[...] The more I think about it the more I like the idea on Panpsychism, which can start with brute chemical reactions based on chemical affinities, to more complex sensitivity to changing environment, to sensory awareness and responses, to self-aware consciousness of one's relationship to the environment.
I am not talking about "thinking" per se. All material things do have an objective "experiential" existence, no?
How do regular patterns emerge from chaos? How does H2O expresses itself in 3 distinct states dependent on temperature? How do plants learn to ignore non-harmful irritants? And even more curious, how does a brainless, neuronless Slime Mold acquire the ability for anticipating a regularly occurring future event (time)?
Doesn't each state experience a present state of NOW that was caused by a form of dynamic prior state of NOW?
Even human experience of NOW rests on information being passed on from the past. When we look back in time to an ancient galaxy that no longer exists, are we looking at Universal memory ?
Sure, the only way its non-existent past is applicable at all in presentism is if each of its ridiculously short-lived Nows retains information about the last one that was expunged. Otherwise, they don't share the same identity at all -- and they're arguably still the equivalent of slightly modified parallel universes replacing each other.
But figuratively, changes don't have to be like the ephemeral scenes on a movie theater screen, in which one change seemingly pops-out of nowhere and annihilates the former one, to replace it. The scenes or configuration states of that abbreviated "movie world" can co-exist as differences distributed along a reel of film or information stored on a disk, flashdrive, etc. With the initial apprehension of "what's going on" (corresponding to our cognition's representational take on the move-screen situation) either being a mistaken inference or just one of multiple ways of ontologically conceptualizing received information.
But those spread out over two dimensions depictions of differences (change) on a filmstrip or optic disk can disrupt the integration or idea of common identity, too. For instance, the book quote at the
top of this former post strays away from a continuum of brain/body unity by switching from the opening block metaphor to a cinematic filmstrip one. A
flipbook would have been a better analogy, in the sense of retaining the semblance of a stacked block. Albeit both the filmstrip and the flip-book are compromised with respect to attributing an objective "flow" to spacetime rather than that being an illusion of a brain's discrimination of its own consciousness into a procession of increments from the dawn of fetal awareness to death.
The brain's Now experiences are solipsistic from the standpoint that each one regards only itself as existing, with the others demoted to memory status (the data storage of a putative extinct past). That's due to the underlying chunk-sequence of different neural states that correlate to a distinct Now experience being limited to the "live" or "in play" information that they are processing. They can only be about that specific information that they are devoted to, not what prior chunk-sequences are about or what future chunk-sequences of brain changes/differences are about.
The other, co-existing Now experiences are not recognized as manifesting with the specious current Now, they're islands cut-off from each other, as far as those superficial appearances go. (But are still ontologically united components in terms of the worldline of the brain/body or the brain/body's
4D-worm manner of subsisting which the sliced, 3D approach to consciousness doesn't capture or represent).
Note that the very verbs of common language reflect its inherent bias for the presentism view of time, so there is no way to pristinely describe eternalism without using them, when speaking/writing in common language. It would require a specialized nomenclature to avoid the inherent metaphysical prejudices of common language.
Turning to panpsychism...
The building blocks of intelligence are simply the extrinsic (detectable) characteristics of elemental matter and its ability to interact with itself and relationally constitute both unruly patterns and highly regulated arrangements. So in that sense, intelligence has precursors which it arises from, and they are universal. IOW, pan-proto-sapience is the case, but we don't call it that because matter also assembles into things which are not intelligent -- 99.9999... percent of affairs in the cosmos are not intelligent. We don't call atoms "proto-humans" or "proto-brains".
But with regard to the phenomenal properties of consciousness (those manifestations of vision, hearing, feeling, etc), there seems to be nothing else they can usefully create other than the complex experiences associated with brains. So employment of the term "panpsychism" seems justified in that regard, except that it creates erroneous impressions serving as strawmen for opponents. Because the word-unit "psych" etymologically implies all the capacities of mind, not just the manifestations. I prefer instead proto-phenomenalism, to reduce conflation with memory-based cognition, intelligence, subjectivity, etc. Leaving off "pan" because it's too long to begin with. Etymologically, the ancient root meaning of "phenomen-" is just "show, showing, appearance, etc". It at least has less baggage.
Our two representational approaches to matter are both invented: One is what biological evolution has produced over eons (our perceptions of matter existing as outer appearances of objects in space); and the other is fully artificial: The symbol-based abstractions or technical descriptions in physics.
This thus leaves the question of how matter exists to itself independent of those two modes of human-dependent representation. One idea is that the intrinsic, ontological properties of matter are just primitive manifestations. This kills two birds with one stone by hypothesizing that the brain recruits those elemental "presentations" to construct its complex, psychological experiences of perception and thought. But those primitive manifestations should not be categorized as mental, subjective, and perhaps even "experiences" until orchestrated into such at that higher level of neural manipulation.