"You don't need philosophy to prove reality" - Geeser

[wynn]

Actually, it makes complete sense.
To have the conviction that, despite the entire history of human endeavours to do so, you alone somehow have access to an 'objectivity' cannot be anything but vanity. Such a personal entitlement is cause for great concern, if not medical attention.

Glaucon - but most people are like that, believing themselves to be objective.

The moment one starts to doubt one's senses and cognitive abilities is a precarious one, and the endeavor can easily turn into a slippery slope into a bottomless abyss, ending in insanity.

The history of art and philosophy is littered with the corpses of those who didn't know where or how to stop the doubting.

Again, I can't see it that way. How could being pragmatic possibly coincide with a total resistance to seeking alternatives??

Because such a resistance is often enough the pragmatic option to take.
Better a sparrow in the hand than a pigeon on the roof.

 

[glaucon]

My apologies if you think they are personal jibes.
I accept your warning albeit an extremely unfair one, considering there are these remarks from you, a little hypocritical, don't you think.
And on a similar par to mine. If mine are to be deemed personal jibes, then so must yours.
Being a moderator shouldn't give you the right to be unfair, or be exempt from any criticism should it. You should give yourself a verbal warning too.

Nothing more need be said

Mod note:
Note how I wasn't referring to my behaviour, but to yours.
In any case, simply because others have behaved in such a manner, that doesn't give license to you to do so.
Next time, feel free to PM me, as this is not the place for such discussions.

 

[glaucon]

Glaucon - but most people are like that, believing themselves to be objective.

I agree completely; most people do behave this way.
I think the difference comes into play when that conviction is never questioned..

 

[geeser]

I agree completely; most people do behave this way.
I think the difference comes into play when that conviction is never questioned..

Exactly.

 

[glaucon]

Signal,

Some addendum comments to your post here.
I had to take more time on these.

The moment one starts to doubt one's senses and cognitive abilities is a precarious one, and the endeavor can easily turn into a slippery slope into a bottomless abyss, ending in insanity.

The history of art and philosophy is littered with the corpses of those who didn't know where or how to stop the doubting.


Because such a resistance is often enough the pragmatic option to take.
Better a sparrow in the hand than a pigeon on the roof.

Duly noted. And you're right.

What scares me is how seemingly easy it is for us to lull ourselves into such epistemological confidence.
Obviously, I don't go about critically analyzing where I am when I wake up each morning, or, where I might find my car keys, or, where it is that I drive to so as to go to work. But, in other cases of a much grander scale (granted by the topic) I think that such a cavalier attitude is more problematic than pragmatic.
The question then that occurs to me is: how is it that we can (or should..) identify these classes of cases?

 

[wynn]

What scares me is how seemingly easy it is for us to lull ourselves into such epistemological confidence.

It certainly seems easy!

Obviously, I don't go about critically analyzing where I am when I wake up each morning, or, where I might find my car keys, or, where it is that I drive to so as to go to work. But, in other cases of a much grander scale (granted by the topic) I think that such a cavalier attitude is more problematic than pragmatic.

Let's explore this then: Why do we find that attitude of presuming objectivity problematic when it comes to the "grander scale" but not when it comes to "everyday life"?

Also, where do we draw the line between the two? How come going to the bathroom seems incomparably more mundane than reasoning about the meaning of life?

The question then that occurs to me is: how is it that we can (or should..) identify these classes of cases?

I think it can easily be observed that the "objective form" (ie. when a statement is formulated as if it came from the position of omniscience) is a very powerful tool; artists, politicians and pretty much anyone else who wants some sort of power have been wielding it successfully for millennia.

(I once started a thread on this - http://www.sciforums.com/showthread.php?t=99870 )

To say that all the statements that have been made in that form are irrelevant, wrong or otherwise to be dismissed or relativized is to introduce the end of society and culture as we know them. Without having a viable alternative ready, we cannot bring ourselves to do that.

 

[Doreen]

I think it is quite apparent that Geeser is not in danger of the consequences I was concerned about, yes.

