Is free will possible in a deterministic universe?

[Halc]

and what is the duration of that point in time?

That's like asking the width of a mathematical line. It is zero, which doesn't imply that the line's length is zero.

Also see my post to Sarkus #1236 before you respond please.

That post is full of nonsense. Quack indeed. More like Trigonometric Troll.

If distance = 0 then there are no dimensions

Wrong in multiple ways. Say a line segment is parallel to the y axis. It is zero width in the x direction, so distance along x is zero. There is still an x dimension, but that particular line does not extend into it, so a distance of zero does not eliminate the dimension. There is still a y dimension, and the segment extends a finite distance along it.

 

[Quantum Quack]

That's like asking the width of a mathematical line. It is zero, which doesn't imply that the line's length is zero.
That post is full of nonsense. Quack indeed. More like Trigonometric Troll.

Wrong in multiple ways. Say a line segment is parallel to the y axis. It is zero width in the x direction, so distance along x is zero. There is still an x dimension, but that particular line does not extend into it, so a distance of zero does not eliminate the dimension. There is still a y dimension, and the segment extends a finite distance along it.

and if time duration is zero your Y axis fails to exist... duh!

So our picture of a table can't exist at zero shutter exposure rate.
Y axis can not exist when time duration is zero
rocks can not have dimension if time duration is zero
and I can go on and on...

no time duration means nothing exists... end of story...

next... can we get back on topic now?

 

[Vociferous]

As a reader here, I must say that one doubt I have is whether you, Vociferous, are going to address the seemingly valid criticisms raised against what you have written, notably the relevance of the theories of time? Instead you seem to prefer trying to psychoanalyse the critic, as if that somehow removes the criticisms. Whether he is projecting or not, and to be honest I don’t see any, his criticisms of what you have raised seem to remain. Maybe you should focus on that? Or are you removing all doubt for the readers as to your unwillingness and/or inability in that regard?

Perhaps you could justify the criticisms better than Baldeee has managed to. Repeatedly saying something is irrelevant is a bare assertion, not an argument warranting rebuttal.
Simple. Does causality rely on time? If so, the nature of time is crucial to any question about a deterministic system. I've said this repeatedly, so maybe you haven't been keeping up with the discussion. If you had, you'd have seen Baldeee first claim that anything that disputes determinism is irrelevant to this thread, where it's been stipulated. Then he claimed theories of time were irrelevant if they don't refute determinism. See the contradiction? Even after I said they don't refute determinism, he still insists theories of time are irrelevant, for no clear reason I can discern. I've even asked him to give me any example of something being "set in stone" but not yet existing, aside from his bare assertion about the future. Nothing.

Maybe you can do better?

 

[Michael 345]

Does causality rely on time?

I would contend only in the context the cause must precede the event ie the past must happen before the future

If you class that as rely?

But then again I also contend TIME does not exist

 

[Vociferous]

Yes, all definitions of causality explicitly state that cause must precede effect. So that relationship relies on something separating and ordering those events.

 

[Michael 345]

Yes, all definitions of causality explicitly state that cause must precede effect. So that relationship relies on something separating and ordering those events.

I think the seperation you are looking for is called AGE not TIME

AGE is a arbitrary measurement made between arbitrary markers placed at arbitrary NOW moments

 

[Write4U]

W4U said;
Change merely means another measurement of duration.

Halc said:
where you seem to equate change to measurement of duration, if duration is something distinct from time. I cannot think of any situation where 'change' can be substituted for 'measurement of duration' and still make sense. "The physicist purchased an atomic clock to allow him to get a better change". What???

I misspoke!
To be clear, I should have said; Existing empty space has duration of existence and therefore has an emergent associated time frame (space-time). Change merely precedes another measurement of duration. Increments of duration of individual change inside spacetime. (called time-lines)
Time has no existence in and of itself and is therefore timeless. Time emerges with any physical chronology of existence and/or change.
Thanks for allowing me to clarify what I meant to say.

