Does Physics disprove the existence of free will?

[Sarkus]

I wanted to address this in more detail...
ICEAURA appears to be attempting to refute your strictly deterministic reality theory outcome of freewill being an illusion. I believe he will ultimately fail due to the self justifying criteria you have arbitrarily established ( as discussed in my earlier post#800)

There is no self-justifying criteria (aka question-begging), simply a logical argument that is valid. You accept the validity and thus you are an incompatibilist.
And, for clarity, my theory is not that the universe is strictly determined, but is an argument that says IF the universe is...
There is a difference, with one being a claim as to the nature of the universe, the other being merely a starting point to reach a conditional conclusion. To wit: IF the universe is strictly determined then we are not able to do otherwise.
The next step along the road, with such as yourself at any rate, would be to then examine the scenarios where the universe is not strictly determined, and looking at the ways in which it might not be, and how that might impact the conclusions we can reach.

I am not refuting your theory based on the criteria you have provided. In fact I would agree that your theory, if true, renders freewill an illusion. ( with minor exception)

That exception being...?

Remember it is only YOUR theory not mine. I consider your theory to be invalid.

I would consider it merely a logical argument. And you do find it valid, you simply find it unsound. Which is great. So do I if it assumes the will is strictly determined.
So the question moves to whether indeterminism due to inherent randomness can lead to the ability to do otherwise, or whether a random result offers no further actual ability.

As a potential way forward:
I proposed that your theory doesn't preclude the possibility that genuine freewill may indeed be fully determined as a product of billions of years of evolution. A possibility you refuse to accept.

Yet you previously stated you saw freewill as an impossibility in a determined universe? And now you are offering it as a possibility? Please can you make up your mind? Either you think freewill is possible in a determined universe or it is not?
If you think it is not compatible then the argument formulated by Baldeee way back is sufficient to say that the system itself, or how the system arose, is irrelevant to the conclusion. So in a determined universe I have considered the possibility, and rejected it.

The plausibility of such a concession supported by observable Human history of self determination. ( a form of compatabalism)

You are question begging that "self determination" is the ability to do otherwise. You need to show that that is the case.

I offered a way for you to maintain a strictly deterministic reality that included a strictly deterministically evolved genuine freewill to accommodate observation and empirical evidence of self determination in humans. I was overly optimistic perhaps. You chose to ignore it. ( neither traditionally compatabalist or incompatabalist) Fine!

I didn't ignore it, but it is sufficent to know that the system is deterministic to conclude that the system is not able to do otherwise. You yourself have concluded that freewill is not possible in such a deterministic universe... and now you have issue when I agree with that. You are confused as to your own position, QQ. Or if not internally then at least what you post most definitely is.

So let's try to sort out your view: do you think free will is possible in a deterministic universe? If you do, which part of the logic set out by Baldeee to you find invalid? It can't be that the universe is deterministic (although Baldeee simply premised that the system in question is built from deterministic interactions), so what is it?
If you do, however, think free will is not possible, why are you trying to push what you consider to be a plausible explanation for how free will might be possible in a deterministic universe?

So you remain stuck on a theory I consider to be invalid. Yet valid as a thought experiment with no real grounding in reality.

So you consider it to be invalid, even though you've previously agreed that free will is impossible in a deterministic universe, so which part of the logic is invalid? And you consider it unsound, which is fine, we can soon begin to explore how the alternatives (e.g. Indeterminacy) might lead where a valid argument about determinism can not (e.g. To whether free will is an actual ability to do otherwise).

Taking the following in turn:

It is premised on the illogicality of a finite start to reality - Big Bang theory

No, it does not. It simply starts from the assumption of determinism. Further, how is a finite start to reality (BB theory) illogic? That is worthy of a separate discussion on its own

The illogicality of finite boundaries in time, volume and dimension.

Who is setting finite boundaries in these things, or is this just another nod to the illogicality of the BB theory?

It is premised on NO understanding of what Life is, nor what consciousness is etc. Nor how central and crucial organic life, willed and un-willed may be to the orderly existence of this universe.

