Kalam Cosmological Argument for the existence of God

[James R]

Jan Ardena:

I am still discussing the KCA, but there is an obstacle that has arisen (Barker's reformulation), which make you convinced that the argument is invalid for that reason.

Barker did not reformulate Craig's argument. The version of the KCA that I put in the opening post is from Craig, not from Barker. I have been discussing Craig's KCA argument all along.

It claims that the first premise contains 2 claims, as opposed to the 1 claim it does make. It supposes that the claim makes reference to things that don't begin to exist. This is false.

Compare:
1a. Everything has a cause.
1b. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

To me, it looks like 1b is making a distinction between things that begin to exist and things that do not begin to exist, and talking about only those things that begin to exist. In contrast, to me it seems that 1a is talking about all things.

So, how about you. Do you think there are the same or different? Explain.

I contend that the scriptural definitions, and descriptions of what we term as God, is synonymous, at a basic level, with the definition I stated, of the term totality.

Yes, that's what I thought. So "the totality" is just another name for "God", and you're begging the question.

God is a non thing in relation to things. And it neither irrelevant, or fluff.

No. You can't have it both ways.

If "the totality" is the same as God, and "the totality" includes things, then God/the totality includes things. That is, things are part of God, or part of the mereology you're calling God, or whatever.

I'm happy to not mention G-O-D, and call it the totality if you like.

I'd prefer it if you stopped dancing around and started saying what you mean. When you're talking about God, don't talk about "the totality" in an effort to obscure what it is you're referring to. Use the word "God".

How is the totality assumed in the first premise 'everything that begins to exist has a cause' if it is a fact that everything that we can observe beginning to exist has a cause. That information merely draws attention to our natural observations.

Is there something other than God that does not begin to exist?

You keep dancing around this question. Why?

What does begin to exist without a cause?

We might get to that later.

What doesn't begin to exist, apart from God?

 

[Jan Ardena]

Compare:
1a. Everything has a cause.
1b. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

To me, it looks like 1b is making a distinction between things that begin to exist and things that do not begin to exist, and talking about only those things that begin to exist. In contrast, to me it seems that 1a is talking about all things.

So, how about you. Do you think there are the same or different? Explain.

Either things begin to exist, or things exist eternally. That is the distinction you're making.
Things don't exist eternally. That is our common experience. Unless you have any information of any thing that exists eternally.
Generally we accept that things which begin to exist, has a cause. Would you say that is correct?

The reason for 1b premise I think would be to respond to those who are not prepared to differentiate between God, and things.
It further serves to highlight the difference between the nature of God, and the nature of things. Not that it presupposes God, or some being like God (if you don't want to use that term). It categorises all things as everything that begins to exist, just in case it was missed in 1a.

So I think they say the same thing in essence, with added information on the nature of things.

Yes, that's what I thought. So "the totality" is just another name for "God", and you're begging the question.

My point is, it doesn't have to be called God. You could call it the totality, but it would be the same thing.

No. You can't have it both ways.

If "the totality" is the same as God, and "the totality" includes things, then God/the totality includes things. That is, things are part of God, or part of the mereology you're calling God, or whatever.

Yes, but God, or the totality, is not a thing, and in that descriptive regard, it is a non thing.
You must see that by now.

I'd prefer it if you stopped dancing around and started saying what you mean. When you're talking about God, don't talk about "the totality" in an effort to obscure what it is you're referring to. Use the word "God".

God, is a word that is used as a general description of a Supreme Being, which is the source of everything. You don't like that word so I'll replace with a word that is more palatable. The ''totality''. It means the same thing to me, and if you being honest, you'd admit it does for you as well.

Is there something other than God that does not begin to exist?

You keep dancing around this question. Why?

I've answered you twice now. The totality, and matter.
When is your big moment? My neighbours are complaining about the drum roll.

jan.

 

[arfa brane]

So it seems the argument hangs on various meanings of "begins to exist". Since logically something eternal doesn't begin to exist, this is the foot in the door for the whole argument.
I can't see that trying to use the meaning of "necessary existence" changes anything, if all it relies on is the difference between an eternal and a finite existence--having a beginning or not--so is a red herring.

