I curse things and situations to vent though I realize that they don't have agency. I try to do that instead cursing any sentient life form, especially humans, because I see sentience on earth as victimized by the universe, so to speak.
LOL, I know what you mean. But that's arguably animism that attributes agency to non-living things. Panpsychism as used today refers to matter having or existing as phenomenal and descriptive properties. As opposed to lacking manifestation and not being conceptually distinct and apprehended as anything (absence; nothingness). No one represents their models of an objective world as blank, because that's utterly useless. They inconsistently project corporeal appearances (sensible properties) and technical conceptions and understanding (rational properties) upon something that's usually contended to be devoid of such mental characteristics. That's why we're subliminal or implicit panpsychists -- we deny it, but our behavior reveals otherwise. Kind of like a guy holding the loot asserting that he didn't rob the liquor store, and really believing it himself -- not just deceiving the authorities. Naive realism is essentially a form of panpsychism, and the innate belief we come equipped with, until encounters with philosophy and science challenge that. It's also why there is no hard problem of consciousness. There is no need to explain experience if we don't (practice-wise) actually remove phenomenal (as well as intellectual) properties from our depictions of matter or a mind-independent reality. Just a confusion resulting from our ontological pretentiousness of treating technical descriptions and the abstract mapping of causal relationships as being non-mental replacements for corporeal appearances, when such are glaringly artificial (produced by reasoning and represented by symbols that manifest as much as the perception or thought of a rock). Panpsychism can be framed in Russellian monism as Lee Smolin does below, but he's also referred to it as panpsychism in interviews. Lee Smolin: The problem of consciousness is an aspect of the question of what the world really is. We don't know what a rock really is, or an atom, or an electron. We can only observe how they interact with other things and thereby describe their relational properties. Perhaps everything has external and internal aspects. The external properties are those that science can capture and describe through interactions, in terms of relationships. The internal aspect is the intrinsic essence; it is the reality that is not expressible in the language of interactions and relations. Consciousness, whatever it is, is an aspect of the intrinsic essence of brains. --Time Reborn ... page 270 Bertrand Russell (on naive realism): Physics assures us that the occurrences which we call "perceiving" objects, are not likely to resemble the objects except, at best, in certain very abstract ways. We all start from "naive realism," i. e., the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow are not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know in our experience, but something very different. The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of the stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at war with itself: when it most means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will. --An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth
