Hallucinations, proof of computers?

gamelord

Registered Senior Member
Okay want to say, last year I had a hallucination. Hallucination was I saw a red digital timer in my eye counting down time. The hallucination was unlike most hallucinations. This is because it wasn't really a delusion, I did not believe in monsters or ghosts or anything like that. Instead it was more like a videogames, where something was stuck to my eye, like a gui, hud. Like I was a cyborg robot in a videogame, with text on my eye.

I googled about hallucinations, it says this
"Look out the nearest window. See all that real stuff? Stuff that looks real? No possible way it could be fake? That's what hallucinating is like. It looks normal. I don't realize I'm hallucinating until someone says something along the lines of “John, there's no one in the corner staring at you”

This is why I am not sure what I did was a hallucination. Because hallucinations are silly and make you believe in things that look real. But none of this looked real, it looked fake, like a robot in a game. I was not delusional, I did not for a minute believe the hallucination was part of physical space, instead it felt like I had a robot eye, with a GUI on it of text.

The other thing to note is, the hallucination faded to an intense red slowly, like an opacity fadeout of a videogame. And the hallucination was not part of physical space, it was like a 2d overlay on my eye that moved with my eye, and did not move with 3d space.

So the other thing is, neurologist says I have weird things in my brain, after he scanned me. He has no idea what they are, but he does not think it is cancer. So the weird stuff in my brain is unexplained.


The other thing is, 2 years ago I was taking a nap and closing my eyes. When I close my eyes I usually just see blobs of color. But this time, I closed my eyes and saw computer screens that looked like 1995 unlike any computer screen I had seen. Everything was in a new language too. The language looked slightly russian but it was not Russian.

My immediate hypothesis was that I was on the computer too long, so I opened my laptop and I realized the GUI of the laptop did not look the same as the GUI I saw imprinted in my brain. The spacing was different, the colors were different, the colors were in such a way that as not to be simply inverted, and the text was different.


So my hypothesis is that we could be living in a simulation. Neil de grasse tyson says sim theory is plausible.
 
So my hypothesis is that we could be living in a simulation. Neil de grasse tyson says sim theory is plausible.

That our apparent bodies and the manifested character of all other corporeal phenomena would be residents of simulations (of sorts) is unavoidable even without the broader and centuries-worn "realities nested within realities" speculation going under the contemporary label of simulation hypothesis. From the standpoint that the well-behaved external world which one normally experiences is outputted / maintained by configurations of neural activity. But the latter "within the skull" microcosm is kept updated by supposedly objective sensory information. Whereas hallucinations are internal psychological slash chemical influences intruding upon that external environment model of the individual, using manipulated memories that are the same building blocks of dreams.

Erwin Schrödinger: "The world is a construct of our sensations, perceptions, memories. It is convenient to regard it as existing objectively on its own. But it certainly does not become manifest by its mere existence. Its becoming manifest is conditional on very special goings-on in very special parts of this very world, namely on certain events that happen in a brain."​

But back to the grander scale version: Beyond the problem of ever verifying it, these simulation hypotheses often repeat the same situation to explain or be the next-level cause of the original situation (if they advocate using computers made possible by yet another repeated natural realm of mechanistic relationships). IOW, such either is or scrapes shoulders with the Homunculus Fallacy. Resulting in an endlessly receding Russian Doll-like scenario if they were accepted to be the case.

To avoid that, any hierarchical cause proposed for the continuum of this world needs to be something different than this world itself -- not of a computer origin, or at least not computation dependent upon the familiar properties and regulating principles sported by this physical manifestation.

Also, and perhaps needless to say: Unless quantum computers could circumvent the expected limitations, we ourselves could not literally simulate yet another entire universe via conventional computers existing within this cosmos. Much less support an extended Russian Doll scenario via that (further virtual realities nested within virtual realities).