We can understand the phrase "beginning of time", but it implies that time somehow bootstrapped itself; in order to begin anything, time has to pre-exist.

 

[Baldeee]

Considering I'd already defined the usage, continued confusion is your own problem.

Enough with the self-righteous attitude, for Pete's sake!
If you have nothing to say on a point that actually furthers the discussion, please don't bother saying it, especially if your only purpose in saying it is to express a self-perceived superiority.

1. Physical existence requires a cause.
2. God is not physical.
3. Therefore, god has no cause.
4. Therefore, god is the only available uncaused cause.

(2) If god were physical, we would expect to have access to some physical evidence for god. This premise does not assume god to exist. It merely makes the assumption that if one did, it could not be physical. I think you'd agree with that, as an uncontroversial assumption.

If you don't mind I'll brush over the veracity of options (1) and (2), neither of which I think can be proven as true (and with the first it is the matter of sufficiency that is more in question, I think), as I'd initially like to focus on validity.

On that matter, (3) appears valid from (1) and (2) - given your definition of "require" (although personally I'd prefer a more unambiguous phrase that does not involve a word that could be used with the alternate, more general, meaning during discussion).

But I contend that (4) is still an invalid conclusion that god exists for 2 reasons.
The "only available" assumes that God is the only non-physical entity, an assumption not stated within the premises, thus one can not logically conclude "only".
At best one can conclude that God is a possible uncaused cause.
Yet even if you amended 2 to state that God is the only non-physical entity, and that the non-physical can have causal power, you could only validly conclude that God is the only available uncaused cause, but not that God is necessarily the cause of the physical.
To do that you have to logically exclude the possibility of infinite causality / causal loops by the physical etc.
I'm not suggesting that either is possible or impossible, only that they remain logical possibilities until you rule them out, and as such you could not validly conclude on a specific solution as being valid.
To preach back to you: a valid argument is only such if it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
As such, positing a single solution, as you are doing, where multiple solutions might logically exist, is invalid as the solution selected might be the wrong one.

Secondly, your conclusion in 4 is merely that God is the only available uncaused cause.
For this to be a valid proof of God's existence you would need to actually conclude that God exists, not what God would be if God exists.
You have clarified that your premise 2 means that IF God exists... and as such your conclusion should incorporate this conditionality, and thus "IF God exists then God is the only available uncaused cause."
To conclude that God exists, premise 2 would have to be taken as assuming God does exist, which is clearly question begging.
To avoid that your premise 2 should be "non-physical things exist" and then a (2.1) can follow from (1) and (2): "non-physical things are uncaused."
None of this assumes that God exists.
If, however, you assume that God is the only non-physical thing then you are begging the question as set out in the OP (JamesR detailing Dan Barker's criticism).
With (1), (2), (2.1) and (3) still valid and no mention of God, one can conclude in (4) that the non-physical are available uncaused causes.

To limit this to God, or to having attributes that we then can say fits the label/understanding of God, one would need to validly show how there is only one such non-physical entity - not just assume it - and then also show validly how it is not possible for there to be an infinite causal chain of physical causation, or some other explanation that possibly fits the premises.
Ultimately your conclusion would be that the only possible solution is that X, with attributes A, B, C, exists.
By comparison to the understood notion of God, we can then claim that God is shown to validly exist.

And then we can discuss the veracity of the assumptions you have used.

Earlier in this thread I posited that nothingness is the only 'other' non-physical (entity?...abstract object?). Nothingness shares all the necessary qualities of a creator god. Nothingness being the only non-physical is another uncontroversial assumption.

So you believe, although I contend that it is controversial.
For example, how can it be meaningful for nothingness to be considered an entity at all?
Or to possibly be said to exist?
I'm not putting this forward as my case but merely to show that it is far from an uncontroversial position to take.

Granted, the equivalency of god and nothingness does warrant further argument.

Indeed.

