Precisely.
But what one is commenting on is not something 'out there', but rather upon one's own thoughts.
And here is where a problem arises since communication about me, for example, will be taken by me to be about things not in your thoughts. There is the me for you and then there is the me for me. So once you are speaking/writing and make generalizations about others
that they notice
it will seem like claims about what is 'out there' unless you are using language in a non-standard way. IOW what may have great integrity as a representation of your thoughts in your journal takes on MORE than an epistemological solipsism once it is read by others and seems to be intended to be read by others. Were I eavesdropping on you speaking out loud to yourself at home it would be another story.
Isn't it?
I feel less crazy now. I am quite sure you will not like the comparison, but there was a certain point where I realized that Lixluke was communicating in yet another way and there was a certain consistency to his position then.
If by "others" you mean other entities, other people, then, conditionally, yes.
In this sense, "others" are nothing but my thoughts. The condition is that all of this is simply epistemologically stated. In other words, though I have little reason to say I have knowledge of an external source of these others, it's much more reasonable to maintain that I am not the source.
And so it might follow that upon reading your accounts the reasonably posited others will likely take your claims to be not merely about them as thought forms 'in' you or perhaps better 'of yours,' but as also about them and thus claims about objective 'things'.
I think we must.
The only other option is to fully grasp solipsism, and from a pragmatic position, it doesn't take much to see how poorly that would work out for us...
I don't think so. I don't think I have to assume others are just like me and necessarily approximately limited in the way I seem to be. I can simply explore. I could also think they might live out potentials I have. IOW that I am not what I seem like now. I certainly have experienced this in mundane ways where I go by (what seems like) my past experience of myself and assume I will not be able to ____________or do not experience ___________ and then find to my surprise that I was incorrect. I do not know where the limiting border is for those kinds of experiences.
Precisely.
The first is simply due to the facticity of our lives, thus, I've characterized it above as a pragmatic concern. The second is simply a function of being epistemologically prudent.
But oddly this epistemological prudence has led to claims about everyone. I understand, now, that this everyone is as thought forms in you. But, nevertheless, you end up making statements in terms of we and us. This doesn't seem as spare as it could be.
No. I'd say sticking to one's strictest epistemology would lead (as noted above) to solipsism, and then, yes, delusion.
However, "delusion" is tricky, as it's a loaded word (ontologically speaking..).
I was being wry.
A neat metaphor. Yeah, I think that works.
In areas like this one, I keep coming back to Kant's notion of apperception, where we're constantly bombarded by information, by sense-data. We are creatures that experience in an environment, and while we can, to a degree, be selective about what we 'receive', or 'listen to', that constant barrage cannot be eliminated.
There's no doubt that all that information is mediated by us,
See now as a creature who does not experience itself as (only) inside the phenomology of some guy in Canada, this sentence from someone saying they are being epistemologically prudent and not making objective claims (or ontological ones) seems pretty cocky.
I notice above, where I bolded, some of that model of the way things are, which to me makes both objective and ontological claims.
but to me, to speak of that unmediated 'source' is highly subject to error ( in particular, if we also try to characterize that 'source' in a non-subjective, non-interpretive manner, i.e., "objective"). If however, we simply describe our experiences, and from there compose some commonalities of features, at least then we're still speaking of the experiential...
I can see you saying 'I' but once you get to 'we'.....
Ever the realist. I love it.
Yes, I completely agree with what you're saying here.
For the most part, we all live our lives, as if everything we guess at is a truth. Pragmatically, this works fine, for the most part. It is only when we are questioned, when we are pressed to defend our assertions, that we come to see how poorly thought out they usually are.
I'm sure I could compose a list of at least one hundred things that on any given day I operate such that I know them to be certain. However, if pressed, I'm not sure how well I would do. Right now, I can think of perhaps one thing that I am prepared to assert as true. My overall point being that, the acts of asserting and claiming, in our daily lives, are nearly interchangeable (which of course, muddies the hell out of what we're trying to do herein..).
I have argued a similar line in defense of non-rational decision making and belief. I mean, we simply do not have time to be rational through and through. And frankly Agrippa's trilemma seems to arise if one sets out. Especially once memory and some minimal trust in it is on the table. And how could it not be?
You'll have to explicate further for me.
I'm either totally misunderstanding you or, I don't see how these three positions are problematic if used together.
I wasn't arguing they were an ill fit. I was laying out what I saw as our differences. That we differed on each point.
I hope I'm not contradicting myself, and I don't think I am, but if you see it, I'd rather address it.
I disagree with you on each point or at least 1 and 2, but I do not think I can show you are wrong.
1) I would say I must speak to others as if they transcend my experience of them. So when I write things down, I include this being beyond my full grasp. So I cannot speak of their limits. I cannot be objective about them beyond their beyondness. What you referred to as a reasonable assumption - that they are entities in their own right - seems not to affect your approach to putting truths into language. I would not say this is wrong. It is an effective use of language, but I think it leads to confusions because it is not what people expect - even the ones in your head I would guess.
2) I think one live in the world as if our assumptions or best guess are correct, but then have caution about stating with seeming certainty these assumptions. IOW 'don't know' is often a good official position. And further it would probably be interesting for everyone to see where they decide to be officially agnostic and where they don't. I think they will find, as I did, that my criteria vary. That the epistemological demands we expect others to follow, we often ignore ourselves on other issues.
Oh how beautifully Wittgensteinian.
In short, yes, that's right.
Though this doesn't necessarily mean that I'm not. In the Fregeian line of thought on Sinn and Bedeutung.
So we can take this one step further and imagine me relating what you've said to my spouse and how it will definitely sound to them like you are making objective claims.
Ah. OK. I see what you're saying now.
Yes, I can see how, given what I've written so far, my description of communication would seem to be more reportage, than interactive.
bingo.
hmmm
OK, let me say this then: epistemologically, there's a vast difference between experiential reports, and active discussion.
(I've got to do some more thought on this for sure...)
Sure.
Well, I've been told I'm excellent at communicating, but not so good at communication. In other words, put me on the spot an I can recite; put me on stage and I'm mute.
OK. I am getting a fuller picture.
I think some languages and cultures also fit this more than others.
Some are very objective. Language contains information, it does not express. Some are more subjective, the core is more like dancing than informing. Amazingly I would say you have taken a very rational approach to language. You are informing - which fits my sense of Canadians where care and information are prioritized (more than your neighbors to the South) - BUT this is all solipsized philosophically. So it is not personal in the usual sense, but nevertheless is highly self-focused as the ground of information. Your communication adheres to your own experience. Its merits are to the extent it fits your experience. Which again sounds obvious. That one should do this. Until I see the consequences when others are spoken of.
It ends up that statements, which from the pen or mouth of others, would be claims about the objective make up of the universe, are really claims about your experience. The same exact sentence would have radically different philosophical implications - or potential scope of claim - coming from you and someone else.
EDIT: sorry this last bit ends up rather ad hom, not that I mean it in any insulting way. I found your approach fascinating and I wanted to mull over it culturally, since that is where I usually encounter that kind of issue. I only think it is positive that you have this approach. I think a diversity of approaches to language is both good and inevitable. How else can we see the limitations of our own use.