 

[Sarkus]

Perhaps you could justify the criticisms better than Baldeee has managed to. Repeatedly saying something is irrelevant is a bare assertion, not an argument warranting rebuttal.

I think he has adequately expressed why he considers it irrelevant. Just looking at the past few posts of his:
#1182: "If no theory of time alters the nature of determinism, as you have agreed, and if the question can be answered by analysis of that nature of determinism alone, then of what relevance is the theory of time?"
#1172: "Look, I’ve explained to you quite fully why I consider them irrelevant, how I can answer the question without the need to consider theories of time."
#1170: "Hence the choice [of a theory of time] is irrelevant, since the question relies solely on what is or is not possible in a deterministic system."
I.e. he is saying that if something is not required to answer a question then it is irrelevant to the question. And that he can answer the question without needing to consider the theory of time.
If you don't see that as an explanation of why he thinks it irrelevant then the issue you're facing is somewhat closer to home, I fear.

Simple. Does causality rely on time? If so, the nature of time is crucial to any question about a deterministic system.

Only if it impacts on what determinism is, or does. And you've repeatedly stated that you agree that it doesn't. Thus, if the answer can be answered only by looking at the nature of determinism, the nature of time is clearly irrelevant. This seems fairly obvious, no?

I've said this repeatedly, so maybe you haven't been keeping up with the discussion.

But what you're saying is not actually explaining why it is relevant to the discussion. Being necessary does not automatically make something relevant. Relevance depends on the issue/question being discussed. If X requires Y, but the question can be answered solely by analysis of X, then Y is not relevant - unless, of course, Y alters the nature of X (while still remaining X) such that it alters the analysis of X. You and Baldeee have both agreed that Y (theory of time) does not alter the nature of determinism (X), have you not? Thus if the question can be answered by analysis of X alone, Y would seem to be irrelevant.
For example, if asked the question "if I have 5 bricks and add 2 more, how many do I have?" does it matter that the bricks need to have been created? Clearly not. On what grounds, then, do you think Y is relevant? Because it is necessary for X? That alone, as shown, would be fallacious reasoning.

If you had, you'd have seen Baldeee first claim that anything that disputes determinism is irrelevant to this thread, where it's been stipulated. Then he claimed theories of time were irrelevant if they don't refute determinism. See the contradiction?

No, I'm afraid I don't. If one is asked to analyse X then if anything arises (e.g. Z) which takes X off the table then you're no longer analysing X, thus Z should not be raised if the matter at hand is an analysis of X. All one does by raising Z is analysing the applicability of X, which is an entirely separate matter.

Similarly, as explained above, if you raise something (Y) which doesn't actually alter what X is, then that, too, would seem to be irrelevant to the analysis of X.
This seems reasonably obvious, no? Or what am I missing?

Do you think the theory of time impacts upon the nature of determinism? Does determinism not remain deterministic under all three theories that you have mentioned? If so, and if it is simply the nature of determinism through which one can answer the question, the relevancy of the nature of time really would seem to be irrelevant.

Even after I said they don't refute determinism, he still insists theories of time are irrelevant, for no clear reason I can discern.

His reasons seem pretty clear to me, I'm afraid.

I've even asked him to give me any example of something being "set in stone" but not yet existing, aside from his bare assertion about the future. Nothing.

Again, I think he has explained himself in this regard: "set in stone" is a matter of certainty of events occuring, and the nature of determinism - not the theories of time - is what means we can consider the future, whether it can be said to yet exist or not, to be set in stone.
E.g. at time t=100 the state of the system is X100, and being a deterministic we know that when t=200 the system will be X200, and we can theoretically know everything about X200 IFF we know everything about X100 and the laws that govern the system. Thus X200 is set in stone. When t=200 the state of the system will be X200 and can be nothing else. This is all simply due to the deterministic nature of the system. This is ultimately what it means for the system to be deterministic, i.e. every effect being wholly determined by the causes, and there being no randomness.