1. Physical existence requires a cause.
2. Nothingness is not physical.
3. Therefore, nothingness has no cause.
4. The universe can possess a net zero total energy.
5. Therefore, nothingness can be an uncaused cause.
6. The universe began a finite time in the past.
7. An uncaused cause requires volition.
8. Therefore, nothingness and god are equivalent in being volitional cause.

Just to pull you up on why you need to change the phrasing of "requires" in premise 1 to indicate sufficiency as well as nothingness: you have used "requires" again in premise 7.
Using the definition as per premise 1 you are thus seem to be stating that an uncaused cause necessarily has volition, but also that volition is sufficient to conclude an uncaused cause.
Are you not able to exercise free-will?
Or do you see yourself as an uncaused cause?

As to the actual argument above, is this an argument that is aiming to validly conclude that God exists, or simply to show the equivalence of God and nothingness?
A solution might be somewhat trivial, though: what is the difference between an apple that doesn't exist and an orange that doesn't exist?
No difference: neither exist.
Also, how does 5 follow from 4?

No need to get defensive.

Then please drop the confrontational arrogance and the self-perceived superiority.
It is both unwarranted and unhelpful.

I've already told you that premises need not be exhaustive.

To repeat what I have said before: if one wishes to conclude on a specific solution then they do need to logically exclude all others.
Otherwise the conclusion is invalid.
Now we can disagree on what it means for something to be a valid conclusion, but if I accept your understanding then we would both be wrong.

Validity only requires that premises, if true, lead to the conclusion, not that ONLY those true premises lead to the conclusion. IOW, there's no requirement in logic to dismiss all possibilities.

Validity as per wiki...
"In logic, an argument is valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false."
I have taken wiki as a simple first step to providing what I understand as the definition, and it seems supported by everywhere else I look.
They all seem to concur: if the premises are taken as true but the conclusion can still be wrong then the conclusion is not valid.
I.e. Unless you can logically exclude all other possibilities than your conclusion, the conclusion is not valid.
What you are arguing for is more like a logically consistent solution (one that is true under at least one interpretation of unstated premises), rather than an actual valid conclusion (of being the only possible solution).
And in this regard, I don't think many would disagree that God is not a logically consistent explanation.
I certainly wouldn't.
But valid argument for God's existence is something else, and that's before even considering the veracity of the premises.

So are we done arguing about what validity means?
And do you still hold your conclusion to be valid?
I do stand to be corrected on the matter but you'll need to provide something more than just assertion to the contrary.

 

[PhysBang]

Either things begin to exist, or things exist eternally. That is the distinction you're making.
Things don't exist eternally. That is our common experience. Unless you have any information of any thing that exists eternally.
Generally we accept that things which begin to exist, has a cause. Would you say that is correct?

The question at hand is whether or not there is any thing/being that did not begin to exist. This includes any kind of being, including possible deities, which are a type of being. Additionally, we know that objects are made up of smaller particles; perhaps these things might last forever.

For the logical purposes of the KCA, however, the claim being made is about those beings that at some time began to exist, not any others, and that these particular beings had a cause.

The reason for 1b premise I think would be to respond to those who are not prepared to differentiate between God, and things.

You use the word "things", but we might use the word "beings". Any god would be a being.

So I think they say the same thing in essence, with added information on the nature of things.

You are the one adding things to the argument; you are discussing something other than the KCA.

My point is, it doesn't have to be called God. You could call it the totality, but it would be the same thing.

Now you use the word "thing" to describe a god, something that you said could not be done.

Yes, but God, or the totality, is not a thing, and in that descriptive regard, it is a non thing.
You must see that by now.

No, you just used "thing" to describe a god.

God, is a word that is used as a general description of a Supreme Being, which is the source of everything. You don't like that word so I'll replace with a word that is more palatable. The ''totality''. It means the same thing to me, and if you being honest, you'd admit it does for you as well.

No, few people would make the equivalence that you are doing. Even those who follow the Vedic tradition.

 

[Yazata]

Thanks for the link. That article is written by Craig and seems to be quiet a good presentation of his Kalam Cosmological Argument. Probably he has slightly modified it from his original version in an attempt to address some of the objections that have been raised.

There seem to be different versions of Craig's KCA argument floating around out there. I think that you are right, that he's probably tweaking it to address objections.

For completeness, I'll post all steps and conclusions from the bottom of that article:

1. Whatever exists has a reason for its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external ground.
2. Whatever begins to exist is not necessary in its existence.
3. If the universe has an external ground of its existence, then there exists a Personal Creator of the universe, who, sans the universe, is timeless, spaceless, beginningless, changeless, necessary, uncaused, and enormously powerful.
4. The universe began to exist.​

Ok, there are his initial premises, for this version of the argument anyway. I think that their truth is debatable. #3 is especially problematic. I'm sure that many people have already raised that objection, and Craig tries to address it elsewhere.

Now Craig starts generating lemmas. So let's just look at whether his intermediate and final conclusions are implied by his premises, assuming for the sake of argument that everything is true.

5. Therefore (from 2 and 4), the universe is not necessary in its existence.

That seems to follow.

6. Therefore (from 1 and 5), the universe has an external ground of its existence.

That seems to be a logical implication too, assuming that we accept the truth of premise #1, which is doubtful in my opinion.

7. Therefore (from 3 and 6), there exists a Personal Creator of the universe, who, sans the universe, is timeless, spaceless, beginningless, changeless, necessary, uncaused, and enormously powerful.

I'll even hold my nose about #3 and agree that this one is a logical implication as well. Assuming that everything that went before #7 is true (I would argue that it isn't) #7 does seem to be implied.
​

Specifically, premise (2) creates a distinction between "whatevers" that "begin to exist" and "whatevers" that do not begin to exist. And before we start arguing about "whatevers" vs "things" vs "totalities" and the like, I note that clearly Craig includes God in the "Whatever" in (1) and (2).

Ok.

The same question arises: is there anything apart from God (Craig's "Personal Creator") that did not begin to exist?

Craig seems to think that 'abstract objects' don't have temporal beginnings. I imagine that like Plato perhaps, he's thinking about things like a perfect circle, sphere or torus, along with many less visualizable and more abstract mathematical objects and logical/mathematical relationships. The abstract uniformities that causal relationships display, the thing that physicists try to capture in their mathematics, might belong in this class too.

If so, then premise (3) needs to be modified to include the possibility of some other thing that did not begin to exist being the "external ground of existence" for the universe.

I think that Craig's strategy is to argue that only one kind of object that doesn't begin to exist can serve as the universe's external cause. So his #3 doesn't just jump out of his head fully born, it arrives as the result of an argument. That's why I'm interested in the additional premises from the wikipedia article in which he discusses the qualities that in his opinion the cause of the entire space-time-matter universe must have. ( I note that he's talking about causes there and not reasons or grounds of being, which complicates things).

If not, then premise (2) begs the question by implicitly assuming the existence of God, which is what the entire argument is supposed to prove.

Don't all mathematical and logical proofs do something like that? Aren't a proof's conclusions already implicitly present in its premises? Proofs just draw out and make explicit what's already implicitly there.

In (2), by "necessary" I think Craig is asserting that anything that "begins to exist" could conceivably either exist or not exist. This is so as to exclude the possibility raised in Craig by (1) that the universe exists by reason of its own nature.

Yes, I agree that Craig is thinking along those lines. The big-bang would arguably serve Craig's purposes in trying to dismiss the possibility that the space-time-matter universe exists necessarily (that it can't not-exist) and I notice that he makes great use of it. I think that the contingency of the space-time-matter universe is at least plausible, if not entirely certain.

On the other hand, Craig wants to do the opposite with God. He wants to claim that there can be no "external ground" for God, and that God exists due to his own nature (and thus is "necessary"). Note that Craig also sneaks in the "necessity" of God in his most dubious premise (3).

