The idea that the storyteller means to suggest - to bring to the listeners's minds - the notion that the mysteries at issue are actively hidden, concealed, from trees and insects and such, is awkward and unmotivated, as is the notion that the poet is presenting to their audience Eve as some metaphorical mother of the Snake, and similar perverse impositions.
As generic philosophy, it leads to a discussion that is not without merit, but the present application is a bit less than useful. There arises a question of utility and purpose. Some have suggested one need not know much about what they criticize in certain issues, and we can leave those aside. Among their sympathizers, though, are some who argue various aspects of the fact that vulgate religion is, in fact, vulgar.
Indeed, this point sometimes goes further to suggest that the religion really is what people make it, and it is not unwise to note that aspect does not preclude excusing critics from ever finding a clue about what they criticize.
The thing is that, evolutionarily, religion isn't going away anytime soon. As a marketplace—
i.e., living—reality, gutterbrawling lowbrow has few, if any useful effects; the fulcrum there depending on how we value personal satisfaction in lieu of something more empirically tangible.
To the other, though, finding sufficient clues about human behavior in general and religion in particular can be difficult and long work. The temptation to rest on fallacy can be strong, and it is neither rare nor difficult to encounter poseurs whose strongest argument is rubber-glue, demanding to know "what about" whatever group they seem to hate. Still, though, as I suggested earlier, the enlightened are supposed to have a clue. And, yes, this does, of course, work both ways, so to speak. And it's one thing to recognize the obvious, that if one was enlightened by having some all-wise God at their side, they would make more sense. But it should go without saying that those who assail religious thought, expression, and behavior for being ultimately irrational oblige themselves to some measure of rational thought, expression, and behavior. And, sure, we can chortle at that last all we want, because this is Sciforums, and what we witness in the argument against religion is not enlightenment, nor rationality; it is covetousness.
The problem in this thread, and beyond Sideshowbob in particular, is an imposition of definitions. Some days these definitions work just fine, but there are inappropriate contexts and applications. In this case, arguing about what an ancient document actually says does require we attend the contemporaneous definitions; the counteridyll, that the religious corpus we criticize ought to be
this instead of
that is, ultimately, fallacious.
It is a run of the mill example - ok, better than that but still common - of a standard poetic technique, all but universal in oral traditions that include epic tales. It's not a separation, but a repetition with variation.
Something more than arbitrary, say-so contrarianism would, comparatively speaking, at least have
some decent use.
Besides, remember the context I'm responding to, which is one of modern, disbelieving eyes with no real sympathy to the elements you're attempting to introduce, and even less for the literary and historical record pertaining to centric notions of life and death in theocultural iteration. Where I might find your consideration of storycraft in history relevant and functional is somewhere outside the known constraints of the story at hand.
The point about the use of 'living' in tale-telling allusion isn't inherently wrong; we just happen to know the general thematic context of
chay, as well as have awareness of persistent themes in the Abramic record. That second note, about spiritual life and death, wasn't a joke. Also, before dismissing as a "still common ... all but universal", that we are considering one of the most influential archetypes of oral tradition recorded in epic form known in history. And as to why
this variation, per your thesis, that, too, has psychoanalytical meaning in its historical context. Chasing this stuff down, as I mentioned earlier, isn't always
fun, but let me know when you get to Barnabas; it's a mess.
From the gutter vulgate to the politician on high, is there nothing in between? To illustrate: To the one, we might propose an example of the vulgate in an adult, youngish, Catholic male with a mild learning disorder. And while there is no guarantee the Pope, to the other, is without a learning disruption, neither is that question necessary to our purpose.
The Pope will utter political statements. The young man will present and communicate a faith that is less catechismal, and more vernacular and inconsistent. There are reasons these iterations of faith stand out to us. Not quite the Pope, of course, are the myriad Christianist church leaders in the U.S., and their postchristian revival flocks; it is effectively impossible for Americans to ignore the disruption these institutions cause. And somewhere between our young Catholic and, say, the mother who murdered her sons for Jesus because He gave her a sign when one of the boys killed a frog, or the mother so enraged that her twelve year old was not a virgin she slew the girl, yes, of course there is a reason these spectacles catch our attention.
The range people who will discuss literary craft and history, as you have raised, seems complicated and thereby rare; most of what we will get is apologism and inquisition, a political dispute. Dispassionate discourse is extraordinarily unlikely in an environment entirely given over to superstition, fallacy, and politics.
Where such discourse and rational advocates should find rational sympathy, here at Sciforums they will generally encounter petty covetousness.
Rational historical discourse is similarly discouraged. The political joke is that the Calvinists and the Brethren will settle their differences once they've dealt with the rest of us. Consider the value of engaging that actual historical analysis; the contemporary factions don't even properly understand what they're on about in this aspect.
Look around at the religious people you criticize. Do you think they can keep up with that discussion? Go ahead, tell a Christian they are wrong because God doesn't exist, but what, really, would you expect them to do?
These days, when the question of Christianism requires me to engage in such a fashion, it seems more productive to point out they should probably drop the pretense of being Christian. Backing that line, however, does require knowing at least something about what one criticizes. But they can either hop on the trolley and get a clue, in such cases, or run away to ignorance. The bit where the critics join them in the gutter because that was the whole point of complaining, anyway, doesn't surprise. Remember, most contemporary Amreican Christians are no more prepared to discuss the tension 'twixt Dallas and Fullerton than most of their critics. Compelling Christianists to recognize their heritage forces them to reassess their faith; it's one thing to have a belief, but another to countenance the fact of its excremental and wholly human origin.
For rational people not lost in religious zeal, that ought to file under,
Duh.
Look, even Donald effing Trump can occasionally be correct. If he happens to say his suit is blue while wearing a blue suit, then he will be correct. It can even be an accident, but if someone happens, in that moment, to disagree with him just because he's Donald Trump, or a Republican, or generally full of shit, they're still wrong, no matter how full of shit Donald Trump really is.
There are five sentences in Jan's argument at
#32↑. The first four are functionally correct and not in conflict with other outcomes of the Biblical text. The fifth can be challenged as a matter of opinion invoking degrees, gradations, or anything short of the absoluteness of the word, "altogether".
• • •
Not at all. The strongest argument for the obvious reading is that the alternative is ridiculous: that the authors of the Bible didn't count birds as living.
This argument is the equivalent of running around in 1987 trying to argue with young people about the word "bad".
Or, perhaps, writing a literary review that a particular book is terrible and shouldn't be taught in schools, because, after all, the best and worst of times are opposites, and can't both be at once. And at the end, you might point out the toxicity of pretending death is "rest". There is, after all, an argument to be had that we shouldn't be filling children's heads with contradictory notions.
Think of it this way: If you want to criticize "them", but instead address your own straw men, you only criticize yourself.
Sadly, it's both ego defense and a manner of cruelty; it's a gaslight torching your own straw man for the sake of setting something on fire, and has an effect of denouncing someone or something while effectively silencing it. The extraordinary disrespect actually seems the only purpose.
Remember, what you mean by "obvious reading" not so much ignores a literary record spanning millennia as despises it, and relies on an imposed definition that didn't even exist among people when the stories were told and recorded in writing. It is neither rational nor scientific to craft such fallacious surrogates to criticize.
The strongest argument for what you call the obvious reading is the shape of your failure; the only argument you're addressing is your own imposition.