Well, that is debatable .
Consciousness is not an abstraction. The hard fact is that most living things exhibit "awareness" of their environment due to the specific pattern their molecules are arranged in.
Wetness (water) is a mathematical pattern of non-wet particles. We call these emergent properties, [...]
Outward mechanistic form alone (extrinsic properties or relationships) merely substantiates
zombie consciousness, not experiences. To unpackage this:
Adding the adjective of "mathematical" to patterns (or the empirical things which the concept of "patterns" is superimposed over) simply means that the discipline (mathematics) studies spatial relationships or geometrical structure in addition to quantity, and is thereby inclusive of "patterns".
It doesn't mean the invented category slash discipline of "mathematics" owns patterns, form, structure, or organization any more than the invented discipline of astronomy owns the planets, stars, galaxies of the universe. Which is to say, appending the adjective "mathematical" to items doesn't provide them with additional causal powers.
Yes, it can be zealously construed that "pattern" is even what intelligence (as a spectrum from simple to advanced) fundamentally depends upon to begin with: Mechanistic spatial configurations that store information and dynamically react, discriminate and respond in special, functional ways. The primitive precursor for "intelligence" is thereby the universal ability of matter to interact with itself and constitute changeable structures. Thus allowing multiple substrates to instantiate sapient activity.
But such is also a precursor for everything else, too, so no need for us to narrowly label those precursor capacities "proto-intelligence". That would be like calling a carbon atom a "proto-organism" or "proto-human", as if biological entities are the only affairs carbon can implement.
It's no different for zombie consciousness (outward conscious behavior of a body that is devoid of experience). Dynamic mechanistic configurations are responsible for detecting details of the environment and navigating a "robot" through an obstacle course of things, and even identifying items.
Nothing about that (zombie consciousness) entails the conception of "patterns" globally having intrinsic states with properties that could developmentally produce experiences.
Though if philosophers or scientists want to explain our brand of consciousness that features experience and its phenomenal (exhibited) content, then they would seem to have to go a route of attributing intrinsic states to matter. To avoid explanations that are dualism scenarios caused by either the "summoning" or the conjuring acts of distributed electrochemical patterns.[1]
For instance, anyone who gets away from that dualism by claiming that the experiences (manifestations) of consciousness literally are the neural correlates themselves is asserting (whether verbally realizing it or not) that matter has intrinsic states. Because the external or extrinsic relationships of neural electrochemical patterns that are either in sensory mode or dreaming mode sure as heck don't outwardly resemble the perceptual content itself or a dream itself.
It's only when going down a motivated route like this to explain _X_ that "patterns" (or the arrangement of matter which that concept is applied to as an identifier) would seem to entail a hidden phenomenal character that can be developmentally manipulated into the complex experiences of consciousness. Otherwise, it is or would be an unnecessary, speculative possibility.
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[1] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: "Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it [or rather a sensory experience -- a private manifestation of consciousness and its content] are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception."