I find the 'Foot in the Mouth' award wrongly given to Rumsfeld who speaks some sense after all. Known knowns - Oil Known Unknowns - Iraqi WMD Unknown Unkowns - Implies a potential un-known future cause that would help an US adventure not-known at present. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image!
I take no responsibility for that mess. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! I never said I could get it to make sense. I was trying to reduce J.P.'s argument into something comprehensible but as I parsed out each statement the whole thing fell apart. But I'll take the award anyway. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! ~Raithere
J.P. The word "prove" raises a lot of arguments. What can be called "proved"? I did not finish the reading because he did not reach my standard of seriousness by defining every concepts he used to build a structure of undersanding. Without a concret begining, everything following sounds shaky.
Rait, LOL, it seems I am guilty of not being clear either. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! I think you need an award for attempting to unravel and decode gibberish and for your immense patience. If anyone can unravel 'Foot in the Mouth' confusion then you are my favorite choice.
Ah... in that case I humbly thank you. I was considering your suggestion that J.P. is Langan but after reading a bunch of Langan's work I don't think so. J.P. just seems to have been contaminated by his writing style. Langan actually has some ideas I find interesting but his prose is unnecessarily (or perhaps deliberately) confusing and his theories far from being proven or complete. I think if he backed off of the idea that he's solved the riddle of existence and worked on developing and explaining his idea's more clearly and concisely some of his ideas might be taken more seriously. But he needlessly confuses things, using 20 words when 10 would have sufficed, using ambiguous terms, and inventing new terms when they are not really needed. J.P. comes across similarly. As in this wonderful example here: "If, that which necessarily exists is nothing but discrete, non-compositional existential entities, then such discrete non-compositional existential entities are greater in existence than an existing absolute compositional existential entity, but this statement is obviously absurd, since an existing absolutely compositional existential entity must contain all existing non-compositional existential entities, by definition;" Which essentially breaks down into meaning 'the whole is greater than the part'. Similarly reduced the whole argument crumbles into a set of unproven assertions and while some are individually true or provable, the conclusion is unwarranted. The clever part (truly brilliant) is the insinuation of the term 'entity' which is a wonderful use of ambiguity. In context one would interpret it to mean 'something that exists' but it also brings in the notion of 'a being' which is yet unfounded in the argument. Yet agreement with the assertion sneaks in a tacit agreement that opens the door for the idea of god. I think both J.P. and Langan tend to use this over-worked loquacity to confuse and intimidate or impress their opponents. There's an interesting 5 page discussion on Langan's site where he attempts to explain his theory to someone which displays his style very nicely. Despite the man's pleading for Langan to take it slowly and not to introduce too much of his CTMU theory too quickly he keeps flooding the discussion with it. Perhaps this is caused by his high IQ and he just has difficulty speaking at a more common level but I tend to think that it isn't. ~Raithere
Rait, Yes I am sure you are correct. But I think that - "If, that which necessarily exists is nothing but discrete, non-compositional existential entities, then such discrete non-compositional existential entities are greater in existence than an existing absolute compositional existential entity, but this statement is obviously absurd, since an existing absolutely compositional existential entity must contain all existing non-compositional existential entities, by definition;" deserves some type of award. Take care Cris
"If, that which necessarily exists is nothing but PLANT CELLS, then such PLANT CELLS are greater in existence than an existing PLANT, but this statement is obviously absurd, since an existing PLANT must contain all* existing PLANT CELLS, by definition;" Want to give awards.?! Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! all* - is it necessary.?
Well, ...OK, whatever you say Wes Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! Your insights have been most helpful.