However, my focus is on how ethical it is to challenge another person's views.
Even in a medium designed for such purposes, such as this forum.

And just to add to your excellent question with its neo-opposite:

When is it immoral NOT to challenge another person's views?

I think the set of the answer to the second question is small and might provide a good working start for the issue you raise.

When should one intervene? (not that this question is easier, but if you end up with an answer you are comfortable with, all other situations are ones where one should not intervene.)

In response to your question...

It seems like someone placing their views in an online discussion forum is inviting this, or should know they are. Of course the way one probes/attacks/questions anothers view is key. One can simply ask questions and then present one's own concerns about what seem like leaps in logic or lack of support or whatever is bothering one. IOW probe rather than attack and then where not satisfied respond not from an objective stance - this is incorrect because - but rather a more subjective, epistemological one - I can't see how I could get from your A to B.

Not that I live up to this myself.

Of course the way views are presented often affect the way I question their views.

One thing your rebringing this issue up here made me think of is that
Ad homs are taboo - though clearly not abstained from here -
but
labeling another person's ideas is OK, and it probably shouldn't be. By labeling I do not mean simply categorizing, but giving someone's belief a pejorative label. Calling it a delusion or stupid or whatever should be just as taboo. It may seem to allow some kind of philosophical breathing room, since it is not a (direct) ad hom, but as my parenthetical adjective indicates, I think it might as well be an ad hom. Given the intimacy of beliefs and believers.

 

[Doreen]

Obviously, I don't go about critically analyzing where I am when I wake up each morning, or, where I might find my car keys, or, where it is that I drive to so as to go to work. But, in other cases of a much grander scale (granted by the topic) I think that such a cavalier attitude is more problematic than pragmatic.

'where to find my car keys' has built into it the precise ontology geeser is defending. If it works not to go about critically analyzing this.....? I think you can see where I am going. But more importantly, what is grander than the implicit ontological issues there?

The question then that occurs to me is: how is it that we can (or should..) identify these classes of cases?

Perhaps this is what you are getting at here.

 

[glaucon]

'where to find my car keys' has built into it the precise ontology geeser is defending. If it works not to go about critically analyzing this.....? I think you can see where I am going. But more importantly, what is grander than the implicit ontological issues there?

I disagree.
To me, this says nothing ontologically, but harkens more to Signal's observation that, for the most part, we do in fact behave as if we are so ontologically confident.

Perhaps this is what you are getting at here.

Indeed.
I'm starting to wonder if, regardless of how we each choose to treat our ontological environment, what's of greater significance is how we each systematize our environment (given that, despite the disparity amongst individual definitions of 'really real', we do nonetheless all grant some sort of hierarchical gradation...).



hmmmm

 

[Doreen]

I disagree.
To me, this says nothing ontologically, but harkens more to Signal's observation that, for the most part, we do in fact behave as if we are so ontologically confident.

Some may act 'as if' but I would think this would take tremendous effort. Do you really think there is something different about when you look for the keys than when someone who never wonders about some philosophical issues looks for their keys. IOW 1) how do we find/point out this 'as if-ness' that you are positing? and 2) aren't you confusing what you do at one moment 'mulling over philosophical issues' with what you are in another moment?

Note: I am reacting this way because of the context....where 'grand' is a criterion.....

'where to find my car keys' has built into it the precise ontology geeser is defending at what you are calling a grand level

I should have perhaps added the bolded words above.

Indeed.
I'm starting to wonder if, regardless of how we each choose to treat our ontological environment, what's of greater significance is how we each systematize our environment (given that, despite the disparity amongst individual definitions of 'really real', we do nonetheless all grant some sort of hierarchical gradation...).

I think we do, but I think this is misleading. Since it will tend to imply gradation in objective grandness. This is a grand belief, this is a mundane one.

This reminds me also of what I think is the cavalier way the word 'delusion' is tossed about - let alone 'insanity'. As if most of our day to day conceptions - also including what selves are, what actions are, what choices are (or are not), what objects are and so on - are not radically culturally dependent. A kind of myth of the given. Some time in another culture can make one realize that there is much more flexibility there than seems obvious 'here', whereever here is.

 

[wynn]

I disagree.
To me, this says nothing ontologically, but harkens more to Signal's observation that, for the most part, we do in fact behave as if we are so ontologically confident.

Some may act 'as if' but I would think this would take tremendous effort. Do you really think there is something different about when you look for the keys than when someone who never wonders about some philosophical issues looks for their keys. IOW 1) how do we find/point out this 'as if-ness' that you are positing? and 2) aren't you confusing what you do at one moment 'mulling over philosophical issues' with what you are in another moment?

I second Doreen's concern here.

The "as if" qualifier can only be applied once a person has lost the absolute certainty of being ontologically confident.

But for me to say that Geeser "acts as if he was absolutely ontologically confident" is to say I think my ontological confidence is more absolute than Geeser's - which is absurd, given that 1. I myself acknowledge not to have such confidence, 2. "absolute" cannot be graded.

(And yes, I am aware that I myself have told Geeser and numerous others that they do as if they were omniscient. )

For the sake of my own consistency, I indeed need to presume that others may have absolute ontological certainty. As repugnant as that presumption might seem to me, and as much as it might disqualify me and disarm me.

(And it's not just about ontological certainty - but also epistemological and ethical certainties; IOW it's about certainty.)

 

[wynn]

When is it immoral NOT to challenge another person's views?

When should one intervene? (not that this question is easier, but if you end up with an answer you are comfortable with, all other situations are ones where one should not intervene.)

Answer to both:
When one party has the authority to challenge the other party's views.
This is the case:
1. When there exists a mutually agreed upon relationship where one party is the superior one and the other inferior/dependant, and when the views-to-be-challenged are within the scope of that relationship.
2. When one party, by virtue of their position has such an authority even when an agreed upon relationship does not exist.

The prime example of the first is adult teacher - adult disciple; of the second parent - child, or police officer - citizen.

Relationships between equals are moot, I think. Challenging or correcting someone (even if this person is your friend) is an act of superiority, of inequality, and accepting a challenge or a correction is an act of inferiority/subordination, of inequality.

It seems like someone placing their views in an online discussion forum is inviting this, or should know they are. Of course the way one probes/attacks/questions anothers view is key. One can simply ask questions and then present one's own concerns about what seem like leaps in logic or lack of support or whatever is bothering one. IOW probe rather than attack and then where not satisfied respond not from an objective stance - this is incorrect because - but rather a more subjective, epistemological one - I can't see how I could get from your A to B.

Sure, but since we are persons, the issue of superiority/inferiority remains (and is often hard to swallow).

One thing your rebringing this issue up here made me think of is that
Ad homs are taboo - though clearly not abstained from here -
but
labeling another person's ideas is OK, and it probably shouldn't be. By labeling I do not mean simply categorizing, but giving someone's belief a pejorative label. Calling it a delusion or stupid or whatever should be just as taboo. It may seem to allow some kind of philosophical breathing room, since it is not a (direct) ad hom, but as my parenthetical adjective indicates, I think it might as well be an ad hom. Given the intimacy of beliefs and believers.

Exactly.

What I said about personal superiority/inferiority may seem over the top, archaic, despotic, against open-mindedness and such. But the fact is that people are often resistant to let themselves be challenged or corrected by those they do not respect.
And when they do accept a challenge or a correction from someone whom they do not respect, I think this usually feels like they have been manipulated, forced, violated - and the challenge or the correction will not be seen positively, and will not stick.

"Just abstractly discussing a topic and seeing what we can learn" sounds nice enough in theory, but I think is not so in practice.

 

[wynn]

I'm starting to wonder if, regardless of how we each choose to treat our ontological environment, what's of greater significance is how we each systematize our environment (given that, despite the disparity amongst individual definitions of 'really real', we do nonetheless all grant some sort of hierarchical gradation...).

Yes, I agree.

An example of this hierarchization is implied in questions like:

Whose input is more trustworthy: That of an anyonymous forum poster or someone whose credentials I know and appreciate?
Is the occasional good idea of a forum poster worth it that I rather spend considerable amounts of time at that forum, as opposed to cultivating a relationship with the person with the credentials?

 

[glaucon]

Sorry... I wrote these comments late last night but forgot to hit ye old "Submit" button...

Some may act 'as if' but I would think this would take tremendous effort. Do you really think there is something different about when you look for the keys than when someone who never wonders about some philosophical issues looks for their keys. IOW 1) how do we find/point out this 'as if-ness' that you are positing? and 2) aren't you confusing what you do at one moment 'mulling over philosophical issues' with what you are in another moment?

I don't think it takes any effort at all. In fact, I think it takes no effort. It's this kind of mental attitude that we ordinarily enjoy. Familiarity and repetition acclimatise ourselves to our environment. What is difficult, in my mind, is to 'overcome' the obvious, the mundane, and to re-call it into question, to take up that skeptical position...


As for the difference between the philosopher and the non-philosopher searching for keys, no, I don't think that there's a difference. Which is precisely my point.

To question 1):

No need to; we can define it negatively. We can all (hopefully...) recognize that our everyday perceptual experience is subject to error. Thus, what appears to be the case, need no be so. Nonetheless, for the most part, we do in fact behave as if what need not be the case, in fact is.

To question 2):

Not at all. Though the two mental spaces are dissimilar, I am still of just one mind. I would argue that, to a greater or lesser degree, we each take on the 'philosophical stance' multiple times a day. I think that the determining factor here as to which mental space one operates in is a function of context and familiarity. (again, echoing my earlier comment about classifying..)

Note: I am reacting this way because of the context....where 'grand' is a criterion.....

I should have perhaps added the bolded words above.

I don't get what you're saying here.
Probably my misunderstanding...

I think we do, but I think this is misleading. Since it will tend to imply gradation in objective grandness. This is a grand belief, this is a mundane one.

That's exactly what I was implying.
You don't think we apply such a gradation???

This reminds me also of what I think is the cavalier way the word 'delusion' is tossed about - let alone 'insanity'. As if most of our day to day conceptions - also including what selves are, what actions are, what choices are (or are not), what objects are and so on - are not radically culturally dependent. A kind of myth of the given. Some time in another culture can make one realize that there is much more flexibility there than seems obvious 'here', whereever here is.

Oh Doreen.... guilty as charged. You have a good memory.

I any case... I have to admit, there's some intriguing content here... but I'm not sure i grasp it yet. I'll have to do more mulling...

 

[Doreen]

I don't think it takes any effort at all. In fact, I think it takes no effort. It's this kind of mental attitude that we ordinarily enjoy. Familiarity and repetition acclimatise ourselves to our environment. What is difficult, in my mind, is to 'overcome' the obvious, the mundane, and to re-call it into question, to take up that skeptical position...

That's essentially what I meant. I was saying there was probably nothing 'as if' about your mundane ontological assumptions. If you looked for your keys while treating is as 'as if'

that would take an effort. So I am skeptical you do.

As for the difference between the philosopher and the non-philosopher searching for keys, no, I don't think that there's a difference. Which is precisely my point.

Au contraire. It was my point. [laughs]

To question 1):

No need to; we can define it negatively. We can all (hopefully...) recognize that our everyday perceptual experience is subject to error. Thus, what appears to be the case, need no be so. Nonetheless, for the most part, we do in fact behave as if what need not be the case, in fact is.

And my quibble is that we do not merely behave as if. We allow the belief to have full sway most of the time.

I don't get what you're saying here.
Probably my misunderstanding...

It would be very hard to explain. It seems to me that once you split grand claims and less grand ones, you grant a lot of ontological weight to what are considered less grand ones. Which I think is common. It is as if a world where there is a subject object split and where we get sensory information from objects via a faulty but generally accurate set of senses - iow some kind of realism - is not such an odd claim.

But what is the control reality that we are determining this against?

It is in fact completely fantastic. In fact this should be the one area scientists, skeptics and religious people should all be in agreement: how amazing, whatever this is.

A creature is looking for its keys.

What could possibly be weirder?

That's exactly what I was implying.
You don't think we apply such a gradation???

We do, but I don't think we should. Especially if one is taking a generally cautious and skeptical stance.

Oh Doreen.... guilty as charged. You have a good memory.

I any case... I have to admit, there's some intriguing content here... but I'm not sure i grasp it yet. I'll have to do more mulling...

Yes, I actually did remember you used the word, though I was thinking more of Q. I guess my main point is that we are all metaphysicians. I don't think this can be avoided. Now one can be a cautious, fairly skeptical person and learn about other cultures - perhaps even other species - and try to get in their heads to get some sense of assumptions one might not notice. And add on other ways of challenging one's worldview and then build cautiously outward pragmatically.

But once one confidently weighs in on the mundane and grand scale, I think culture and one's metaphysical assumptions are suddenly present.

 

[Doreen]

Answer to both:
When one party has the authority to challenge the other party's views.
This is the case:
1. When there exists a mutually agreed upon relationship where one party is the superior one and the other inferior/dependant, and when the views-to-be-challenged are within the scope of that relationship.
2. When one party, by virtue of their position has such an authority even when an agreed upon relationship does not exist.

The prime example of the first is adult teacher - adult disciple; of the second parent - child, or police officer - citizen.

Relationships between equals are moot, I think. Challenging or correcting someone (even if this person is your friend) is an act of superiority, of inequality, and accepting a challenge or a correction is an act of inferiority/subordination, of inequality.

I agree with most of this so far. At the end though. Can one not have mutual right to challenge. IOW when you think the other person needs to be challenged and when they feel you need to be. Sort of like in a marriage, a good one. I suppose one might be assuming a localized superiority, that the other has, at the very least a blind spot. And given this...what if one simply has not made a global decision about the other person. IOW one has not decided I am morally, spiritually, philosophically, intellectually - whatever fits the context - but this seems to be as blind spot on their part and I am challening them. One might end up thinking one is superior, after one knows more. One might decide this is a peer. One might even end up feeling like the other person is really more competent in whatever category, but on that day, on that point, it was good to have challenged them.

Implicit in all this is that there are factors that make it moral to point out stuff.

Why? first things that come to mind are that their beliefs are hurting someone: themselves or others or 'me'.

Actually I can't think of anything else that would obligate one to challenge another person.

Sure, but since we are persons, the issue of superiority/inferiority remains (and is often hard to swallow).

yes.

What I said about personal superiority/inferiority may seem over the top, archaic, despotic, against open-mindedness and such. But the fact is that people are often resistant to let themselves be challenged or corrected by those they do not respect.
And when they do accept a challenge or a correction from someone whom they do not respect, I think this usually feels like they have been manipulated, forced, violated - and the challenge or the correction will not be seen positively, and will not stick.

Agreed.

"Just abstractly discussing a topic and seeing what we can learn" sounds nice enough in theory, but I think is not so in practice.

I hope I didn't say the quoted portion. But anyway....I think, actually, it is good that it matters to us. That it is not simply a game like chess - which players seem to care a heck of a lot about despite its lack of implications.

 

[wynn]

I agree with most of this so far. At the end though. Can one not have mutual right to challenge. IOW when you think the other person needs to be challenged and when they feel you need to be. Sort of like in a marriage, a good one.

Ideally, yes - I think this sums up the issue quite well:

Proper motive is of three types:
desiring the welfare of the person criticized,
desiring the welfare of the world
and desiring one’s own welfare

There are three types of proper motive [for criticizing somoene's faults]:

(1) If the intention in analyzing someone’s sins is to ensure that he attains his ultimate welfare, then such reflection is auspicious.
(2) If the motive behind reflecting on someone’s sins is to benefit the whole world, then this is to be counted as an auspicious act.
(3) If such reflection is undertaken for one’s own spiritual welfare, then it too, is auspicious. There is no fault in such reflection.
source

I emphasize ideally because people tend to have very different views on what actually constitutes a person's welfare and benefit.
If two people hold the same values, the same ideas about welfare and benefit, then interactions between them are, of course easy, even when they involve criticism.