Craig complicates things by sometimes arguing in terms of 'cause', and other times in terms of 'ground of being'. He also throws out the phrase 'reason for its existence'. These three aren't all the same idea. 'Cause' is a difficult to describe idea drawn from physics and from this-worldly common-sense, that seemingly refers to the constant temporal conjunction of physical events (or kinds of events, or something). 'Ground of being' seemingly refers to reducibility to whatever is most fundamentally real. Physical objects are reducible to atoms, which in turn are reducible to subatomic particles. Somewhere down there, at least if we hope to avoid infinite regresses, there needs to be something that just exists in its own right and isn't further reducible to something else. (That returns us to the ancient Greek concept of atom, from 'a-tomos', indivisible into parts.) So when he argues in terms of 'ground of being', Craig seems to me to be suggesting pantheism, that the universe is somehow made out of God, which presumably is that thing which is most ultimately real. I don't think that he really wants to go there, so he uses the phrase 'external ground' which doesn't make a whole lot of sense to me. He also uses the phrase 'reason for its existence'. To me, that suggests 'explanation', an account of a mysterious something that dispels the mystery and reduces the unknown to the known. ('Grounding' of a different sort, this time epistemological rather than ontological.) Which raises the question of whether God, which would seem to be infinitely mysterious, can ever serve as the explanation of anything.

For now, I would still like to concentrate on the validity of the argument rather than addressing the huge problems of the soundness or otherwise of the various premises.

My first impression is that it looks valid to me, though it doesn't appear to be sound. The conclusion seems to follow if we accept the truth of the premises (which we probably shouldn't).

 

[Jan Ardena]

The question at hand is whether or not there is any thing/being that did not begin to exist. This includes any kind of being, including possible deities, which are a type of being. Additionally, we know that objects are made up of smaller particles; perhaps these things might last forever.

Why is it the question at hand?
To somehow try to dismantle the first premise?

If we see the premise as it is, ''everything that begins to exist has a cause'', it becomes synonymous with our own objective experiences.
The real question at hand is what begins to exist without a cause, because we have no objective experience of things that don't begin to exist. So the question becomes meaningless at this point.

For the logical purposes of the KCA, however, the claim being made is about those beings that at some time began to exist, not any others, and that these particular beings had a cause.

It can only be that, as we don't know of things working in any other way (with any certainty).

You use the word "things", but we might use the word "beings". Any god would be a being.

The first three premises of the KCA addresses ''things''

You are the one adding things to the argument; you are discussing something other than the KCA.

So is Barker's reformulation, as it brings into question, in the first premise, notions that have yet to be deduced, and then saying ''see, it begs the question''

My point is, it doesn't have to be called God. You could call it the totality, but it would be the same thing.

Well I've stated that God is regarded as a non thing, in relation to our objective understanding of ''thing''.
But sometime I will refer to the concept or the idea of what we're discussingand call that a thing.

No, you just used "thing" to describe a god.

Really?

No, few people would make the equivalence that you are doing. Even those who follow the Vedic tradition.

What? That God is the totality?
I beg to differ. That is the essential point of theism.

jan.

 

[Sarkus]

Don't all mathematical and logical proofs do something like that? Aren't a proof's conclusions already implicitly present in its premises? Proofs just draw out and make explicit what's already implicitly there.

It's true that the valid conclusion must be implied by the premises, but the conclusion can not merely state that which is implied within one of the premises. The conclusion is the implication that arises from a number of premises that in and of themselves say separate things. And the conclusion should not be able to be reached from just one premise.
E.g.
All P are Q
R is a P
Therefore R is a Q.
The conclusion is clearly implied only by the combination of the two premises - i.e. you need both bits of infomation to produce the conclusion validly.
You cannot conclude that R is a Q unless you have both premises.

Compare that to:
Everything but P is a Q.
R is not P
Therefore R is a Q.
At initial glance one might conclude that this is not question-begging, that the conclusion follows validly.
But if the initial premise is re-written: "A is a Q, B is a Q, C is a Q..." etc but omitting P from being a Q, then it is clear that the conclusion is simply restating something given in that first premise.
This is in essence what Barker was doing with his reformulation to demonstrate the question-begging of the KCA as written by Craig. At least as I see it.