Now, when it comes to the theories of time, it seems that at time t=100, one theory says that only t=100 actually exists, another says that all t from 0 to 100 exist, and the other says that all t, from 0 to whenever the system ends, exist. As you can see, this is simply a matter of what is considered to exist. They say nothing about the certainty or otherwise of events in the future. But if all those theories are compatible with a deterministic system, then it is still the determinism in a deterministic system that means the future is set in stone.

Thus if the system is deterministic then everything is set in stone, but whether or not the future can be said to exist or not is dependent upon the theory of time one adopts.

This seems to be his position, and it is one I concur with, and hopefully the above is clearer for you to understand.

Maybe you can do better?

I can only explain it as I understand it. And given the above, the onus would seem to remain on you to justify the relevancy of the theory of time to the discussion. As shown above, something being necessary is, alone, fallacious reasoning.

 

[Vociferous]

I think he has adequately expressed why he considers it irrelevant. Just looking at the past few posts of his:
#1182: "If no theory of time alters the nature of determinism, as you have agreed, and if the question can be answered by analysis of that nature of determinism alone, then of what relevance is the theory of time?"
#1172: "Look, I’ve explained to you quite fully why I consider them irrelevant, how I can answer the question without the need to consider theories of time."
#1170: "Hence the choice [of a theory of time] is irrelevant, since the question relies solely on what is or is not possible in a deterministic system."
I.e. he is saying that if something is not required to answer a question then it is irrelevant to the question. And that he can answer the question without needing to consider the theory of time.

#1182: The question can't "be answered by analysis of that nature of determinism alone" because the question is not solely about determinism. Claiming that determinism alone is enough to answer a question about both determinism and free will is simply begging the question, by not taking into account anything but a foregone conclusion.
#1172: Repeating that something is irrelevant does nothing to justify the claim.
#1170: Repeating that something is irrelevant does nothing to justify the claim. And relying solely on determinism is begging the question, by ignoring the part about free will.
I.e. Just because he thinks something is not required to arrive at his preferred answer does not make it irrelevant to any possible alternative. And denying that there may be any alternative conclusion is begging the question.

Only if it impacts on what determinism is, or does. And you've repeatedly stated that you agree that it doesn't. Thus, if the answer can be answered only by looking at the nature of determinism, the nature of time is clearly irrelevant. This seems fairly obvious, no?

If anything were to impact what determinism is or does, it would be just as much begging the question as just presuming determinism precludes free will, as a foregone conclusion.
No, the nature of time both does not alter what determinism is or does and does effect where in time the causal input exist.

In mathematics, computer science and physics, a deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system. A deterministic model will thus always produce the same output from a given starting condition or initial state.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterministic_system

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/​

A deterministic system only requires there be no randomness involved in the evolution of future states, and causal determinism only requires that the input at a given time determine the results thereafter. The theories of time do not introduce any randomness, and they do affect the "given time" of the causal input. If there is causal input of the present, unaccounted for by the past alone, that is crucial to an intellectually honest inquiry into the possibility for free will (which acts in the present) in such a system.

If you have a genuine interest in engaging the theories of time, instead of just dismissing them out of hand, I'd be happy to reiterate how they are relevant (which I presume you've missed).

But what you're saying is not actually explaining why it is relevant to the discussion. Being necessary does not automatically make something relevant. Relevance depends on the issue/question being discussed. If X requires Y, but the question can be answered solely by analysis of X, then Y is not relevant - unless, of course, Y alters the nature of X (while still remaining X) such that it alters the analysis of X. You and Baldeee have both agreed that Y (theory of time) does not alter the nature of determinism (X), have you not? Thus if the question can be answered by analysis of X alone, Y would seem to be irrelevant.
For example, if asked the question "if I have 5 bricks and add 2 more, how many do I have?" does it matter that the bricks need to have been created? Clearly not. On what grounds, then, do you think Y is relevant? Because it is necessary for X? That alone, as shown, would be fallacious reasoning.

