So, where are we at as far as evidence of God goes, 170-something posts into the thread. Let's see...
Jan Ardena has blustered on about how he isn't interested in evidence, yada yada yada. As far as actually presenting any goes, there are two things. At one point he appeared to suggest that everything in the world is evidence of God, but he couldn't quite bring himself to commit to that position when asked the question directly.
Jan will never commit to
anything when asked directly. You should know that by now. Committing to something would mean having to defend it, and Jan prefers to always be on offense, never on defense.
Apart from that, he suggested that the "scriptures" are evidence of God, without providing any particular reason as to why they should be considered as such.
To be fair, Jan did write this in post #61:
"I've already told you what I think is good evidence, things like the cosmological, and teleological argument, or most things by William Craig Lane. I don't base my theism on them, but they are basically good in my opinion."
The second sentence might strike some people as an evasion, but I'm less sure.
Let's change 'knowledge of God's existence' to 'knowledge of good and evil'. Most of our Sciforums atheists aren't amoral, they believe very strongly that they can discern evil and differentiate it from good. In fact many of them seem to my eye to be puritanical-style moralists, always casting judgement when the topic is social-issue politics or something like that.
The question here is what
justifies moral judgements. Some people might be adherents of various metaethical theories such as utilitarianism, but I suspect that most of them would say, as Jan said, that their moral judgment that 'X is wrong' isn't really the result of utilitarian calculation. It's going to be more intuitive than that. The metaethical justification for the intuition only appears after the judgment has been made. (And then continually adjusted until its result conforms with the original intuition, reducing mush of ethics to little more than sophistry.)
So if moral intuition is not only admissible, but somehow
required in order for somebody to be considered something more than a psychopath, then why isn't religious intuition being given the same courtesy?
Similar points could be made about mathematics and logic I think. It's easy to talk grandly about mathematical proofs, but at the end of the day whatever logical necessity a proof expresses still has to be intuited.