It is premised on everything pertinent: determinism. If the argument is valid from those premises, then the conclusion is valid. If you don't like the conclusion you can certainly consider it unsound, in which case we can look at the alternatives (e.g. Indeterminacy). But it doesn't need to understand what life is, what consciousness is, for the conclusion to be valid. And as valid it would apply wherever the premises are accepted. I.e. when considering a deterministic universe

It is premised on NO understanding of how important the existence of Life is to the issue.

I understand exactly how important it is: zero

It offers no mechanism for causality to induce the loss of freedom for willed life forms that is self evident, from the theoretical starting point (Big Bang)

Appeal to consequence.

and the list goes on,

I'm sure you can come up with many more reasons to reject the argument, QQ. But if considering the case of a deterministic universe, none of them are relevant. And even for the case of an indeterministic universe you'll still have a rough time trying to argue the relevance of them, if the only added aspect to the nature of the universe is randomness.

However, if one wishes to entertain one self with your thought experiment and turn a blind eye to the tenuous premises then sure the outcome would be that genuine Freewill is non-existent , even if there is a mountain of evidence to suggest other wise.

There is a mountain of evidence to suggest that we appear to have a genuine free will. The appearance of it, however, is not in question, but it is where you seem happy to stop.

 

[Sarkus]

Finally! a little light....

I'm sure you think so.

Whether genuine freewill is determined to be indeterministic or not, is impossible to prove.

Eh? Do you mean "established to be..."? Or are you genuinely suggesting that a system built from deterministic interactions can actually be indeterministic?

However the point of raising the possibility is to show you how a strictly deterministic reality can produce genuine freewill with out compromising that strict determinism.

But you have no more raised the possibility than by saying "square circle" raises the possibility that it exists. You need to do more than just put words together. You need to show how such can actually happen, and just Handwaving about evolution over billions of years is not sufficient, any more than saying "give scientists a billion years and they'll come up with a share circle!"

For if the indeterminism that is being suggested may exist because of deterministic evolution, then that indeterminism ( other than by the self determiner) is indeed something that has been fully determined to exist.

So, again, are you honestly suggesting that a genuinely indeterministic system can arise from a deterministic universe? That is what you are going with?
How, other than by it being words put together, is that anything more than just a square circle?

Ok try again:

Scenario :
We have a strictly deterministic reality that evolves a state of indeterminism that affords humans the ability to genuinely self determine ( aka freewill)

Aka, "we have a square circle".

Question:
Does the genuine self determinism that is determined to exist invalidate the notion of a strictly deterministic reality.

Unless you can show how genuine indeterminacy can arise from a strictly determined universe, anything that is genuinely indeterminate would invalide the notion of reality being strictly deterministic. Hence radioactive decay, unless governed by some hidden strictly deterministic system, would suggest our universe is indeterministic, and not strictly deterministic, even if it can be closely approximated in most ways by being considered strictly deterministic.

Or in a more metaphorical or theological sense:
When God grants mankind self determinism by his blessing, does mankind actually have freedom to self determine or are we just deluded into thinking we have and are really being determined to be free by Gods will?
(classic religious conundrum )
or

If someone says that your freedom is dependent on the blessing of that someone then is the notion of freedom invalid?
Does the dependency invalidate the freedom granted?

I'm really not sure what relevance this has?

or

If a policeman with a gun says you are free to go are you really?

It is a really difficult thing to explain but at least I tried....

Well, thanks for trying.

 

[Quantum Quack]

Well, thanks for trying.

your welcome!

I'm really not sure what relevance this has?

if indeterminsm is dependent on a strictly determinstic reality can it be truly indeterminate?
It is the logical proposition that is involved more so than the subject matter at hand.
For example:
If the existence of nothing is dependent on the existence of something can it truly be said to be nothing?

 

[Quantum Quack]

Also you overlooked the point I was making with the following.

For if the indeterminism that is being suggested may exist because of deterministic evolution, then that indeterminism is indeed something that has been fully determined to exist.

Care to consider it now?

 

[Sarkus]

if indeterminsm is dependent on a strictly determinstic reality can it be truly indeterminate?

Either something is truly indeterminate or it is truly determinate, irrespective of how it is arrived at. (I use the adjective "truly" to avoid issues of mere appearance of being indeterminate or determinate etc). Do you think something truly indeterminate can arise from strict determinism?