But we're not talking only about determinism and time; we're also analyzing free will (if we're not just begging the question). The question involves both X (determinism) and Z (free will). While I'm sure Baldeee can arrive at his preferred conclusion without seriously considering Y, any outright denial of Z being relevant is begging the question. X requires Y (time), and is critical to having any consensus on the definition of X. Z, operating only in the present, is also crucially involved with Y. One doesn't need to alter X to still require Y to establish the details of X pertinent to Z.

If that's not satisfactory reason to simply engage with Y, I'll just accept that you're fine with begging the question too.

If you had, you'd have seen Baldeee first claim that anything that disputes determinism is irrelevant to this thread, where it's been stipulated. Then he claimed theories of time were irrelevant if they don't refute determinism. See the contradiction?

No, I'm afraid I don't. If one is asked to analyse X then if anything arises (e.g. Z) which takes X off the table then you're no longer analysing X, thus Z should not be raised if the matter at hand is an analysis of X. All one does by raising Z is analysing the applicability of X, which is an entirely separate matter.

Similarly, as explained above, if you raise something (Y) which doesn't actually alter what X is, then that, too, would seem to be irrelevant to the analysis of X.
This seems reasonably obvious, no? Or what am I missing?

Do you think the theory of time impacts upon the nature of determinism? Does determinism not remain deterministic under all three theories that you have mentioned? If so, and if it is simply the nature of determinism through which one can answer the question, the relevancy of the nature of time really would seem to be irrelevant.

No one offered anything that took determinism "off the table". That's Baldeee's straw man.
And if you altered determinism, in any way that made it the least bit indetermined, that would be irrelevant. Presuming that theories of time might do so is, again, Baldeee's own straw man. And demanding that theories of time do so, in order to be relevant, is plainly contradictory to not diminishing determinism. If you can't see that, I truly can't help you.

Again, determinism isn't the only thing under analysis here. But treating it as such is begging the question. I've repeated said that no theory of time alters determinism in any way that makes it less deterministic. But the theory of time is necessary to any honest evaluation of free will, the other half of the question here.

 

[Vociferous]

(cont...)

Again, I think he has explained himself in this regard: "set in stone" is a matter of certainty of events occuring, and the nature of determinism - not the theories of time - is what means we can consider the future, whether it can be said to yet exist or not, to be set in stone.

I'm still waiting for any concrete example of anything that can be "set in stone" before it even exists, beside the bare assertion about the future.

E.g. at time t=100 the state of the system is X100, and being a deterministic we know that when t=200 the system will be X200, and we can theoretically know everything about X200 IFF we know everything about X100 and the laws that govern the system. Thus X200 is set in stone. When t=200 the state of the system will be X200 and can be nothing else. This is all simply due to the deterministic nature of the system. This is ultimately what it means for the system to be deterministic, i.e. every effect being wholly determined by the causes, and there being no randomness.

That presumption relies solely upon there being no causal inputs between X100 and X200. It is begging the question to just presume any such new inputs are random and violate determinism.

Now, when it comes to the theories of time, it seems that at time t=100, one theory says that only t=100 actually exists, another says that all t from 0 to 100 exist, and the other says that all t, from 0 to whenever the system ends, exist. As you can see, this is simply a matter of what is considered to exist. They say nothing about the certainty or otherwise of events in the future. But if all those theories are compatible with a deterministic system, then it is still the determinism in a deterministic system that means the future is set in stone.

Saying the future is already "set in stone" can only be logically justified by eternalism, where the future already exists. Presuming that reasoning holds for the other two theories of time is a wholly unjustified bare assertion, unless or until someone can offer any other justifying example that does not involve the nature of time. If the future does not already exist, there is a logical reason why it doesn't. And since only a preexisting future offers any justification for it being certain, a non-existing future implies some other causal input than the past or distant initial conditions. None of which violate determinism, as none introduce randomness, but antecedent causes need not be in the distant past to still be deterministic.