"Seems" is quite an appropriate remark. It says that? I must have missed it. If the assumption is wrong (i.e. the first numbered statement), what does that make your conclusion? Again, the CTMU says that? And again, I must have missed it. It doesn't say that "We" are self-contained, it says that *Reality* is self-contained. What this means: if anything were outside of reality and could somehow influence reality, then it would be inside reality. No observations can be made outside of reality for this reason. Indeed. It says nothing of this sort. Are we talking about the same CTMU here? I think the CTMU says that consciousness transcends reality, and not that is is some sort of "program". Perhaps, but that theory is not the CTMU. Unfounded assumptions would be something like this: "This program ..." - first of all, there is no program. The CTMU speaks of UBT (Unbound Telesis), and it also talks about SCSPL (Self-Configuring Self-Processing Language). I'm beginning to wonder if you have any experience (at all) with formal logic? Where are you getting the impression that the self-containment principle has anything to do with people? Again, the CTMU doesn't make any reference to humans being "self-contained" - now that is something unfounded. What kind of expert are you? You state, "but not in the way a living thing does", yet you offer absolutely no explanation in how the universe differs from a "living thing". Strangely, if you look close enough you might come to notice no distinction between a "living thing" and the "universe". Strange, you seem to be stuck on the "program" idea, and also the relationship between universe and "person". I can't force myself to believe you gathered this from the CTMU. The only interpretation that is far-fetched is ... I will save the insults, but you need serious revision. What!? Where did you pull this one from? Seriously, if you are here to joke around this isn't the place. From #1 - #10 you made up your own little statements and own little conclusions about them, all while none of which have anything to do with actual CTMU material. Universe = God. Its called Pantheism, aside from the CTMU, Pantheism has numerous insightful and logically based references. It would only be to your benefit to research this material. Yes, that's right - the same #10 that mysteriously came from the CTMU when we weren't looking. Interesting use of logic. Remarkable! After reading this I am left with the same reflection - how ironic indeed.
Using 2-valued logic, the statement becomes: [Existence is a paradox] or [existence is not a paradox] If existence is "NOT" a paradox, then existence is completely logical. If existence is both a paradox and not a paradox, then it is P and ~P which is a P, paradox. Absolute truth? If we observe a logically consistent universe, the conclusion is that the universe is a self resolving paradox. Is it metaphysically objectionable with regards to formulating existential paradox in terms of sentenial relations encapsulating true and false predications, in a noncompliance with certain restrictions against the sentences in any formalizable language, with self ability to express predicated truth value? However necessary, paradox in all of its many splendored forms, does not involve self-denial or self affirmation of categorical truth, with which we concern ourselves, to prohibit a solution to the liar paradox in formal languages? Alas, the assumption and conclusion are metalogical expressions in a heretofore informal metalanguage. It most certainly must refer to the truth and falsehood of the antecedent and consequent of a certain true conditional, expressed in the object language of standard propositional logic. It need not be that the modality of the liar paradox be oh so disquieting. The modality of a proposition's being, such, that it can be either true or false, whether or not it can be reduced away, or driven underground in Bertrand Russellian fashon, by making reference instead to a proposition's being true or false indifferently, is ineliminably, and unalienably, part of the metalogic of the definition of a material conditional, just as it is ineffably and ineliminably part of the higher-order metalogical semantic characterization of the concept of deductive validity. It must be metalogically conclusive to say most truly of a true conditional, that if its antecedent is true, then, its consequent must be true or necessarily is true, and that if its antecedent is false then its consequent can be or is possibly either true or false, and of a false conditional that it must be or is necessarily such that its antecedent is true and its consequent is false. For such as it may be, it is by means of these modalities of truth conditions in the metalogic of standard propositional logic and predicate calculus that we define the conditional, by all means necessary and sufficient. It is categorically in terms of the inevitable truth table requirements, that the metalogical paradox about which the conditional contraposition is most necessarily proposed, to, which the deductively valid transformation rule of conditional contraposition is then applied most judiciously with metalogical paradoxical implications notwithstanding. Trivial but absolute: Existence "Exists"...