To create the illusion of a richly extended cosmos, some kind of technological, collective solipsism would have to be recruited, akin to how your brain creates a limited and semi-permanent external environment on the fly for your dream avatar, when you're asleep (IOW, generating "more of it" as needed). Of course, an actual dream is sloppy in its coherence, so technological solipsism would have to be regulated by firm principles (rather than the arbitrary emotional impulses of a dreaming brain) to make the extended illusion of its giant cosmos reliable and hang together well. That would include revising memories and environmental records to cover up glitches and any major errors / conflicts in processing.

~
 
That our apparent bodies and the manifested character of all other corporeal phenomena would be residents of simulations (of sorts) is unavoidable even without the broader and centuries-worn "realities nested within realities" speculation going under the contemporary label of simulation hypothesis. From the standpoint that the well-behaved external world which one normally experiences is outputted / maintained by configurations of neural activity. But the latter "within the skull" microcosm is kept updated by supposedly objective sensory information. Whereas hallucinations are internal psychological slash chemical influences intruding upon that external environment model of the individual, using manipulated memories that are the same building blocks of dreams.

Erwin Schrödinger: "The world is a construct of our sensations, perceptions, memories. It is convenient to regard it as existing objectively on its own. But it certainly does not become manifest by its mere existence. Its becoming manifest is conditional on very special goings-on in very special parts of this very world, namely on certain events that happen in a brain."​

But back to the grander scale version: Beyond the problem of ever verifying it, these simulation hypotheses often repeat the same situation to explain or be the next-level cause of the original situation (if they advocate using computers made possible by yet another repeated natural realm of mechanistic relationships). IOW, such either is or scrapes shoulders with the Homunculus Fallacy. Resulting in an endlessly receding Russian Doll-like scenario if they were accepted to be the case.

To avoid that, any hierarchical cause proposed for the continuum of this world needs to be something different than this world itself -- not of a computer origin, or at least not computation dependent upon the familiar properties and regulating principles sported by this physical manifestation.

Also, and perhaps needless to say: Unless quantum computers could circumvent the expected limitations, we ourselves could not literally simulate yet another entire universe via conventional computers existing within this cosmos. Much less support an extended Russian Doll scenario via that (further virtual realities nested within virtual realities).

To create the illusion of a richly extended cosmos, some kind of technological, collective solipsism would have to be recruited, akin to how your brain creates a limited and semi-permanent external environment on the fly for your dream avatar, when you're asleep (IOW, generating "more of it" as needed). Of course, an actual dream is sloppy in its coherence, so technological solipsism would have to be regulated by firm principles (rather than the arbitrary emotional impulses of a dreaming brain) to make the extended illusion of its giant cosmos reliable and hang together well. That would include revising memories and environmental records to cover up glitches and any major errors / conflicts in processing.

~
I've had dejavu before, so maybe that is it trying to cover up some kind of error.

I don't know why solispm is inherently needed. Physics in games are become very realistic and approaching the same level of detail as reality.

It is important to note the concept of LOD (level of detail) when it comes to sim theory. This is because, rendering our life story, although of great effect, is not needed that much computational power. First of all, the framerate of our lives does not seem much higher than 60 or 120 fps. And some say a framerate cannot be proven, because the mind is too liquid. Well the mind kind of blends together the frames in our consciousness. Because shower droplets are seen as streams, our minds lack the detail to be conscious of each individual shower droplet.

Second, we seem to have a visual field that only has high details in certain areas. We cannot simultaneously increase the detail of our vision in all areas, only that which we are focused on. This would be a cheap trick to decrease GPU strain of the sim.

Finally, we cannot actually see atoms, unless we are focused on the microscope. Thus the idea that the system would have to render the whole universe, down the the DNA strand and molecule, is a fallacy. It is more like Quake's BSP technology which gives the illusion you are in a giant world, when all it is rendering is the current room you are in, and once you step into the next room the other room dissappears and is not rendered. Similarly, molecules and star systems would not actually be rendered, until you go to look at them. This goes hand in hand with quantum theory and that things only exist depending on the manner you observe them.

So creating a sim of this universe would not really require that good of a computer, only a computer maybe a few years or decades down the road. And the computers could be "system linked" so that there are multiple people in this world, inside the same massively multiplayer system.
 