And if you can't follow that much, there's little point in trying to connect free will with something you dismiss out of hand, seemingly begging the question, by just presuming the future "set" by the past without any real justification except asserting determinism means it must be so. Determinism doesn't actually say how far in the past events must be set, nor how far into the future.

 

[Sarkus]

#1182: The question can't "be answered by analysis of that nature of determinism alone" because the question is not solely about determinism. Claiming that determinism alone is enough to answer a question about both determinism and free will is simply begging the question, by not taking into account anything but a foregone conclusion.

Then perhaps you need to actually explain what it is about free will that relies on the nature of time, that means the question can be not answered through determinism alone? Just a thought. At the moment you haven't.

#1172: Repeating that something is irrelevant does nothing to justify the claim.
#1170: Repeating that something is irrelevant does nothing to justify the claim. And relying solely on determinism is begging the question, by ignoring the part about free will.
I.e. Just because he thinks something is not required to arrive at his preferred answer does not make it irrelevant to any possible alternative. And denying that there may be any alternative conclusion is begging the question.

I think that's the point he's been making with regard your position: he has stated why he thinks it irrelevant. He has been waiting for you, it seems for quite a while, to show how it is relevant. I can just as easily turn your comments back to you: repeating that something is relevant does nothing to justify the claim.
On what grounds do you hold it to be relevant? I.e. what is it about the specific theories of time one chooses that has an impact on the matter at hand? You haven't answered that. That seems to be what he has been saying to you many times, with you not playing ball.

If anything were to impact what determinism is or does, it would be just as much begging the question as just presuming determinism precludes free will, as a foregone conclusion.

Who is saying it is a foregone conclusion? Unless you mean that it is the logical conclusion? And if it is the logical conclusion... can that be helped? I mean, we could argue that 2+2 doesn't =4, because being 4 is the logical conclusion.
If you honestly think the theory of time one adopts has an impact on the matter, the onus is on you, and has remained on you since you first raised it, to explain and show why it is. It is not on anyone else to show that it is not relevant.

No, the nature of time both does not alter what determinism is or does and does effect where in time the causal input exist.

Sorry, you're saying that the the nature of time affects where in time the causal input exists? How so? If A is the cause of B, in all theories surely A is perceived to happen prior to B. Whether A actually exists when B occurs is not an issue for determinism. It simply means that A leads to B, and always leads to B.

A deterministic system only requires there be no randomness involved in the evolution of future states, and causal determinism only requires that the input at a given time determine the results thereafter. The theories of time do not introduce any randomness, and they do affect the "given time" of the causal input. If there is causal input of the present, unaccounted for by the past alone, that is crucial to an intellectually honest inquiry into the possibility for free will (which acts in the present) in such a system.

The bold is mine, clearly, but where do you get the idea that the causal input for the present can not be accounted for by the past alone? Nothing within determinism allows for it. Determinism: "the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature." Again, bolding mine. Note that this means that every event is wholly determined by events prior to the event in question. I.e. there is no "unaccounted for by the past alone". That is your misconception of determinism.
Sure, if there is a causal input that is unaccounted for by the past alone, you might be on to something, but here the universe is assumed to be deterministic, and the deterministic universe is one where every effect is wholly determined by antecedant causes. There is simply no space for "unaccounted for by the past alone". That notion is mutually exclusive to determinism. If you disagree with that then it might explain much of your disagreement with Baldeee, but it is one you would seem to be on the wrong side of.
Now, whether you think that this means that he, or I, or anyone who follows the argument, is simply begging the question, is to assume that, as has been stated previously, concluding that Socrates is mortal is to beg the question.

If you have a genuine interest in engaging the theories of time, instead of just dismissing them out of hand, I'd be happy to reiterate how they are relevant (which I presume you've missed).