Why do you assume that 2-valued logic is applicable here? When we consider such things as QED, superposition, or the wave-function of a photon it seems to me that the nature of existence defies such a limited duality. Nor do I see that you've actually resolved or offered anything new here. To be or not to be, is rather old observation. What paradox? What the fuck does 'metaphysically objectionable' mean? Is that like epistemologically contrite? Wow. What a mind-breaker. Look J.P. I'm not going to apologize for being rude anymore because I find your posts ridiculous. They essentially amount to a snow-job. While I am awed by your ability to transform rather simple observations into jargon filled, grandiose sounding, conundrums your arguments reduce into purely trivial observations linked by faulty logic to unwarranted conclusions. If reality is formally syntactic there are indeed certain things we can infer about it. But that's a big 'if' and you haven't proven it. Nor does it seem to be very well explored in your treatment of it. You're glossing over any number of assumptions. Finally it would be, by definition, incomplete (re: Gödel's Theorem) and therefore CTMU must be incomplete. You cannot simply 'wish' it away by stating that it's a self-resolving paradox. Not unless you bring the mathematical proof with you. ~Raithere
so you come to this forum, insult everyone in it, try to shove your crock of shit down everyone's throat and then fucking whine about it when people trash your argument. you sir, are an annoying prick. it might be fun to actually debate your pile of shit if you weren't such a wannabe intellectual cunt. (yes both a prick and a cunt, you seem to at least entertain yourself) show you're a human. show you give a fuck about people. show you are a fucking TEACHER if you think you have something to teach. the debate tactic "I'm smarter than you, you cretin, you dolt" won't do much to enlighten anyone if you can't properly defend it when very bright people (like cris and raithere) "nitpick". ass. Here's a for instance: Agnosticism dictates that the question of god is fundamentally unknowable (basically since you can never know if there is a system functioning outside the system you're currently in, unless you find out and then you don't know if there's one outside of that.. blah blah blah). You advocate a "theory" (the 'pile of shit' referred to above) that seemingly ignores that conclusion. Can you explain briefly how it is possible to know that which can't be known? Is it because Chris Langden's IQ is so high? Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image!
You seem so quick to criticise this guy's intelligence (Chris Langan's) Chris, and I agree with you, he hasn't really done anything, but that doesn't mean he's not intelligent, or even highly intelligent. Yes someone else proposed the theory of evolution, which has take time to be produced (in terms of history), and no doubt he uses other peoples theories, but that doesn't mean they are all incorrect. Anyway, isn't 'I.Q' (and it's tests) about noticing a proper correlation between seemingly random aspects??
langan was not able to succeed in college nor has he ever established himself as reputable in any field. the guy is completely full of himself. he is a laughing stock by anyone who even knows the slightest bit about anything.
[ ... snip ... ] I feel obligated to apologize for giving you - or anyone - the impression that I was directly insulting someone. To some extent, I was [if you characterize a group of people as I had done], but I certainly did not name names and I didn't mean anyone in particular and it was definitely a generalization. I didn't mention much about those few people who made their way here and actually contributed a thing or two - my focus wasn't on any of them. I would estimate for every 20 people who attempt to analyze the CTMU, only 1 or 2 get at least half of it straight - including me, I was one of those 18 - 19 others who didn't quite get it at first. I've been following the CTMU for quite some time now, and I've had plenty of questions of my own. In due time, nearly everything I have asked has been addressed, and I soon found out that I didn't know as much as I thought I did about the subject. I think the same can be said for a number of people visiting this forum. I get the impression that you are insecure of yourself at this forum. Perhaps you felt as if I was including you in that generalization and I'm sorry for that. But I wasn't including you - in fact I wasn't even talking to you. Everyone is entitled to their own opinion, no matter how useless it is. LOL! That I do! Calling me a "cunt" and thinking of yourself as "bright" in the same post wouldn't really give much credit to either. Again, I must apologize for invoking such a response, I truly am sorry. I feel like we could have gotten much further if not for this.
If the universe is closed, the "information" or entangled quantum states cannot leak out of the closed system. So the density of entangled quantum states, continually increases, as the entropy must always increase. Each quantum-wave intersection corresponds (I think) to processed information. The energy is re-quantized, so the total energy of a system is a constant. Information is compressed and matter shrinks. http://www.polymath-systems.com/intel/hiqsocs/megasoc/noes44/newcomb.html quote: The solution of problems, and the resolution of paradoxes, are inherently computational activities. What, then, could be a better setting for this resolution than a computative one? And what could possibly be a more fitting preface than a brief introduction to the abstract theory of computation? Consider an acceptor F = (Q, S,d,qo,A). Q is a finite nonempty set of internal states, S is an alphabet whose symbols are concat_enated as strings, qo c Q is the initial state, and A c Q is the set of accepting states triggered only by input recognizable to F. The transition mapping d, which governs the way in which F changes states, is deterministic if d:Q x S —> Q, but nondeterministic if d:Q x S —> 2Q (where 2Q is the set of all subsets of Q). In the nondeterministic case, d will be written dn, for clarity. In terms of human psychology, we might regard the 5-tuple of F as its "categorical imperative", or accepting syntax, and say that F projects this syntax onto its universe. Nothing in the universe of F is recognizable to it but the particular input strings (sense data, facts) which cause it to pass through some q e A; they are its phenomenal "reality", a subset of the noumenal metareality of the wider universe in which strings are representationally gener_ated and entered by programmers. The restriction to finite Q is pragmatic and amenable to conditional relaxation. If F is deterministic, it accepts (recognizes) a string s e S* if and only if d(qo, s) e A. Since we have defined d only for the individual symbols s e S, we must define an extended transition function d': where l is the null string, d'(q,l) = q; and for all q e Q, s e S, and s e S* (where S* is the set of varirepetitional permutations of the d e S) , d'(q,ss) = d' (d' (q, s) ,s). Thus, the accepting behavior of F is defined inductively for s-quantized string extensions; the way in which we recognize and assimilate new bits of information within our reality is specified in d'. Were we to widen the discussion to imagination, conceptualization, theorization, or other intrinsic computations, we would need to consider "ideas"; we would have to generalize from recognition to abstraction by means of a nonlocal or self-iterating, input-free extension of d. If the reference to "strings" seems to imply a dimensional limitation on input, this too can be generalized. Where F is nondeterministic, it accepts a string s e S* if and only if dn'(qo,s) n A = ~Ø. The nondeterministic extension dn' of dn is defined by induction: dn'(qo, l) = {q} , and dn'(q,ss) = Uq'cdn'(q,s) dn(q',s). I.e., q' is one of the possible successors of q under dn' given s; the unextended mapping dn on singletons of S* then determines the image under dn' of s plus an adjoint symbol s, given q'. This is a classical recursive definition. It describes a stepwise probabilistic ramification of computative potential whose complexity depends on dn. Nondeterminism is not always restricted to Q x S; under certain conditions, either Q or S can be extended, or A shifted within Q. This. of course, entails a modification of F, unless F is defined to allow for parametric extension and adjustment. To this effect, let F' be such an open extension. To be meaningful in mechanistic contexts such as those in which acceptors are usually considered, F' must exist within an appropriate mechanistic extension of the computative environment of F. Organisms, being mechanical in the deterministic sense, need not be distinguished in this extension. Nondeterminism can be used to subtly manipulate recognition, thus cryptically modifying an acceptor's reality. Nondeterministic recognition can help to explain the ability of an acceptor to rapidly sieze certain kinds of higher-order phenomena, or even interact with higher-order agencies ordinarily insensible to it. Having thus formalized the logical abstraction of recognition - i.e., the passive phase of organo-mechanical cognition - we now proceed to the output behavior of computative automata, or to the active phase of cognition. Consider a transducer M = (S,Q,T,d,m), where S is a finite nonempty input alphabet, Q a finite nonempty state set, T a finite nonempty output alphabet, d:Q x S —> Q the state-transition function, and m: Q x S —> T the output function. A computation of M has internal and external phases; through m, the output that M delivers back to its outward universe depends on strings of d-iterated transitional internal states. Thus, m is a functional of the function d of input. Together, m and d totally determine the behavior of M. They can be extended from S and T to S* and T* as for the acceptor F: d'(q,l) = q, m'(q,l) = l; and d'(q, ss) = d( d'(q,s),s), m'(q,ss) = m'(q,s) m(d'(q,s), s). Where appropriate, we can add to M an initial state ("reset control") qo: M = (S,Q,T,d',m',qo), to be regarded as a separator of locally independent computations, and put it at the disposal of a function r c M which determines computational relevancy. Considered as a robotic brain, M T-behaves according to m, but Q-reasons towards its decisions along paths