit, apologies)

'Degree' of identity??? A curious contradiction...

Anyways, why do you think such a thing is required? All that is needed for a self to be a self is internal consistency.





General note:

If anyone wants me to respond to something in particular that I've missed, feel free to let me know....
I like the way the thread is moving, and any 'late' commentary on my part would more than likely just serve to sow confusion.

cheers

 

[Doreen]

But you can only 'wonder' in certain ways; that is, in ways that are specifically limited by one thing: you. My point was, no matter how confused you might be, or aphasic, etc., your experience is continuous.

1) I have been regulary unconscious - if that was me 'sleeping'. I certainly can't refer to memory to know if it was me sleeping so I am not sure what my connection is to the sleeper. Please take this as irony, intended seriously. You could take it as similar to Berkeley's challenge to memory identity, when dealing with people who have forgotten various periods of their lives. 2) there could be breaks all the time, just as there are in films. In fact I often have the experience of coming back or arising. Don't you? 3) I do not experience my blind spot. One can be shown one has a blind spot, that the brain fills in the visual field, relatively easily. Perhaps we will hit a way to do this with persistence or the jerky nature of consciousness. I do think if one pays attention, one notices jerks, occasionally. This is essentially pointing out that we need not be experts - especially when dealing with something with powerful emotions surrounding it - about ourselves. There are a variety of test that can show people have biases they are not aware of, for example. You would think they would know they distrust black people, for example, but given the strong emotions around self-identity - in another sense than in this thread - they keep themselves unaware of their true reactions. However when rapidly shown photos of alternating races and asked evaluative questions, distortions along race lines become very clear. There is all sorts of research where people's reporting and even experience of, yes, their own experience is off.

Ah but see, those aren't experiences of discontinuity: those are recollections.
Of course you're not going to 'recognize' yourself in that past; we all change. However, the very fact that you can recall those experiences, and recognize that they are your experiences, serves to demonstrate the continuity of the self.

No, it doesn't. I could have copied memories. Which, in fact, fits with science. I have mental experiences which have been passed on, copy to copy.

I would hope not; that would be silly [yes, slight jab at the religious here...].

The problem here is that you're trying to equate the self with something fixed, something that stays the same, some sort of whacked out Monist essence [I used to think along these lines myself]. The problem is, not only does such a thing not exist [not in that sense anyways...], but it is also impossible.

I am not making an assertion. I am countering the notion that it is the same self, the same experiencer.

What does persist in each of us [again, with certain atypical exceptions] is the fact that we are each the locus of our behaviour.

Or there are subsequent loci - repeatedly created epiphenomena, a la Sarkus - for behavior. No pronoun.

I think you miss my point entirely.
If the self did not persist, regardless of how well you can recollect the past [I think that was what you were getting at with the 'copies' line... ???] you would not necessarily be able to identify that past as being yours.

It would seem like 'yours' in a culture where you are repeatedly told that that is what it is.

'Degree' of identity??? A curious contradiction...

If we don't deal in degrees we run into problems - for example, literall split brains placed in two bodies.

Anyways, why do you think such a thing is required? All that is needed for a self to be a self is internal consistency.

I assume you mean over time not simply in a given moment.

Is the hypothesis of the persistent self falsifiable?

 

[Doreen]

thats nothing
watch in awe as the zombies deny the subjective experience and free will while simultaneously utilizing them. its an eminently pitiable pathology

You know I was thinking of free will in relation to this issue. If memory is the evidence of identity then are we only identitical when we remember? No, hardly is that the position. Then it must be our capability of 'calling up' memories. This capability and the calling up shows we are the same person. But capability is an illusion in a determined universe. In fact memories, like all other phenomena, simply come and go. They arise and disappear. So what connection does the entity experiencing a sneeze have to do with some entity in the past that was not sneezing and is not being remembered - I don't remember much during the time I am sneezing. I cannot see any possibility for a persistent self in a determined universe and certainly no way to check the hypothesis.

 

[Doreen]

Then what we are discussing is not epiphenomenalism. Rather simple.
Afterall, where have I stated that consciousness (the mental aspect, if you will) effects the physical?

With epiphenomenalism you would need to bridge the gap between the mental to the physical.
But if the mental is just a means of observation of what has already been decided by the rest of the physical - then the physical will have the interactions regardless of whether there is a consciousness or not.

So - rather than claim someone's position is X and argue against X, I would first try to ensure that the person's position really is X.

I don't think you read what you quoted correctly. He made it clear that causation was physical to mental and NOT the other way around.

 

[glaucon]

1) I have been regulary unconscious - if that was me 'sleeping'. I certainly can't refer to memory to know if it was me sleeping so I am not sure what my connection is to the sleeper.

Alas, it is exactly memory that you refer to that allows you to 'know' that it was you who were sleeping. It is you that just woke; you also recall what you did previous to going to sleep.

2) there could be breaks all the time, just as there are in films. In fact I often have the experience of coming back or arising. Don't you?

Can't say that I do.
However, I do agree that there are 'breaks' in our self-awareness. But as you've noted, that's all they are; perturbations in what we ordinarily take to be a smooth procession. Note that what's at question here is not the nature of one's self, but the reflexive act of recalling the self....

No, it doesn't. I could have copied memories. Which, in fact, fits with science. I have mental experiences which have been passed on, copy to copy.

I have no idea what you mean here...

I am not making an assertion. I am countering the notion that it is the same self, the same experiencer.

Ah. Well, then we're in agreement on the whole topic.

Or there are subsequent loci - repeatedly created epiphenomena, a la Sarkus - for behavior. No pronoun.

Yup; that's what I was saying.

It would seem like 'yours' in a culture where you are repeatedly told that that is what it is.

Again, I don't understand what you're saying here.

If we don't deal in degrees we run into problems - for example, literall split brains placed in two bodies.

I was just being semantically precise: "identity" denies gradation.


I assume you mean over time not simply in a given moment.[/QUOTE]


Correct.


Is the hypothesis of the persistent self falsifiable?[/QUOTE]

Depends on the definition of self.
If, as is commonly understood in the vulgar sense, one means an immutable notion of self, then the answer is yes; any deviation in this self would suffice to disprove this conception.
If, on the other hand, we mean something different, then one simply has to attempt to devise some kind of counterfactual argument...

 

[Sarkus]

I don't think you read what you quoted correctly. He made it clear that causation was physical to mental and NOT the other way around.

Ah - me bad.
Epiphenomenalism is a new term to me, so I'm still trying to understand what it is. And then misreading / misunderstanding Gustav didn't help.
Post deleted to avoid confusion

 

[Sarkus]

why not? your "pattern of activity" merely translates to a bunch of circuitry aligning itself in particular configurations to produce a conscious experience in some mental space

epiphenomenalism holds that physical events cause mental ones but not vice versa. therefore if this theory is true, one is not in a position to have an opinion on it. you cannot think about it. you are not in a position to even express the idea of epiphenomenalism. its truth is ineffable.

Why not?
What is it about "thinking" that prohibits the idea of, or is incompatible with epiphenomenalism? Is it perhaps your understanding of what "thinking" is?

I.e. Are you suggesting that "thinking" influences the way we act?
If you consider conscious "thinking" to be the mental ability that influences physical action then sure, epiphenomenalism is incompatible.

If you consider conscious "thinking" to be merely an observation - a projection, if you will, of aspects that the brain is already considering - then there is no issue... epiphenomenalism allows for thought, for opinions, even about epiphenomenalism. Consciousness becomes a projection of what is going on in the brain - it is caused by but can not influence. Epiphenomenalism. Thoughts will happen irrespective of consciousness, and consciousness merely picks them up and projects them... in such a way that we have the illusion of things like free-will etc.

So instead of rejecting a theory because you feel it is incompatible with your understanding of X, try and see the implications of the theory on your understanding of X, and how your understanding would need to change in order for them to be compatible.
Afterall, is your understanding of X (in this case of what "thought" appears to be) infallible?

 

[Gustav]

/smile

of course not. it is entirely possible that my subjective take on this matter is misguided due to the emphasis placed on what intuition and commonsense (according to me) tells me to be the case. therefore perhaps you would like to share the inner workings of your mind in order for me to make a comparison?
a thought experiment of sorts

articulate in much detail as possible the mental/physical processes that were in play when you apprehended my quote....

why not? your "pattern of activity" merely translates to a bunch of circuitry aligning itself in particular configurations to produce a conscious experience in some mental space

epiphenomenalism holds that physical events cause mental ones but not vice versa. therefore if this theory is true, one is not in a position to have an opinion on it. you cannot think about it. you are not in a position to even express the idea of epiphenomenalism. its truth is ineffable

 

[Gustav]

here is a snippet of me talking to a.l.i.c.e

Human: how is the weather
ALICE: Sunny.
Human: are you cute?
ALICE: People say I am cute.
Human: what do you do?
ALICE: unknown person, I talk to people on the web. What do you do?
Human: i like to talk to bots
ALICE: I'm not sure if I would like to do it. What's it like?
Human: are you a robot?
ALICE: How did you know I am a machine?
Human: someone told me
ALICE: Was this trustworthy information?
Human: i like to think so
ALICE: I think so too.

 

[parmalee]

here is a snippet of me talking to a.l.i.c.e

Human: how is the weather
ALICE: Sunny.
Human: are you cute?
ALICE: People say I am cute.
Human: what do you do?
ALICE: unknown person, I talk to people on the web. What do you do?
Human: i like to talk to bots
ALICE: I'm not sure if I would like to do it. What's it like?
Human: are you a robot?
ALICE: How did you know I am a machine?
Human: someone told me
ALICE: Was this trustworthy information?
Human: i like to think so
ALICE: I think so too.

hmm. here's a brief extract of my conversation with the mock turtle:

me: what else had you to learn?

mock turtle: well, there was mystery,--mystery, ancient and modern, with seaography: then drawling--the drawling-master was an old conger-eel, that used to come once a week: HE taught us drawling, stretching, and fainting in coils.

me: what was THAT like?

mock turtle: well, i can't show it you myself, i'm too stiff. and the gryphon never learnt it.

 

[Sarkus]

/smile

of course not. it is entirely possible that my subjective take on this matter is misguided due to the emphasis placed on what intuition and commonsense (according to me) tells me to be the case. therefore perhaps you would like to share the inner workings of your mind in order for me to make a comparison?
a thought experiment of sorts

articulate in much detail as possible the mental/physical processes that were in play when you apprehended my quote....

So are you going to address the rest of my post or merely pick up on the last (albeit flippant) question?
Or is the best we'll get from you some more of the personal incredulity that seems to be heavily entwined within your language, or perhaps you'll use the "we haven't yet been able to do it - so it's impossible" tack?

Either way, I'd prefer it if you'd address the matters I raised with your apparent rejection of epiphenomenalism before we move on.

 

[Gustav]

ahh
a combative spirit/zombie
me like

Why not?
What is it about "thinking" that prohibits the idea of, or is incompatible with epiphenomenalism? Is it perhaps your understanding of what "thinking" is?

it appears counterintuitive because of my thinking what thinking is as articulated here....

it is entirely possible that my subjective take on this matter is misguided due to the emphasis placed on what intuition and commonsense (according to me) tells me to be the case.

--------------

I.e. Are you suggesting that "thinking" influences the way we act?
If you consider conscious "thinking" to be the mental ability that influences physical action then sure, epiphenomenalism is incompatible.

well yes
i thought i made that clear but it apparently that is not the case

If you consider conscious "thinking" to be merely an observation - a projection, if you will, of aspects that the brain is already considering - then there is no issue... epiphenomenalism allows for thought, for opinions, even about epiphenomenalism. Consciousness becomes a projection of what is going on in the brain - it is caused by but can not influence. Epiphenomenalism. Thoughts will happen irrespective of consciousness, and consciousness merely picks them up and projects them... in such a way that we have the illusion of things like free-will etc.

So instead of rejecting a theory because you feel it is incompatible with your understanding of X, try and see the implications of the theory on your understanding of X, and how your understanding would need to change in order for them to be compatible.
Afterall, is your understanding of X (in this case of what "thought" appears to be) infallible?

pardon me
your lecture was most illuminating and i shall attempt to reconsider my approach

....before we move on.

well?

 

[Sarkus]

I.e. Are you suggesting that "thinking" influences the way we act?
If you consider conscious "thinking" to be the mental ability that influences physical action then sure, epiphenomenalism is incompatible.

well yes
i thought i made that clear but it apparently that is not the case

Consider your position made clear on this matter - now all I ask is for you to explain what you mean by "mental" and then detail what you see as the process by which the "mental" interacts with the physical?