I'm all ears. I've followed the thread thus far and, honestly, have yet to see how they are relevant, although given what I see as your misconception of determinism, I can see how you might think you have explained their relevance.

But we're not talking only about determinism and time; we're also analyzing free will (if we're not just begging the question). The question involves both X (determinism) and Z (free will). While I'm sure Baldeee can arrive at his preferred conclusion without seriously considering Y, any outright denial of Z being relevant is begging the question.

No, it's not. At least once you had agreed that the nature of determinism is not altered by the theories. His position, as stated, was that it was that nature alone that can answer the question. Sure, he undoubtedly has a notion of "free will" that he's working with, but I'm guessing that his argument is that if the result of all our "choices" are set in stone then all choice, and free will in general, is a useful illusion but an illusion nonetheless. Now, if one defines free will as the process of weighing up inputs and producing an output, then that works just as well for any and every automated switch. A thermostat, for example. More complex, yes, but the same in principle. And if that is all one considers freewill to be, then maybe that is where you should focus your attention? Because as it is, this sidetrack into the theory of time seems, as he has repeatedly advised, irrelevant.

X requires Y (time), and is critical to having any consensus on the definition of X.

You're slipping in your language, though. Y is not time, but the theory of time - specifically the ontological nature of time: which part of the past, present, and future actually exists. It is surely sufficient for determinism that there is the perceived passage of time. It doesn't require the past to exist. It doesn't require the future to exist. What is it about the existence of the past or future that affects the answer to the question here? That is what you're not supplying, or at least haven't supplied thus far.

Z, operating only in the present, is also crucially involved with Y. One doesn't need to alter X to still require Y to establish the details of X pertinent to Z.

If Z only operates in the present, and as per determinism the present is wholly determined by antecedant causes (i.e. the past), then whether or not the past now actually exists, and whether the future now exists or not, would seem to be irrelevant. The only thing that would be relevant would, I agree, be Z (free will) and X (determinism). Where does Y (theory of time) come in to it? Do you see Y (the theory of time) as being relevant to what free will is, for example. Because if so then you really do need to express that. Is that what you think, that the theory of time impacts what free will is? Are some concepts of free will only possible with some theories of time, perhaps?

If that's not satisfactory reason to simply engage with Y, I'll just accept that you're fine with begging the question too.

Sure, you can simply conclude that anyone who doesn't agree with you, or accept what you're saying, is begging the question, or you can try to actually detail why you think the theory of time is relevant.

No one offered anything that took determinism "off the table". That's Baldeee's straw man.

Maybe it is. I'm just explaining to you why what he said does not seem contradictory.

And if you altered determinism, in any way that made it the least bit indetermined, that would be irrelevant.

Agreed.

Presuming that theories of time might do so is, again, Baldeee's own straw man. And demanding that theories of time do so, in order to be relevant, is plainly contradictory to not diminishing determinism. If you can't see that, I truly can't help you.

He wasn't "demanding that the theories of time do so, in order to be relevant", but was saying that the only way they could be relevant is if you somehow showed they affected what it meant something to be deterministic, while remaining deterministic. His argument is clearly that if it doesn't affect determinism, and if he can answer the question through determinism alone (given whatever notion of free will he has assumed) then the theory of time really isn't relevant. That is not contradictory. And if you can't see that then I truly can't help you.

...

 

[Sarkus]

Cont’d…

Again, determinism isn't the only thing under analysis here. But treating it as such is begging the question. I've repeated said that no theory of time alters determinism in any way that makes it less deterministic. But the theory of time is necessary to any honest evaluation of free will, the other half of the question here.

You haven't actually mentioned how it impacts the evaluation of free will in any way. At least not that I can see. Maybe you have, maybe you can point to where you have indicated as much? And in doing so, maybe you really will show how the theories of time are relevant. Because that really is lacking from you thus far.

I'm still waiting for any concrete example of anything that can be "set in stone" before it even exists, beside the bare assertion about the future.