It is the logical proposition that is involved more so than the subject matter at hand.

I can see how the question might inform the subject matter at hand, but given that it is the subject matter at hand (ability to do otherwise) that we are discussing, I would suggest that very little, if anything, should be involved more than the subject matter at hand.

For example:
If the existence of nothing is dependent on the existence of something can it truly be said to be nothing?

Isn't that like asking "if a square is dependent upon being a circle, can it truly be said to be a square?" And are you sure you're not just heading into linguistic matters, rather than the phenomena themselves? Plus, what is the relevance to the matter at hand?

 

[iceaura]

To wit: IF the universe is strictly determined then we are not able to do otherwise.

That argument says nothing about freedom of will.
You go on to draw conclusions about freedom of will that require further assumptions, clarifications regarding the agent or performer of the determined action, clarifications regarding the role of time, and so forth. These you have yet to argue coherently, or even in some cases recognize as issues.

 

[iceaura]

It is no more an assumption than assuming up front that Socrates is mortal. It is simply a logical conclusion.

It doesn't follow from your premises. And you don't argue it from your premises. So it is not a conclusion of your argument.

With iceaura, and others, they assert that freewill is compatible with determinism.

By pointing to the central assumption involved in declaring them incompatible, which is so obviously dubious that those making it have gone to great lengths to deny they are doing so.

And - furthermore, as yet to be discussed - described a possible or plausible nature of that compatibility, providing not only an existence argument but a constructive one.

 

[Baldeee]

Wow, this same discussion.
I guess one should not expect to resolve anything here when the philosophical debate has been raging unagreed for centuries.

That argument says nothing about freedom of will.

It says everything about freedom of will, if one takes freedom of will as the ability to do otherwise, and not simply the engineering degree of freedom that a system can show, applied to the human system or otherwise.
The argument quite clearly concludes that there is no ability to do otherwise.
That seems to say quite a lot about such freedom of will.

You go on to draw conclusions about freedom of will that require further assumptions, clarifications regarding the agent or performer of the determined action, clarifications regarding the role of time, and so forth. These you have yet to argue coherently, or even in some cases recognize as issues.

If you are referring to the logic I originally put forward, what other assumptions are required?
It is all quite clearly contained in the premise.
There is no need to clarify anything regard the agent or performer, or the role of time.
If the system is accepted as deterministic, the conclusion is that it can not do otherwise.
Why is further clarification needed?

It doesn't follow from your premises.

Determinism being incompatible with freewill being an ability to do otherwise follows validly from the given premises, and with no further assumptions needed.

And you don't argue it from your premises.

He seems to.
Surprisingly consistently, in fact, it seems.

So it is not a conclusion of your argument.

It is a valid conclusion.
If you disagree with the conclusion then which premise do you disagree with?
Because the logic is valid.
If one considers the classic syllogism that Markus alludes to (All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal) then my original formulation is effectively:
A deterministic system is not able to do otherwise.
The will is a detdeterministic system.
Therefore the will is not able to do otherwise.

However, to get to the premises above I start with the premises of a deterministic interaction not being able to do otherwise, and a system that is made up of such interactions is itself deterministic.
But the logic is otherwise fundamentally the same deduction.
On what grounds do you claim, therefore, that the conclusion is invalid?

By pointing to the central assumption involved in declaring them incompatible, which is so obviously dubious that those making it have gone to great lengths to deny they are doing so.

Is think your flawed claim that I assumed from the outset that the ability to do otherwise is supernatural?
This is a patently incorrect claim of yours for reasons already given, and seemingly adequately explained at length by Sarkus as well.
Is one already assuming that Socrates is mortal in the premise that Socrates is a man?
No.
That he is mortal is the conclusion.
That the ability to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism is the conclusion.
From that one can conclude that if the universe is deterministic then freewill (the ability to do otherwise) does not exist.
Or, as you phrase it, is supernatural.
But this is again a conclusion, not an assumption.
And no matter how often you try to argue otherwise, you will remain wrong on this point.
If you disagree that the conclusion matches reality then your only recourse is to disagree with one of the premises, and as Sarkus told QQ, this would then be a matter of soundness and not validity.
So which one do you disagree with?