But people are usually barely compatible in their values, so criticism often turns into a fight for getting the upper hand.

Actually I can't think of anything else that would obligate one to challenge another person.

While I readily acknowledge the versatility and relativity of what constitutes welfare and benefit, I need to point out that it undermines one's own (ethical, philosophical) stance if one does not impose (yes!) it upon others.

If, for example, I believe that beating children is wrong, and I see a mother beating her child but I don't do anything - then this undermines my conviction that beating children is wrong.

So the obligation to challenge another's views comes from being true to one's own convictions.

If one doesn't stand for one's own convictions when the opportunity for that actually arises, then one might as well not have those convictions at all and doesn't benefit from them.

But anyway....I think, actually, it is good that it matters to us.

Well - we have mutually (at least some of us) agreed upon to take correction from others.

 

[Doreen]

I emphasize ideally because people tend to have very different views on what actually constitutes a person's welfare and benefit.

And further what can seem, even to the agent, like concern about one's welfare, can actually be hatred of the one the concern is aimed at. At least, so it has felt to me. Any rule about this kind of thing can be abused by people's lack of self-awareness. And of course a racist concerned about my 'hanging out with niggers'....who challenges my 'naive politically correct views of race'....is this person in fact obligated to challenge me? Or have they already gone past a deeper need to challenge their own ideas?
This example is, in a way, misleading, since we may all think this is 'obvious' while at the same time confident in our own decisions to intervene.

If two people hold the same values, the same ideas about welfare and benefit, then interactions between them are, of course easy, even when they involve criticism.

Yes. Though even here, interpretations of those same values - which I assume would be laid out in words - can vary so significantly that their 'sameness' is only apparent.

But people are usually barely compatible in their values, so criticism often turns into a fight for getting the upper hand.

Yes.

While I readily acknowledge the versatility and relativity of what constitutes welfare and benefit, I need to point out that it undermines one's own (ethical, philosophical) stance if one does not impose (yes!) it upon others.

It is very messy.

If, for example, I believe that beating children is wrong, and I see a mother beating her child but I don't do anything - then this undermines my conviction that beating children is wrong.

So the obligation to challenge another's views comes from being true to one's own convictions.

And how do we distinguish between two people who each have very strong convictions about very similar seeming ideas, where one of them intervenes a lot and the other intervenes only rarely. Can they both be moral in their prioritization of intervention?

If one doesn't stand for one's own convictions when the opportunity for that actually arises, then one might as well not have those convictions at all and doesn't benefit from them.

Right now I am...how shall I say it...in the mood to agree, because right now I am surprised to find that a strong interventionist stance does in fact seem moral and to some degree a form of self-care - following your interesting lead here. But I notice that for most of my life my interventions were rare, often only in close relationships, and here very cautious. I think this was not simply being overprotective of myself and showing a lack of conviction.

I get the impression you might at least sympathize with whatever instinctive caution I have here, one based on some value that perhaps we both prioritize. IOW I can come at this issue from one angle and feel intervening is something I should do more often. I can come at it from another angle and feel intervening is something I should do less often.

Well - we have mutually (at least some of us) agreed upon to take correction from others.

That certainly seems a fair conclusion. Interesting.

I just mulled this some and realized that context means a lot. For example: are the ideas dominant in some way? I feel less inclined to intervene in relation to marginal opinions. But if it is an idea that I see as supported by the mass of whatever context, I feel a stronger urge to intervene. I guess here this might play out in a greater defense, on my part, of Abrahamic religions, and if I am critical of beliefs in those religions, I am more likely to out myself as a theist in the discussion - since this at least is an indirect intervention against the dominant pattern here. I think there are other contextual factors.

I need to mull, interesting!

 

[wynn]

Where is Lightgigantic when you need him ...