In a deterministic universe everything that happens is set in stone, everything is determined, wholly, fully, absolutely, from the state of the system in a prior moment (and governing laws). Everything that subsequently happens does so with certainty. It can not, could not, will not, be anything other than what it is. This is the nature of determinism. Do you accept that much? If not then there are more fundamental matters to work through, because then it would be you not actually understanding what it means for a system to be deterministic.

But if you do accept it then if you want a concrete example: your next move. The one after that. The one after that. What you are thinking now. The activity of every single molecule, atom, in the deterministic universe, is set in stone. Everything. If you accept the first part above, but then don’t accept those as concrete examples, then it would seem you are simply refusing to listen.

That presumption relies solely upon there being no causal inputs between X100 and X200. It is begging the question to just presume any such new inputs are random and violate determinism.

??? If there are causal inputs into the system between X100 and X200 that are not accounted for by the state of the system at X100 then the system at X is not deterministic. It is relying on things outside the system, such that X(n+1) is not wholly determined by Xn. Thus system X is, by definition, not deterministic. But we are supposed to be assuming a system (the universe) that is deterministic, are we not?

Saying the future is already "set in stone" can only be logically justified by eternalism, where the future already exists.

No, that is your presumption that existence is required for something to be set in stone. I have explained how being set in stone is justified from the nature of determinism itself. You have agreed all theories of time allow determinism, thus to be “set in stone” does not require it to exist, only that when it exists it is will happen exactly as determined from antecedent causes determine it to happen.

Presuming that reasoning holds for the other two theories of time is a wholly unjustified bare assertion, unless or until someone can offer any other justifying example that does not involve the nature of time. If the future does not already exist, there is a logical reason why it doesn't. And since only a preexisting future offers any justification for it being certain, a non-existing future implies some other causal input than the past or distant initial conditions. None of which violate determinism, as none introduce randomness, but antecedent causes need not be in the distant past to still be deterministic.

This is you being unable to divorce the certainty of an outcome from that outcome existing. I can’t be held accountable for you not understanding the difference. And unless you can come to understand and appreciate the difference then you’ll continue to struggle here.

And if you can't follow that much, there's little point in trying to connect free will with something you dismiss out of hand, seemingly begging the question, by just presuming the future "set" by the past without any real justification except asserting determinism means it must be so.

It’s not “asserting”… it is what determinism entails. Utterly and absolutely.

Determinism doesn't actually say how far in the past events must be set, nor how far into the future.

Determinism is the notion that state X1 wholly determines the next state X2. If X1 wholly determines X2 then X2 wholly determines X3, which wholly determines X4, ad infinitum. At the moment you’re suggesting that X1 wholly determines X2, which wholly determines X3, but this may not wholly determine X4. That, unfortunately, would be not be a deterministic system. Determinism doesn’t just work for a while and then break down. A system is either deterministic or it is not. Either every moment is wholly determined by antecedent moments, or it isn’t. And at the moment your “Determinism doesn't actually say how far in the past events must be set, nor how far into the future.” is simply to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of determinism. If something is not part of state X100 but has an effect on X200 then system X is not deterministic.


But hey, this is Baldeee's fight. It's quite clear to me that you don't grasp what determinism is, which explains much of the disagreement. Sure, one needs to address what is meant by "free will" as well, but so far you haven't even asked him that question. You've simply asserted that the ontological nature of time is relevant, without ever explaining why. And you assume question begging when one doesn't agree with you. But then perhaps you see question begging in concluding Socrates to be mortal. Who knows.
So I'll leave this disagreement with you to Baldeee. He may have a different take on the matter. But unless you can grasp what determinism entails, and explain the relevance of the theories of time, I can't see it actually going anywhere.

 

[Write4U]

Deterministic system

In mathematics, computer science and physics, a deterministic system is a system in which no randomness is involved in the development of future states of the system.[1] A deterministic model will thus always produce the same output from a given starting condition or initial state.