generated by d. Where d is deterministic, m may be related to it as a "timing function" according to which any computation can be arrested (input aborted, regression terminated) and converted to output on passing certain tests. Where the duration of the computation is determined with d, input becomes the only variable. Where input as well is fixed in content and scheduling, the entire system is tightly determined. As Laplace might have observed, predicting the behavior of deter_minate mechanisms requires only data, the means to acquire it, and a valid scientific methodology to organize and interpret it. While the situation is actually more complex, the fact remains that were one to play a deterministic game with a deterministic transducer like M, one would need only a detailed knowledge of its input and programming to predict the outcome, given analytic tools adequate for that purpose and consistent with one's own constraints (e.g., the amount of time available for analysis and strategy). If one's object in the game were merely the validation of one's prediction, so much the easier to win. Suppose instead that M has nondetenninistic output capping mn, where state-transition may or may not be deterministic. Then the prediction of output entails control of mn by the predictor. To win a game of prediction, one must now control mn as well dn Sn to the extent chat it is output-critical; one must take over where the probabilistic mn leaves off. Since whichever control the transducer has over itself resides in mn and dn, one must in effect deprive it of self-control. The relevance to "free will" is obvious. Computation is purposive. The purpose of an acceptor is pure recognition; no action is explicitly predicated on its internal transitions. The purpose of a transducer is conversion of input to output; yet, such a conversion is aimless unless algorithmic. Like yin and yang, acceptors and transducers are complementary; only together can they begin to resemble functional systems of organic complexity. In order to model organic systems, transducers must be endowed with goals and algorithms comparable to the ends and means of living beings. Algorithms are themselves purposive procedures which model both acceptance and transduction. The problems which comprise their input are scanned by preliminary steps for certain kinds of information, which must in turn be accepted as parameters by subsequent steps, and so on to the output stage (at which point the algorithm delivers its answer). The mechanistic representation of an algorithm must allow for the innate structure of a device, considered apart from the algorithm itself; this structure may have variant and invariant aspects. The algorithm simply conforms variables to purpose given the invariants. As the definitions of F and M might lead one to expect, this generally involves importing to M the set A c Q defined for F. Human beings, it is said, are self-programming. Their thought is polyalgorithmic; useful algorithms are either meta-algorithmically constructed, or selected from a learned store, to deal with input. If learning, construction, and selection are deterministic, then they characterize a deterministic meta-algorithm not fundamentally different from any other deterministic algorithm we might study. If they are nondeterministic, then they are characteristic of a nondeterministic meta-algorithm, and likewise. It follows that the formal transductive model of human nature withstands any objection from the relative complexity of human mentality or behavior. Newcomb's object-transducer MN naturally includes an acceptor: MN (S,Q,qo,d,A,m,T). Recognition is phasic; a string must often be "pre-accepted" for M to tell whether to accept or reject it. Ordinarily, this tentative phase of recognition is easily computed by the physical entities whose behavior is predicted by ND. To be "real", an input-quantum s must simply possess a certain first-order predicate, "reality", which - this being a self-validating tautology - induces a type-theoretic predicate stratification like that involving the old Cretan, Epimenides. To this sine qua non of recognition corresponds a primary element q1 of A; no input-quantum failing the q1-test is reified, whereas all those passing are relayed to Q - q1. Higher-order recognition of "passed" quanta then proceeds at a rate determined by the respective computational demands of the stratified-algorithmic phases of dM. Corresponding to the structure of A are various ordered states analogous to q1 within their respective levels of acceptance. Let us narrow the definition of MN in a way consistent with Newcomb's problem. Suppose that associated with mM is a threshhold value b > 0 below which output is nil, but above which a decision will be finalized and implemented. With each qi c Q we associate a pair of strength coefficients ai, and ai2, to be incremented and decremented according to a strategic dM, appropriate to the Newcomb decision-theoretic context; these represent the current tendency, given the present amount of input, for MN to output either possible behavior (taking one or both boxes, respectively). The ai divide Q into three classes XQ, YQ, and ZQ, with membership conditions a, > a2, a, < a2, and a, = a2 respectively. To each qi is attached a total weight ai = |ai, - ai2|. As soon as the output condition [a = b] is met, a decision and behavior result which correspond to the Q-class of the current state (note that dM, being strategic, precludes q c ZQ, or "indecision", at the output deadline). Thus, the states of Q c