This might be one of those chats where phenomenology collides with scientific tries at objective description. Darkness seems to be phenomenal (something brains derive from perceptual inputs), but we try to take it beyond this abstraction and determine objective absences of, say, visible light, thus defining a phenomenon by its opposite. (we do this with "cold," too)
I could say for example that "scaryness" is a quantifiable, controllable, repeatable property of horror movies. We could measure galvanic skin response, pulse and perspiration during different movie scenes, correlate this with reported experiences of viewers being scared, and come up with a dataset of physiological changes that is then put under the phenomenal umbrella of scaryness. But when we're packing up the equipment and heading home, we can admit that scaryness, as an abstract way of speaking about scenes in fright flicks, remains in the phenomenological sphere and is not a more objective set of physical properties like, say, cinema projector photons passing through rectangular frames of film emulsion and bouncing off a phosphor screen 24 X/sec. into human eyes where they strike visual pigment molecules and trigger electrochemical signals through the optic nerve etc.
I think it's easy to get into what philosophers call category errors.
en.wikipedia.org
We don't find a chemist who will separate out all the compounds in paint and then produce one on a little sample tray and say "here is the darkness!" (or if she does, then we take it as metaphor, not a literal substance with the unique property of darkness)