In physics

Physical laws that are described by differential equations represent deterministic systems, even though the state of the system at a given point in time may be difficult to describe explicitly.

In quantum mechanics, the Schrödinger equation, which describes the continuous time evolution of a system's wave function, is deterministic. However, the relationship between a system's wave function and the observable properties of the system appears to be non-deterministic.

In mathematics

The systems studied in chaos theory are deterministic. If the initial state were known exactly, then the future state of such a system could theoretically be predicted. However, in practice, knowledge about the future state is limited by the precision with which the initial state can be measured, and chaotic systems are characterized by a strong dependence on the initial conditions.[3] This sensitivity to initial conditions can be measured with Lyapunov exponents.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterministic_system

Can we say that if a system is deterministic, it has to be mathematical in essence?

 

[Quantum Quack]

Yes, all definitions of causality explicitly state that cause must precede effect. So that relationship relies on something separating and ordering those events.

If thinking in imaginary terms yes perhaps you are right.
Try:
The effect is the SUM of it's causation. So therefore Causation is the Effect and doesn't precede it in reality except as an arbitrary imaginary construct.

When observing a material object on a table you observing it's causation as an effect. You see no causation other than it's SUM.
As such the total causation does not precede the effect but is the effect.

 

[Write4U]

When observing a material object on a table you observing it's causation as an effect. You see no causation other than it's SUM.

The causation from moment to moment is hidden inside the table by thr trillion of dynamic movement of atoms and moleules. The sum is constantly renewing itself from the change of a previous sum. One can say that a previous sum is the causation for the next sum , but that's neglecting new input to the prior sum before the function to produce a new sum.

 

[Halc]

Yes, all definitions of causality explicitly state that cause must precede effect.

This is an interesting assertion. The only real-world deterministic models are the counterfactual ones like Bohmian mechanics. One real world, hard determinism, and the necessary property of such a model is that cause does not necessarily precede effect. To have it otherwise (as many of us prefer), you have to throw that sort of determinism out the window. What I do tomorrow is not determined by any physics that posits cause before effect.
It's an interesting conundrum of the sort preventing you from having your cake and eating it too.

 

[kx000]

Free will is for choosing between heaven and hell... Hello determinism.

 

[Write4U]

This is an interesting assertion. The only real-world deterministic models are the counterfactual ones like Bohmian mechanics. One real world, hard determinism, and the necessary property of such a model is that cause does not necessarily precede effect.

Can you explain this in some detail?

AFAIK, Bohmian Mechanics are purely deterministic, but necessarily not at all reversible .

Specifically, Bohmian mechanics asserts that electrons and other elementary particles have a definite position at every time and move according to an equation of motion that is one of the fundamental laws of the theory and involves a wave function that evolves according to the usual Schrödinger equation.Apr 26, 2017

Bohmian Mechanics

Does this mean that the Pilot Wave is a reversible function of the universe?

Does an ocean have a reversable wave function? Does Chaos have a reversible deterministic function?

 

[Write4U]

Free will is for choosing between heaven and hell... Hello determinism.

You sound like you believe you are a God and have a choice in the matter, curious.

Zeus received the sky, Poseidon received the seas, and Hades received the underworld, the unseen realm to which the souls of the dead go upon leaving the world as well as any and all things beneath the earth. Some myths suggest that Hades was dissatisfied with his turnout, but had no choice and moved to his new realm.

Hello determinism......

 

[Halc]

Can you explain this in some detail?

AFAIK, Bohmian Mechanics are purely deterministic, but necessarily not at all reversible .

I was not talking about reversibility, but from what I read online, it seems that all of quantum mechanics is fully reversible. I was speaking of determinism, and reversibility does not follow from determinism. Conway's Game of Life for instance is fully deterministic, yet is not reversible.

Does this mean that the Pilot Wave is a reversible function of the universe?

I thought pilot wave theory had pretty much been falsified.