MN are preferential and impetal, the graded fore-images of the outputs they favor. This is just a convenient way to view the internal configurations to which they correspond, and does not violate the general definition of transducers. Nor, for that matter, does it violate the way human beings perceive their own decision-making processes. The question posed by Newcomb's problem involves the computative analysis, by a predictive agency with computative characteristics, of the computative analysis undertaken by a transducer on a given input. That input is the problem itself, presented in the manner prescribed by the formulation. This situation, which defines a computative regression, is recursive and inductively extensible. The regression in turn defines the only soluble context for the higher-level "paradox" generated by the problem. This context translates as mechanism. The mechanism is a stratified automaton G containing both the predictor and its object-transducer as sub-automata. Whether "free will" is defined determlnistically as mere outside non-interference in m and d, or nondeterministically as the ability of MN to override any exogenous restriction of mn or dn, its mechanism is contained in that of G. Logical diagonalization of the formal computational language generated by the accepting syntax of MN directly implies that certain structural aspects of G may be unrecognizable to MN. In particular, those aspects involving MN-relativized nondeterminacy, as well as those involving certain higher-order predicates of the nondistributive, nonlocal organizations involving mM and dM, are formally undecidable to it and need not be recognized directly by it with any degree of specificity. To understand why, consider the extent to which a common computer "recognizes" the extended system including its cpu, its other components, its programmers, and the environment it inhabits. In fact, it can recognize nothing that does not conform to its input-to-output transformational grammar. Even if it were self-analytic, such analysis could be limited to a schematic electronic syntax which overlooks the material elements of which it is constructed. In any case, it can make sense of nothing but strings of input translated and rearranged according to the internal stratification of its hard and soft programming. You, your purposes, and your dependencies are undecidable to it, and so are the mechanisms by which you can predict and control its behavior. It matters not who formulates this undecidability; if the machine's internal logic is inadequate to do so, yours surely is not (currently, most mechanical acceptors are nongeneralistic, treating complementation as negation and negation as rejection; this bars the tools of diagonalization from their computations). Should it ignore your higher prerogatives, you could "diagonalize" it - if nothing extrinsic to the machine were to stop you - with a sledgehammer whose effects on it do not depend on its acceptance. By analogy, Newcomb's object-transducer MN cannot preclude G on grounds of "insensibility". Nor, for chat matter, can we. There are many self-styled experts on undecidability who have expressed the opinion that all attempts to reify Godel's theorem along paranormal lines reflect a misunderstanding of its "real nature". Such experts are quite correct in that a misunderstanding exists, but the misunderstanding is all theirs. What the theorem forces by juxtaposing truth and derivability (or consistency and completeness) is a hierarchical stratification of classes of truth functions and the inferential syntaxes which parametrize them. This stratification follows that of G, fractionating computative reality along with the "truth" to which it corresponds. The stratification of G induces stratum-relativizations of computative time and space. Thus, the timetype in which MN computes recognition and output is a mere subtype of that in which it is programmed. Dynamical "arrows of determinacy" which are inviolable to MN, being programmed into its accepting syntax, have no force whatsoever to the programmatic agencies themselves. This applies just as well to "metrical" restrictions embodied in the MN-syntax; these may allow MN to recognize nothing but an artificial submetric of the metric in which these agencies define their own existence. MN and its reality might consist of quanta with higher-dimensional interpretations as the termini of channels for the transmission of information between strata. Metatemporal predicates may exist with respect to which those of MN, are definite only in a mutual sense; predicates which MN accepts as "before" and "after" could be the programmatic projections of "in front of" and "in back of", or any other G-consistent higher-prepositional relationships. There can thus exist a mechanism x c G through which a predictor like ND could measure and/or control the mappings d, m c MN in ways directly insensible to MN. Where in G relative to MN would such a predictor have to be located? Precisely where access is available. Sirnplistically, we might characterize the predictor-M relationship as one of proper inclusion, where it is understood that prediction is direct rather than second-hand, and programmatic in the passive and active senses. That is, a programmer mentally internalizes the structure of that which he programs, and this internalization amounts to computative inclusion. The fine structure of G, while to a degree analytic, is a natter of some complexity. For now, it will suffice to have demonstrated the possibility of x and its