And - furthermore, as yet to be discussed - described a possible or plausible nature of that compatibility, providing not only an existence argument but a constructive one.

You mean the engineering degrees of freedom?
That a brick in space exhibits?

 

[Schmelzer]

Either something is truly indeterminate or it is truly determinate, irrespective of how it is arrived at. (I use the adjective "truly" to avoid issues of mere appearance of being indeterminate or determinate etc). Do you think something truly indeterminate can arise from strict determinism?

This is, in some sense, a tautology.

What you name "truly (in)determinate" is simply "(in)determinate on the fundamental level". But we can never know that our most fundamental theories are truly fundamental. And an indeterminate theory as an approximation of a determinate theory and reverse happens all the time. Expectation values tend to follow deterministic equations, and deterministic equations give deterministic chaos.

So, what is most fundamental - determinism or randomness - will remain unknown forever.

 

[Quantum Quack]

Do you think something truly indeterminate can arise from strict determinism?

which is why I mentioned those dependency analogues. "Gods blessing, police officers blessing etc...."
I see no conflict if strict determinism leads to the determining of indeterminate states. There fore self determination aka freewill could be a condition that is strictly determined to be indeterminate.
Perhaps the logic is beyond you....
However as I suggested there is an issue of dependency which may compromise the degree of indeterminism that has been strictly determined to exist.

"For chaos to exist, order must be present"
A state of co-dependency perhaps?

I might add, is it not the main purpose of self determination to bring order to chaos?

 

[Quantum Quack]

(All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal

While this is logically consistent it speaks nothing of the truth. It speaks only of logical consistency.
The issue in this discussion has always been at cross purposes.
Logical consistency vs reality based argument.

If this is a discussion about reality then it clearly needs to be stated as such.
Switching context from pure logic to reality based reasoning maintains an endless debate going no where.
Facts:

• Chaos exists
• Order exists

Logical proposition:
A strictly deterministic reality MUST determine Chaos to exist.

• If not then the "strictly determinstic" criteria is invalid.
• If so , then the "strictly determinstic" criteria is also invalid

is this not so?
If yes, then absolute determinism fails as a theory.

If chaos exists then the theory of absolute determinism fails...
and Physics states quite clearly that chaos exists....

So the only question that needs to be addressed is whether "true" chaos exists. ( as Physics states)

It is really that simple... (self determination and freewill are actually irrelevant)

 

[Quantum Quack]

It only has to be shown that "strict determinism" of reality is invalid as a theory. Freewill, and self determination unnecessarily confuses the issue and are irrelevant.
Compare:
1./ Premise:
All men are mortal

Claim:
Socrates is a man

Conclusion:
Socrates is mortal

If one presumes the premise to be correct, which is impossible to know, then sure Socrates is mortal.

2./ Premise:
Reality is absolutely deterministic.

Claim:
Chaos is a part of reality

Conclusion:
Chaos is absolutely deterministic.

An obvious paradox is generated ....
Chaos by definition CAN NOT be absolutely determined.

see the problem?

 

[iceaura]

You mean the engineering degrees of freedom?
That a brick in space exhibits?

Nope.
The extended concept of engineering degrees of freedom, that a human decision in time exhibits. A useful analysis of them remains to be accomplished, afaik. They are qualitatively different - on different logical levels - than those possessed by a brick in space.
And this has been brought to your attention four times now, at least.

Determinism being incompatible with freewill being an ability to do otherwise follows validly from the given premises, and with no further assumptions needed.

It does not. You need the assumption of free will being supernatural - able to choose a different output from identical input. Without that assumption, your determinism is irrelevant.
- - -

It says everything about freedom of will, if one takes freedom of will as the ability to do otherwise, and not simply the engineering degree of freedom that a system can show, applied to the human system or otherwise.

That is confused. Clearly and by lab verified observation, as in the examples, a human decision incorporates the ability to do otherwise in its engineering-analogous degrees of freedom.

