Part the Third
Other critics have argued that the grand jury was exposed to pressure, because when it went home each night after hearing evidence, it was aware of community unrest and other extraneous factors that might have lead it to not indict. But, if anything, the easy course for the grand jurors to have taken would have been to return at least some charge against Officer Wilson, such as a split-the-difference charge like involuntary manslaughter.
This argument would have more credibility if this had been a normal grand jury proceeding. Well, sort of. After all, if this is a normal grand jury proceeding, the jurors would not be going home each night after twenty-five days of presentation spread out over the course of months. They would have heard the evidence in a day or two, likely under sequestration for such a short period, and returned with their decision.
A grand jury verdict in the face of considerable political pressure to charge is a demonstration of a commitment to the rule of law — something to be celebrated rather than condemned.
This is a political argument that ignores the strangeness of these proceedings.
6. The Grand Jury Did Something That Grand Juries Ordinarily Don’t Do.
We can tell Ben Caselman rattled the right cage for two reasons: First, Mr. Cassell links out to a different article by a different author at a different website from the one he wrongly attributed.
Second, Cassell's rebuttal is nearly incoherent:
Ben Caselman at The Huffington Post has an objection styled as a factoid that “it’s incredibly rare for a grand jury to do what Ferguson’s just did.” He reports that in 2010, federal prosecutors sought charges in 162,000 federal cases, and yet grand juries declined to return an indictment in only 11 of them. This point confuses apples with oranges. It take as the apples a pool of cases where federal prosecutors had already screened the evidence for probable cause (or, more likely, reasonable likelihood of success at trial — see the next point below). Hopefully, if federal prosecutors are doing their jobs well, the number of these cases in which probable cause does not exist should be something close to 0% — as Caselman reports is the case. But Caselman then compares these apples to the orange of this case — a situation where a grand jury is investigating with no assurance that any criminal conduct is present. Obviously an investigation into a possible crime is never a sure thing — particularly in the area of police shootings, where the law gives officers some leeway for making split second decisions. The difference in the outcome with the Michael Brown investigative grand jury from a routine federal prosecution is hardly surprising.
Cassell deliberately misrepresents Caselman, who does in fact attempt to account for the differences between state and federal numbers. And, furthermore, Cassell is still the outlier. In order to accept Cassell's apples and oranges argument, we must accept that the manner in which McCulloch conducted this grand jury is routine; we already know it wasn't.
Some critics have alleged that the grand jury misunderstood (or was misinformed) about the “probable cause” standard for returning an indictment. But this grand jury was one that had already evaluated many criminal cases and thus would have had significant experience in applying the probable cause standard.
It would be incumbent upon Mr. Cassell, given everything else we know about this case, to back this part of his argument with certain evidence. How many counts as "many"? And how many of those "many" were conducted like this?
Moreover, the dubiousness about whether the relatively low standard of probable cause was met in this case casts serious doubt on the viability of prosecuting Darren Wilson at trial.
Again, this argument would have at least some merit if this grand jury was conducted as grand juries usually are, something we already know to not be the case. As it is, the failure of a deviant grand jury proceeding to achieve its statistically-prevalent outcome reflects only on the deviant grand jury proceeding. It is inappropriate to misrepresent the situation as Mr. Cassell has.
Indeed, if probable cause is debatable, ordinarily prosecutors do not file charges — even if they believe they can meet that minimal standard. For example, the National District Attorney’s Association recommends, as part of its standards for responsible prosecution, that “[a] prosecutor should file charges that he or she believes adequately encompass the accused’s criminal activity and which he or she reasonably believes can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial.” If the grand jury’s decision about probable cause was even a close call, charges would not ordinarily be filed — should not be filed.
It is interesting that Cassell should make this argument, since it is wholly irrelevant to the grand jury. As it is, Team McCulloch put a lot of effort into calling witnesses in order to discredit them before the grand jury and thereby discourage any indictment.
The ad hominem argument that Robert McCulloch should have recused himself has resurfaced in the wake of the grand jury’s decision. For example, Raul Reyes wrote on CNN’s website that “[f]or the sake of impartiality, McCulloch should have let a special prosecutor take over the case,” explaining that McCulloch’s father was a police officer who, long ago, was shot in a shootout. For this criticism to have any bite, it would be necessary to take the next step and show how an “unbiased” prosecutor would have done something differently than McCulloch — a fact that seems dubious given the extensive evidence that was presented to the grand jury. In any event, the recuse argument lacks merit, as I explained several months ago.
The argument for recusal arises from the fact that in twenty-three years as a prosecutor he has never prosecuted a police officer for shooting a suspect. Furthermore, he has ties to the police and other first responders through a charity intended to support those people and their families
during the Ferguson unrest.
To the one, at this point we need not wonder why Mr. Cassell omits these considerations. To the other, his argument is circular:
"For this criticism to have any bite, it would be necessary to take the next step and show how an 'unbiased' prosecutor would have done something differently than McCulloch — a fact that seems dubious given the extensive evidence that was presented to the grand jury."
The counterpoint is easily predictable:
An 'unbiased' prosecutor would have conducted a normal grand jury proceeding.
9. The Grand Jury Evidence Shouldn’t Be Released.
We might notice that Mr. Cassell did not offer an example of what this argument actually is. But rebutting an actual point isn't Cassell's intention here; setting up his astounding conclusion is:
Yesterday I wondered whether the facts before the grand jury really mattered to some of the more vocal supporters of Michael Brown. Today I think it is becoming increasing clear that they don’t. For too many people, the issue of whether to indict Officer Darren Wilson was never about the process employed or the evidence collected. But fortunately, the prosecutors and the grand jury took a different tack.
This statement seems insane in light of the fact that process is at the heart of objections to this grand jury. The way it reads, with a simple fact appended, is:
For too many people, the issue of whether to indict Officer Darren Wilson was never about the process employed or the evidence collected. But fortunately, the prosecutors and the grand jury took a different tack by offering extraordinary process and protection to the person the grand jury was supposed to be investigating.
The thing about your presentation of Cassell as an appeal to authority is that this particular authority is a severe statistical outlier. Analogously, the anti-abortion movement for years repeated a line by Dr. John Willke about rape victims not being able to get pregnant. That line destroyed at least two election bids in 2012. Activists liked to repeat it because, you know, Dr. Willke is a
medical doctor, so he must be right, right? Except statistically speaking, Willke was an outlier. Of course, in that issue, the magnitude of his deviation can be observed in the fact that rape survivors do get pregnant, and that outcome is not what we would call rare.
Similarly, yeah, I get it, Cassell is a law professor and former judge, but when we actually look at the detail of his argument, we find it not only lacking but actually and specifically dishonest. His article is a political argument, not an actual legal analysis.
End Part III