What happned to Saddam-Iraq's WMD that they have used on Kurds & on Iran?

Implication yes, literal no. I know of zero Democrats or liberal pundits who have asserted Bush said Saddam was part of the 9.11 attacks. But whenever Iraq was mentioned, he threw in a 9.11 reference, like a subliminal message, creating a repetitive word virus that infected the minds of (simple) Americans already angry and ready for a fight. Luckily he had a fight already planned, not the one we expected.

You are debating a strawman. The issue is Bush expoiting the attacks in order to procede with a pre-determined Neo-Con plan as described in the Plan for a New American Century, winning political power, and as a side effect, lucrative contracting deals. Just read Woodward's book on the early days of the Iraq war.

 

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Bhopal, industrial chemicals, insecticide/ nerve agent, the same type of stuff stored at Saddam's ammo sites.


On 3rd December 1984, poison gas leaked from a Union Carbide factory, killing thousands. How many thousands, no one knows. Carbide says 3,800. Municipal workers who picked up bodies with their own hands, loading them onto trucks for burial in mass graves or to be burned on mass pyres, reckon they shifted at least 15,000 bodies. Survivors, basing their estimates on the number of shrouds sold in the city, conservatively claim about 8,000 died in the first week. Such body counts become meaningless when you know that the dying has never stopped.

The Union Carbide factory in Bhopal seemed doomed almost from the start. The company built the pesticide factory there in the 1970s, thinking that India represented a huge untapped market for its pest control products.

methyl isocyanate, or MIC for short. Although MIC is a particularly reactive and deadly gas.

 

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Mix with water and your ready.

Regular maintenance had fallen into such disrepair that on the night of December 2nd, when an employee was flushing a corroded pipe, multiple stopcocks failed and allowed water to flow freely into the largest tank of MIC. Exposure to this water soon led to an uncontrolled reaction; the tank was blown out of its concrete sarcophagus and spewed a deadly cloud of MIC, hydrogen cyanide, mono methyl amine and other chemicals that hugged the ground. Blown by the prevailing winds, this cloud settled over much of Bhopal (see Figure 2). Soon thereafter, people began to die.

 

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A good description of what nerve agent poisoning does,

Survivor, Champa Devi Shukla, remembers that "It felt like somebody had filled our bodies up with red chillies, our eyes tears coming out, noses were watering, we had froth in our mouths. The coughing was so bad that people were writhing in pain. Some people just got up and ran in whatever they were wearing or even if they were wearing nothing at all. Somebody was running this way and somebody was running that way, some people were just running in their underclothes. People were only concerned as to how they would save their lives so they just ran.

 

http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/sup14.pdf

The G stands for German and the A, B, and D signify the
specific chemical. The common names for the G-agents
sarin, soman, and tabun are from part of the name of the
scientist that developed each type. Another class of
nerve agents is represented by the letter V. The most
common agent in this group is VX, the V standing for
venom and the X originating from a series of chemicals
originally synthesized to be used as insecticides. VX has
no common name.
Remember the survivor description of the symptoms,

Exposure to these agents causes a disruption of nerve
impulse transmissions by reacting with the enzyme
acetylcholinesterase. Exposure to even minute quantities
may be rapidly fatal.
Symptoms of exposure may occur within minutes or
hours, depending on the dose and mode of entry into the
body. Symptoms include the following:
• Eyes. Pinpoint pupils, blurred and dimming vision,
pain in and above the eyes aggravated by bright
light
• Skin. Excessive sweating and fine tremors of the
muscles under the skin
• Muscles. Involuntary twitching and contractions of
various muscles of the body
• Respiratory System. Runny nose and nasal
congestion, chest pressure, cough, and difficulty
breathing
• Digestive System. Excessive salivation, abdominal
pain, nausea, vomiting, involuntary urination and
defecation
• Nervous System. Giddiness, anxiety, difficulty in
thinking, difficulty in sleeping, and nightmares

Large inventories of these materials are usually
found only at secure military laboratories or ammunition
depots.

 

"Large inventories of these materials are usually
found only at secure military laboratories or ammunition
depots.

Let's remember that large inventories were not found in Iraq.

 

Buffalo have you written a letter to your congressman informing him that you have found the WMDs?

 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/etc/arsenal.html

At the end of the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein and his elite military units were still in power and in possession of huge stockpiles of deadly weapons. In April 1991, the U.N. Security Council created UNSCOM, a special commission to find and dismantle this arsenal. The U.N. imposed economic sanctions on Iraq that would be enforced until the country eliminated all nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capability.

Two agencies were charged with the task. UNSCOM would uncover and destroy Iraq's biological- and chemical-weapons and ballistic-missile programs; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with uncovering and dismantling Iraq's clandestine nuclear program.

From 1991 to 1998 UNSCOM and IAEA carried out numerous inspections in Iraq, but with varying degrees of success.

For the first few years, Iraqi officials failed to disclose much of their special weapons programs to the inspectors. In 1995, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law Kamel Hussein defected. He had been in charge of the bioweapons program and revealed to UNSCOM that there was a vast arsenal of weapons they had failed to uncover, including biological weapons, and described how the Iraqis were hiding them. This was a breakthrough for the inspection teams, and they continued their work until 1998, when Iraq blocked further access and expelled UNSCOM.

What follows is a summary of what IAEA and UNSCOM had found in Iraq, up until 1998.

For more on UNSCOM's inspections, see FRONTLINE's report "Spying on Saddam."

Iraq's Nuclear Weapons Program

Between 1991 and 1998 the IAEA conducted more than 1500 inspections. IAEA released a report in 1997, with updates in 1998 and 1999, which it believes offers a technically coherent picture of Iraq's nuclear program.

In summary, the IAEA report says that following the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraq launched a "crash program" to develop a nuclear weapon quickly by extracting weapons grade material from safe-guarded research reactor fuel. This project, if it had continued uninterrupted by the war, might have succeeded in producing a deliverable weapon by the end of 1992.[1]

The IAEA inspections revealed seven nuclear-related sites in Iraq. [2] The IAEA reports that all sensitive nuclear materials were removed, and that facilities and equipment were dismantled or destroyed. Activities uncovered and destroyed included:

an industrial scale complex for Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS), a process for producing enriched uranium. The complex was designed for the installation of 90 separators; before the Gulf War, eight were functional. If all separators had been installed, the plant could have produced 15 kg of highly enriched uranium per year, possibly enough for one nuclear weapon.

a large scale manufacturing and testing facility--the Al Furat Project--designed for the production of centrifuges, used in another method of uranium enrichment.

facilities and equipment for the production of weapons components.

computer simulations of nuclear weapons detonations

storage of large quantities of HMX high explosive used in nuclear weapons.

According to former U.N. inspector David Kay, Iraq spent over $10 billion during the 1980s in an attempt to enrich uranium and build a nuclear weapon. However, the Agency concludes that as of December, 1998, "There were no indications to suggest that Iraq was successful in its attempt to produce nuclear weapons," or "that there remains in Iraq any physical capability for the production of amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material of any practical significance." However, the IAEA did find that "Iraq was at, or close to, the threshold of success in such areas as the production of [highly enriched uranium] ... and the fabrication of the explosive package for a nuclear weapon." Despite the fact that the facilities and nuclear material had been destroyed or removed, as early as 1996 the IAEA concluded that "the know-how and expertise acquired by Iraqi scientists and engineers could provide an adequate base for reconstituting a nuclear-weapons-oriented program."

Nuclear physicist and Iraqi defector Khidhir Hamza agrees. He told FRONTLINE that Iraq did not relinquish certain critical components of the nuclear program to the inspectors, and that it retains the expertise necessary to build a nuclear weapon. He believes that Iraq may have one completed within the next couple of years.

Note: IAEA was allowed back into Iraq in January 2000 and again in January 2001. But its inspectors were blocked from full access inspections.


Iraq's Biological Weapons (BW) Program

Between 1991 and 1998, UN inspectors conducted more than 70 inspections into Iraq's biological warfare activities. In its 1999 final report to the U.N. Security Council, UNSCOM noted that Iraq's biological warfare program was "among the most secretive of its programs of weapons of mass destruction." It said that Iraq "took active steps" to conceal the program, including "inadequate disclosures, unilateral destruction, and concealment activities." Therefore, the Commission concluded, "it has not been possible to verify" Iraq's statements about the extent and nature of its biological weapons program.

A 58 page annex to the final report describes what the Commission was able to learn about the BW program, despite Iraq's concealment activities, and documents discrepancies between what Iraq claimed to have developed, or destroyed, and the physical evidence. Some of the findings include:

Extensive BW program: Iraq had an extensive BW program from 1973 until at least 1991. In mid-1995, Iraq admitted that it had weaponized BW agents, but claimed that the entire BW program had been in "obliterated" in 1991 and that all BW weapons had been destroyed and all bulk BW agents had been deactivated. The Commission found, however, that the evidence produced in support of this claim was not credible, and that Iraq "retained suitable growth media, BW facilities, production equipment, teams of expert personnel, and the essential technical knowledge" after 1991.

Bulk production: In July, 1995, Iraq acknowledged that between 1988 and 1991, it had produced two BW agents in bulk: botulinum toxin and Bacillus anthracis spores (anthrax). Iraq reported 19,180 liters of botulinum toxin (10-20 fold concentrated) and 8445 liters of Bacillus anthracis spores (10 fold concentrated).

UNSCOM found, however, that "bulk warfare agent production appears to be considerably understated," given the resources available to Iraq's BW program, including growth media and fermenter capacity. The Commission said that the production rate of Botulinum toxin could be as much as double the stated amount, and 3 times greater than that stated for Bacillus anthracis spores.

Iraq claimed that it unilaterally destroyed more than 7500 liters of the Botulinum toxin and 3412 liters of Bacillus anthracis spores in 1991; UNSCOM noted that there was not evidence to support quantities claimed to be destroyed. The report concludes "the Commission has no confidence that all bulk agents have been destroyed... and that a BW capability does not exist in Iraq."

Iraq also claims to have produced lesser quantities of clostridium perfringens spores, ricin, and wheat cover smut.

BW Warheads: Iraq claimed to have produced 25 Al-Hussein missile warheads and filled them with BW agents. The Commission found that there was no credible evidence to show that only 25 missiles were produced and filled. Iraq declared that the 25 missiles were unilaterally destroyed; the Commission found enough physical evidence to account for the declared quantities of BW warheads, but the location of the remnants were inconsistent with Iraq's story.

BW bombs: Iraq declared that 200 R-400 aerial bombs were manufactured for BW purposes, but acknowledged that the numbers of bombs filled with particular agents (100 with botulinum toxin, 50 with bacillus anthracis spores, and 7 with aflatoxin) were "guesses." UNSCOM did find evidence of the destruction of some BW bombs at the site declared by Iraq, but found that the remnants account for less than one third of the bombs Iraq claims to have destroyed. In addition, UNSCOM found evidence of R-400A bombs carrying BW at an airfield where no BW weapons were declared.

Aircraft drop tanks: Iraq claimed that it produced 4 aircraft drop tanks to disseminate BW agents, and was developing a pilotless aircraft that could carry the tanks, holding either BW or chemical weapons, and release the toxins at a preset time. UNSCOM found that there was no evidence corroborate that only 4 were produced, and noted that interviews indicated that 12 were planned. Remnants of only three destroyed tanks were recovered. UNSCOM also rejected the evidence offered by Iraq--a letter thanking the project workers--that the pilotless aircraft project was shut down.

Aerosol Generators: Iraq developed aerosol generators for the dispersal of BW agents by modifying helicopter-borne commercial chemical insecticide disseminators. Although Iraq claimed the devices were ineffective, UNSCOM received documentation that they were successfully field tested. Interview evidence suggests that there were 12 devices produced; none were destroyed by UNSCOM.

Remaining Bacterial Growth Media: UNSCOM determined that there remained substantial bacterial growth media imported into Iraq which remains unaccounted for: 460 kg. of casien; 80 kg. of thioglocollate broth; 520 kg. of yeast extract; and 1100 kg of peptone. The report says that "the amounts that are 'missing' are significant, and would be sufficient to produce quantities of agent comparable to that already declared by Iraq."


Iraq's Chemical Weapons (CW) Program

UNSCOM was more successful in its pursuit of Iraq's CW program largely because Iraq was more cooperative with its disclosures. The final report notes that a "significant number" of chemical weapons, their components, and related equipment were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision between 1991 and 1997. In addition, the report found:

Extensive CW program: Iraq acknowledged that it carried out a large scale CW program between 1982 and 1990. It claims that more than 50% of its chemical weapons stocks were consumed during the 1980s, and that the majority of its production facilities were destroyed by aerial bombing during the Gulf War.

Bulk CW agents: Iraq said that it produced 3,859 tons of CW agents during the entire implementation of its CW program, and that 3,315 tons of these agents were weaponized. Agents produced in large quantities included mustard, tabun, and sarin.

According to Iraq, 80% of the weaponized CW agents were consumed between 1982 and 1988. In addition, they claim to have unilaterally discarded 130 tons of non-weaponized CW agents during the 1980s. UNSCOM found that these numbers could not be verified.

After the Gulf War, Iraq claimed that it had 412.5 tons of CW agents remaining. Four hundred eleven tons were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision; 1.5 tons of the CW agent VX remain unaccounted for.

Special Munitions: Iraq claimed that between 1982 and 1988, 100,000 munitions filled with CW agents were consumed or disposed of. UNSCOM found that this number could not be verified.

After the Gulf war, Iraq declared that there remained over 56,000 special munitions which could carry either CW or BW agents (22,000 filled, 34,000 unfilled). These munitions are all accounted for. They were either destroyed or converted for conventional weapons purposes.

Iraq claimed that there were 42,000 special munitions destroyed in the Gulf War. UNSCOM was unable to verify that number, and found that the destruction of 2,000 unfilled munitions remains uncertain, and 550 filled munitions remain unaccounted for.

Iraq claimed that it unilaterally destroyed 29,000 special munitions; UNSCOM found that of these, 100 filled munitions remain unaccounted for.

 

Did you miss this?

 

Yes, but I have a problem, my congressman is a democrat, he said thank you, and said that he was aware that the pesticides were found, and he would investigate the situation, which basically means that nothing is going to happen, Now a question for you, the disaster at Bhopal was caused by pesticides, the pesticides were neurotoxins, neurotoxin are a nerve agent, so would that make them WMD's?

 

Only if the intent was to use them as weapons which it was not.

The mosquitoes on the other hand...might have different opinions on this.

 

If it was for mosquito control, why was it stored in Ammo Storage Bunkers? and you haven't explained:

If the MIC would be applied at full strength , would it make a good WMD? It would appear so from the Bhopal incident.

 

I suggest you read up on it. You're making a complete fool of yourself.

And the mosquitoes were a joke. haha?

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http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20050427-121915-1667r.htm

But on the question of Syria, Mr. Duelfer did not close the books. "ISG was unable to complete its investigation and is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war," Mr. Duelfer said in a report posted on the CIA's Web site Monday night.
He cited some evidence of a transfer. "Whether Syria received military items from Iraq for safekeeping or other reasons has yet to be determined," he said. "There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to merit further investigation."
Arguing against a WMD transfer to Syria, Mr. Duelfer said, was the fact that all senior Iraqi detainees involved in Saddam's weapons programs and security "uniformly denied any knowledge of residual WMD that could have been secreted to Syria."
"Nevertheless," the inspector said, "given the insular and compartmented nature of the regime, ISG analysts believed there was enough evidence to merit further investigation."
Speculation on WMDs in Syria was fueled by the fact that satellite images picked up long lines of trucks waiting to cross the border into Syria before the coalition launched the invasion. Mr. Duelfer previously had reported that Syria was a major conduit for materials entering Iraq that were banned by the United Nations.
Saddam placed such importance on illicit trade with Syria that he dispatched Iraqi Intelligence Service agents to various border crossings to supervise border agents, and, in some cases, to shoo them away, senior officials told The Washington Times last year.

 

If its bogeymen you want so desperately, I suggest you put on your contamination suit and look in your backyard.

*yawn*

http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0701/S00056.htm


Boo!

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction

In the early 1970s, Saddam Hussein ordered the creation of a clandestine nuclear weapons program.[2] Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs were assisted by a wide variety of firms and governments in the 1970s and 1980s. [3][4][5][6][7] As part of Project 922, German firms such as Karl Kobe helped build Iraqi chemical weapons facilities such as laboratories, bunkers, an administrative building, and first production buildings in the early 1980s under the cover of a pesticide plant. Other German firms sent 1,027 tons of precursors of mustard gas, sarin, tabun, and tear gasses in all. This work allowed Iraq to produce 150 tons of mustard agent and 60 tons of Tabun in 1983 and 1984 respectively, continuing throughout the decade. Five other German firms supplied equipment to manfacture botulin toxin and mycotoxin for germ warfare. In 1988, German engineers presented centrifuge data that helped Iraq expand its nuclear weapons program. Laboratory equipment and other information was provided, involving many German engineers. All told, 52% of Iraq's international chemical weapon equipment was of German origin. The State Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP) ordered culture media and incubators from Germany's Water Engineering Trading.[8]

France built Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in the late 1970s. Israel claimed that Iraq was getting close to building nuclear weapons, and so bombed it in 1981. Later, a French company built a turnkey factory which helped make nuclear fuel. France also provided glass-lined reactors, tanks, vessels, and columns used for the production of chemical weapons. Around 21% of Iraq’s international chemical weapon equipment was French. Strains of dual-use biological material also helped advance Iraq’s biological warfare program.

Italy gave Iraq plutonium extraction facilities that advanced Iraq’s nuclear weapon program. 75,000 shells and rockets designed for chemical weapon use also came from Italy. Between 1979 and 1982 Italy gave depleted, natural, and low-enriched uranium. Swiss companies aided in Iraq’s nuclear weapons development in the form of specialized presses, milling machines, grinding machines, electrical discharge machines, and equipment for processing uranium to nuclear weapon grade. Brazil secretly aided the Iraqi nuclear weapon program by supplying natural uranium dioxide between 1981 and 1982 without notifying the IAEA. About 100 tons of mustard gas also came from Brazil.

The United States exported $500 million of dual use exports to Iraq that were approved by the Commerce department. Among them were advanced computers, some of which were used in Iraq’s nuclear program. The non-profit American Type Culture Collection and the Centers for Disease Control sold or sent biological samples to Iraq under Saddam Hussein up until 1989, which Iraq claimed it needed for medical research. These materials included anthrax, West Nile virus and botulism, as well as Brucella melitensis, which damages major organs, and clostridium perfringens, which causes gas gangrene. Some of these materials were used for Iraq's biological weapons research program, while others were used for vaccine development.[9]

The United Kingdom paid for a chlorine factory that was intended to be used for manufacturing mustard gas.[10] The government secretly gave the arms company Matrix Churchill permission to supply parts for the Iraqi supergun, precipitating the Arms-to-Iraq affair when it became known.

Many other countries contributed as well; since Iraq's nuclear program in the early 1980s was officially viewed internationally as for power production, not weapons, there were no UN prohibitions against it. An Austrian company gave Iraq calutrons for enriching uranium. The nation also provided heat exchangers, tanks, condensers, and columns for the Iraqi chemical weapons infrastructure, 16% of the international sales. Singapore gave 4,515 tons of precursors for VX, sarin, tabun, and mustard gasses to Iraq. The Dutch gave 4,261 tons of precursors for sarin, tabun, mustard, and tear gasses to Iraq. Egypt gave 2,400 tons of tabun and sarin precursors to Iraq and 28,500 tons of weapons designed for carrying chemical munitions. India gave 2,343 tons of precursors to VX, tabun, Sarin, and mustard gasses. Luxembourg gave Iraq 650 tons of mustard gas precursors. Spain gave Iraq 57,500 munitions designed for carrying chemical weapons. In addition, they provided reactors, condensers, columns and tanks for Iraq’s chemical warfare program, 4.4% of the international sales. China provided 45,000 munitions designed for chemical warfare. Portugal provided yellowcake between 1980 and 1982. Niger provided yellowcake in 1981.[11]

 

1970s?

Maybe you should go further back, like when the Ottomans were plotting against the British. Maybe some biblical WMDs are still around.

 

WMD attacks by Saddam

Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD, Chapter 5 - Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program (September 30, 2004). Retrieved on 2006-04-28.

Location WMD used Date Casualties
Haij Umran Mustard August 1983 fewer than 100 Iranian/Kurdish
Panjwin Mustard October-November 1983 3,000 Iranian/Kurdish
Majnoon Island Mustard February-March 1984 2,500 Iranians
al-Basrah Tabun March 1984 50-100 Iranians
Hawizah Marsh Mustard & Tabun March 1985 3,000 Iranians
al-Faw Mustard & Tabun February 1986 8,000 to 10,000 Iranians
Um ar-Rasas Mustard December 1986 1,000s Iranians
al-Basrah Mustard & Tabun April 1987 5,000 Iranians
Sumar/Mehran Mustard & nerve agent October 1987 3,000 Iranians
Halabjah Mustard & nerve agent March 1988 7,000s Kurdish/Iranian
al-Faw Mustard & nerve agent April 1988 1,000s Iranians
Fish Lake Mustard & nerve agent May 1988 100s or 1,000s Iranians
Majnoon Islands Mustard & nerve agent June 1988 100s or 1,000s Iranians
South-central border Mustard & nerve agent July 1988 100s or 1,000s Iranians
an-Najaf -
Karbala area Nerve agent & CS March 1991 Shi’a casualties not known

 

All of those chemical attacks are pre-1st Gulf War. Your point is? Those have nothing to do with our reason for going into Iraq a 2nd time. We all knew he HAD those WMDs in the past, but those weren't the ones we were attacking Iraq for. Show us the new WMDs. Too bad the Bush administration called off the search.

Crazy zealots.

- N

 

RE: 70s and 80s
Not only did we know he had them - we helped him make them! And supplied photos so that he could maximize the chemically induced death of Iranians.

RE: Ottomans
Actually the English used to gas large villages of Iraqies now and again.