If one considers the classic syllogism that Markus alludes to (All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal) then my original formulation is effectively:
A deterministic system is not able to do otherwise.
The will is a detdeterministic system.
Therefore the will is not able to do otherwise.

Now try to make the leap that the will has no freedom in what it is able to do. You can borrow the example above, if you like: a driver approaching a traffic light. Note that at least until registering the color of the light, and in many cases even afterwards, the driver is able to stop or go as an act of will.

Your difficulties arise from the confusion inherent in your vague conception of "system", and your inability to let go of a supernatural conception of freedom - that to be free, one must be able to get different outputs from identical inputs, contravene natural law and cause/effect relationships.

 

[Sarkus]

That argument says nothing about freedom of will.
You go on to draw conclusions about freedom of will that require further assumptions, clarifications regarding the agent or performer of the determined action, clarifications regarding the role of time, and so forth. These you have yet to argue coherently, or even in some cases recognize as issues.

I see Baldeee has beaten me to a response here. Needless to say you are wrong, and despite all the explanations thus far you still stick to your assertion. I grow weary of trying. You don't get it, you clearly either don't want to or can't, so I am not sure there is any further use in trying to explain it to you. I therefore leave you to your continued ignorance.

 

[Sarkus]

Wow, this same discussion.
I guess one should not expect to resolve anything here when the philosophical debate has been raging unagreed for centuries.

Indeed. What I find interesting is that even compatabilists (those who think freewill is compatible with determinism) aren't all agreed as to whether or not we actually have the ability to do otherwise, and that there are incompatibilists who believe that the existence of the ability to do otherwise is an argument against reality being deterministic. Yet here we find people who reject the notion that we don't have the ability to do otherwise, and consider it so obvious that it must be quite incredible to them that philosophers ever possibly question the idea.

To the rest of your post, good luck with trying to explain things to those that seemingly can't grasp it, and insist that you have introduced additional assumptions.

 

[Sarkus]

This is, in some sense, a tautology.

No more than concluding that Socrates is mortal is a tautology. But yes, if you consider that the conclusion is inherent within the combination of the premises, the conclusion of a valid logical argument is inherently tautological. That is simply the nature of deductive logic.

What you name "truly (in)determinate" is simply "(in)determinate on the fundamental level". But we can never know that our most fundamental theories are truly fundamental. And an indeterminate theory as an approximation of a determinate theory and reverse happens all the time. Expectation values tend to follow deterministic equations, and deterministic equations give deterministic chaos.

So, what is most fundamental - determinism or randomness - will remain unknown forever.

What reality actually is, deterministic or random, is irrelevant, though.
If a valid logical argument exists that starts with the premise of a deterministic universe and concludes there to be no ability to do otherwise, and if a valid argument exists that starts with the premise of a random (I.e. Probabilistic) universe and concludes there to be no ability to do otherwise, then if we assume that the universe is either deterministic or probabilistic, the conclusion is the same: no ability to do otherwise.
At the moment the argument has focussed on the deterministic, because this is the delineator between the compatabilist and incompatibilist. And there is among us a compatabilist or two, hence the focus.

 

[Sarkus]

which is why I mentioned those dependency analogues. "Gods blessing, police officers blessing etc...."
I see no conflict if strict determinism leads to the determining of indeterminate states.

You seem to be back to your square circle. You need to show how an indeterministic state can arise from strict determinism. Otherwise it is an oxymoron. Just putting the words together doesn't make it any more plausible, or else we'd be awash with real square circles, simply because we can put those two words together.

There fore self determination aka freewill could be a condition that is strictly determined to be indeterminate.
Perhaps the logic is beyond you....

There is no logic here to be beyond, QQ. You have simply put words together with no thought to how it might actually arise. Find me something, anything, that provides an argument for how something truly indeterminate (rather than just the appearance of it through lack of knowledge) can arise from strict determinism. As far as I am aware the two are mutually exclusive. A universe that is strictly determined can not have things that are indeterminate.

So no more square circles, QQ, please.

 

[Sarkus]

It only has to be shown that "strict determinism" of reality is invalid as a theory. Freewill, and self determination unnecessarily confuses the issue and are irrelevant.
Compare:
1./ Premise:
All men are mortal

Claim:
Socrates is a man

Conclusion:
Socrates is mortal

If one presumes the premise to be correct, which is impossible to know, then sure Socrates is mortal.

2./ Premise:
Reality is absolutely deterministic.

Claim:
Chaos is a part of reality

Conclusion:
Chaos is absolutely deterministic.

An obvious paradox is generated ....
Chaos by definition CAN NOT be absolutely determined.

see the problem?

The flaw in your argument is a misunderstanding of the notion of chaos. Chaos is simply the sensitivity of the end state of a system to small changes in the initial state, usually of a deterministic system. To say that chaos can not be absolutely determined is just wrong. In a deterministic system it would be.
Chaos would be as much part of a strictly deterministic universe as an indeterministic one. So no paradox is created. The notion of chaos as part of reality does not invalidate the universe from being strictly deterministic.

Furthermore your initial statement is also confusing... Many philosophers who accept that the ability to do otherwise is incompatible with a deterministic universe also consider it to be incompatible with an indeterministic universe, such as probabilistic. If your statement was to suggest that the issue would be resolved if it could be established the universe was not deterministic then you are unfortunately mistaken.

 

[Baldeee]

To the rest of your post, good luck with trying to explain things to those that seemingly can't grasp it, and insist that you have introduced additional assumptions.

One can only lead a horse to the water.
The rest is out of my hands.

 

[Baldeee]

Nope.
The extended concept of engineering degrees of freedom, that a human decision in time exhibits. A useful analysis of them remains to be accomplished, afaik. They are qualitatively different - on different logical levels - than those possessed by a brick in space.
And this has been brought to your attention four times now, at least.

Is anyone stopping you from presenting your case?
Go ahead.

It does not. You need the assumption of free will being supernatural - able to choose a different output from identical input. Without that assumption, your determinism is irrelevant.

This has been explained to you before, by me and by others.
But let's break it down:
If A = B.
X=A.
Therefore X=B.

Valid so far?
Good.

So let A be "deterministic system" and let B be "is not able to do otherwise"
Note, no mention of whether the universe is deterministic, only whether the system in question is.
Let X be the system that we call the will.

So we end up with: a deterministic system is not able to do otherwise, the will is a deterministic system, therefore the will is not able to do otherwise.
Note, no mention of whether the universe is deterministic, only that the will is a deterministic system.

Still consider it valid, or do you see an added assumption that "the ability to do otherwise" is assumed to be supernatural?

So what if the ability to do otherwise was available to an indeterministic system?
And there was an assumption that the universe was indeterministic as a whole but allowed deterministic systems?
Thus "the ability to do otherwise" is not in defiance of natural laws, but the will, as a deterministic system, is not a system that has the ability.
Sans any assumption regarding the nature of the overall universe, it can not be ruled out, and thus it can not be logically valid for you to say that the ability to do otherwise is necessarily to defy the natural laws.

Short version: you're wrong.
Here endeth the lesson.

That is confused. Clearly and by lab verified observation, as in the examples, a human decision incorporates the ability to do otherwise in its engineering-analogous degrees of freedom.

So you keep saying yet are you going to explain how?
Or leave us to simply assume you are correct?
You seem to have mentioned lab-verified observations as if that ends the matter, yet no detail other than, as Sarkus has rightly pointed, such detail that describes judging the "ability to do otherwise" by appearance and not by what is actually going on.
I.e. It doesn't seem, from what you have thus offered, to go any further than that.
I await your input on the matter,

Now try to make the leap that the will has no freedom in what it is able to do. You can borrow the example above, if you like: a driver approaching a traffic light. Note that at least until registering the color of the light, and in many cases even afterwards, the driver is able to stop or go as an act of will.

And a brick in space is able to move in many directions according to what impacts it and when.

Your difficulties arise from the confusion inherent in your vague conception of "system", and your inability to let go of a supernatural conception of freedom - that to be free, one must be able to get different outputs from identical inputs, contravene natural law and cause/effect relationships.

You mean you are confused because you have a vague concept of "system", and because you can't let go of the mistaken claim that I am assuming a supernatural concept of freedom in the logic presented?
Fair enough.
You are confused.
They are not my difficulties, however.