utility to well-situated G-subautomata. Because G is structured to allow for relativized deteririnacy and nondeterminacy, the solution is invariant with respect to argumentation involving mind-brain dichotomy. That is, such dichotomies reduce to distinctions of determinacy and nondeterminacy, and may be treated in kind. Restricted dominance, which relies on probabilistic independence derived from the lower-order, local istic dynamical timetype of MN's artificially restricted "reality", is revealed under G-extension to be 'itself dominated by utility. That is, the subjective utility of MN forces the assimilation by dM of this entire demonstration, which disables restricted dominance and thus frees the strategic component to recognize higher patterns among observed data. The principle of restricted dominance, though valid as long as the reality of MN remains unbreached, loses all force in the presence of exodynamic influence. Let's sum it up. You can be modeled as a deterministic or nondeterministic transducer with an accepting syntax that can be diagonalized, or complemented by logical self-negation. ND can be modeled as a metalogical, metamechanistic programmatic agency, some insensible part of whom surrounds you in a computational space Including physical reality, but not limited thereto. This space is the mechanistic equivalent of the computative regression around which Newcomb's problem is essentially formulated. The existence of this space cannot be precluded by you on the grounds that you cannot directly observe it, nor can it be said by you to deny ND a mechanism of control and prediction of your thought and behavior. Additionally, you have an open-ended run of data which lowers to 1/ 8 the probability that NO is "just lucky". This implies that mechanism does indeed exist, and warrants the adjunction to the axioms of physics an independent, empirical physical axiom affirming that mechanism. This then implies that ND can predict or control human thought and behavior (a somewhat weaker implication, you will notice, than "omniscience"). ND possesses means, motive, opportunity...and you. You are "possessed" by Newcomb's Demon, and whatever self-interest remains to you will make you take the black box only. (Q.E.D.) Trust me, Langan knows what he is talking about, more than I do.
/Wow Wes, are you reaching a breaking point or something? Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! Are you stupid or something? LOL. Figures a sorry assed lemming like yourself wouldn't address a single point! YOU ARE A FRAUD, and you make me sick. Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! /Wes, you are assuming that you know what you are talking about but unless you demonstrate it, by giving us a few "new" mathematical insights then you are only huffing an puffing around. Not much for word problems there bright boy? /Soon your brain will reach a type of informational equilibrium, as maximum entropy sets in. LOL. What a jerk! Is this all you have? And you expect to be taken seriously? You are a joke! Address points or you'll be taken for an idiot. Sadly, I think you are doomed for the latter. /I have witnessed first hand the mathematical genius of people like Chris Langan Please Register or Log in to view the hidden image! LOL. What a powerful point! LOSER! LOL. OH man you're killing me the quality comedy. You sir, are pathetic. /So, the equations please... I gave you simple logic which you wholly failed to address. It's beneath you eh? Oh, you need someone else to think for you? Okay, I'm a genius. My IQ is WAY HIGH. Does that make you want to suckle? Here's a teat bitch, have fun! LOL. I think your failure to address a simple point is indicative of your inability to do so. Oh man THIS is your response? Appeal to authority? Sweet. Did the world's smartest man tell you to try that approach? "hey jp, go tell everyone I'm smarter than them!" LOL. He must not like you or isn't as smart as you give him credit for. Did you know that mathematical aptitude isn't the total measure of intelligence, and the IQ tests are a pretty half-assed measurement of one's insight or (real world) problem solving capability? YOu were probably overpowerd by the smell of langen's ass and lost focus? Gawd. LOL. Shall we delve a little further into your phsyche? Would you prefer to be civil and avoid your ridiculous appeal to authority and realize you are talking with some pretty sharp guys who need to be addresses seriously? Are you simply incapable? Pathetic man, pathetic.
/Calling me a "cunt" and thinking of yourself as "bright" in the same post wouldn't really give much credit to either. Again, I must apologize for invoking such a response, I truly am sorry. I feel like we could have gotten much further if not for this. At least you appear semi-human in that post, thank you. So you think the use of the word cunt and one's relative intellect are directly correlated? Please produce the math. LOL. Get over yourself man! Hey did you know that some people are better with verbal reasoning than with math? It's weird! Not everyone thinks the same! I swear. The CTMU is entirely irrelavant if it claims there is an answer to the god problem, as it assumes that this is knowable. If you can justify that assumption (or any others required by its content) then you may be able to present a reasonable argument. Otherwise, uhm.. well, your point(s) are wholly moot.
when langan is published in a respectable journal, i then may read what he has to say. since he is total crap though. imnot going to read anything he has to say.