I going to say that hallucinations aren't proof of computers...
It was a click bait threat title.

What it actually means to say is that my particular hallucinations are proof of a computer simulated reality.
 
I don't know why solispm is inherently needed. [...] Thus the idea that the system would have to render the whole universe, down the the DNA strand and molecule, is a fallacy.

IOW, the very "don't know why" of only generating experiences of scenes for the relevant observing entities in the simulation.

~
 
IOW, the very "don't know why" of only generating experiences of scenes for the relevant observing entities in the simulation.

~
But that would not be solipism, for instance if all people in a MMO are only rendering their scene, that does not imply solipism. Or in the case of BSP FPS, solipsm would imply that only one scene is real, and that the rest of the players are NOT rendering their scene.
 
But that would not be solipism, for instance if all people in a MMO are only rendering their scene, that does not imply solipism. Or in the case of BSP FPS, solipsm would imply that only one scene is real, and that the rest of the players are NOT rendering their scene.

You're missing the earlier part where it was introduced: "some kind of technological, collective solipsism" -- the latter an expression arguably first used in George Orwell's novel *1984*. The bottom line is that regardless of the tentative labels used or suggested, we both agree. We are both referring to a parsimonious version of a world being simulated by the limitations of conventional computers.

The "collective" modifier simply means that interconsistent multiple points of view are being realized by the processes rather than only the perspectives of a single observing agent of traditional or literal solipsism. The "technological" adjective itself indicates that a mind-based reality isn't being referred to, but one enabled by computation and artificial substrate.

For instance, imagine having a dream where instead of that world being manifested by your one lone avatar's roving POV (equivalent to solipsism proper), your conscious activity is splintered into a hundred avatars with different lives, each experiencing a different scene of that dream realm. At the bottom there's only one brain doing it all, but it's fragmented into multiple simulated personalities handling the business of providing empirical and intellectual evidence of that dream virtually existing.

Instead of a metaphoric comparison to [collective] solipsism, I could have borrowed anything from David Hume's "panphenomenalism" to George Berkeley's immaterialism instead. But those metaphysical proposals still involve the entire observable contents of a universe being maintained. (As either manifestations or perceptions -- rather than as physical entities which aren't even appearances of nothingness to themselves when lacking consciousness, but are nevertheless claimed to "exist in the dark" so to speak).

Whereas technological [collective] solipsism would only worry about the engendering of scenes and sensations for the conscious characters in the simulation that are observing, feeling, etc (and the overall coherence of those events holding together well -- making sense, conforming to rules).

Repeating what I said above, for emphasis: Regardless of the tentative labels used or suggested, we are both referring to a parsimonious version of a world being simulated by the limitations of conventional computers. Instead of the whole cosmos.

Whether or not the internal consistency of it could actually be achieved and maintained across an enormous number of observing / feeling virtual agents is another matter. The designers would not want a resource-devouring mess of having to constantly edit memories of both individuals and environmental records to salvage or restore coherence.

They would also want that world being largely generated on the fly like the brain does a dream. As an example: If you were able to never die and remained perpetually in a dreaming coma, you could walk forever on the plane of an endless landscape -- but your brain certainly couldn't store all of that, but merely be outputting more of it as needed. A brain, however, isn't lawfully reliable: It's not regulated by the stern system of nomological principles, general concepts, etc the simulation team would require.

~
 
Ah I guess so we agree on the same thing, though a different interpretation of the words used.

In any case, the unreliability of the brain could be the exact trick that the system is optimized. Since each mind sees the world differently, graphically speaking most visual entities do not have to be synced "pixel perfect". By a general idea that brains cannot be relied upon for accuracy, failures and inconsistencies in the simulation can be explained away by ideas like "Everyone has a different perception", "Everyone sees the world differently", "under the influence", etc. Some extreme failures of the simulation could be called outright hallucinations or delusions, or be explained away as mandela effects or dejavu.
 
Back
Top