Don't confuse question-begging for necessarily giving an incorrect conclusion, though - it only means that it is not a valid logical argument.
In the case of this example it is clear that there is no actual argument - simply a restatement of a premise as a conclusion.
It has the guise of an argument but it isn't one.

 

[PhysBang]

Why is it the question at hand?
To somehow try to dismantle the first premise?

Well, the point of the KCA is to establish that there is some sort of cause for the universe that is outside of the universe. If you just want to assume from the start that there is such a thing, then the argument is superfluous.

If we see the premise as it is, ''everything that begins to exist has a cause'', it becomes synonymous with our own objective experiences.

No, because we haven't experienced everything.

The real question at hand is what begins to exist without a cause, because we have no objective experience of things that don't begin to exist. So the question becomes meaningless at this point.

That is an interesting question.

It can only be that, as we don't know of things working in any other way (with any certainty).

Nonetheless, all that the first premise says is that of the specific class of beings that began to exist, all of those beings have a cause.

The first three premises of the KCA addresses ''things''

No. The actual wording here is, "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." Here "everything" is an indication of scope, indicating that when we consider all the beings that begin to exist, we are to also attribute to them that these being have a cause. You began to add and then focus on "thing" and to equivocate on that, but it is not essential to the argument.

So is Barker's reformulation, as it brings into question, in the first premise, notions that have yet to be deduced, and then saying ''see, it begs the question''

You are imagining that this is Barker's reformulation.

Well I've stated that God is regarded as a non thing, in relation to our objective understanding of ''thing''.
But sometime I will refer to the concept or the idea of what we're discussingand call that a thing.


Really?

Your inconsistency is somewhat amusing. People who are trying to establish a religious point often choose to deceive, since they often realize that they have no reasonable argument. I suspect that you may have made this realization.

What? That God is the totality?
I beg to differ. That is the essential point of theism.

This is your position and not one that can be argued.

 

[Jan Ardena]

Well, the point of the KCA is to establish that there is some sort of cause for the universe that is outside of the universe. If you just want to assume from the start that there is such a thing, then the argument is superfluous.

It doesn't assume anything, neither does it need to.
The only way it becomes invalid, is if you add something to it.
Other than that it is valid, and it is true (as far as we know at least)

No, because we haven't experienced everything.

So what?
What we know, at this moment, is that everything that begins to exist, has a cause. Unless you can show that something can begin to exist, without a cause, we have to go where the evidence leads. Right?

Nonetheless, all that the first premise says is that of the specific class of beings that began to exist, all of those beings have a cause.

Yes. Everything!

No. The actual wording here is, "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." Here "everything" is an indication of scope, indicating that when we consider all the beings that begin to exist, we are to also attribute to them that these being have a cause. You began to add and then focus on "thing" and to equivocate on that, but it is not essential to the argument.

I don't know why you're harping on about ''beings'', ''indication of scope'', and all that malarkey.
It says ''everything'', and I'm sure you can comprehend what that means without bringing in nonsense.

Your inconsistency is somewhat amusing. People who are trying to establish a religious point often choose to deceive, since they often realize that they have no reasonable argument. I suspect that you may have made this realization.

There is no inconsistency, I'm interested in using the right definition of terms, so that we can slot them in their respective genres. Taken at face value, and respecting the accepted definitions of terms, the KCA is an airtight argument.

jan.

 

[PhysBang]

It doesn't assume anything, neither does it need to.
The only way it becomes invalid, is if you add something to it.
Other than that it is valid, and it is true (as far as we know at least)

Under the operation of the English language and the rules of logic, the argument (as it stands in the first post) cannot be valid. That's just a fact.

So what?
What we know, at this moment, is that everything that begins to exist, has a cause. Unless you can show that something can begin to exist, without a cause, we have to go where the evidence leads. Right?

I cannot claim to know this. I am fairly certain that, for a large class of events, these events have a cause. But I can't say this for all events and certainly not for events surrounding what may or may not be the beginning of the universe.

Yes. Everything!

You need to go reread the premise. It is not, "everything", it is, "Everything that begins to exist".

I don't know why you're harping on about ''beings'', ''indication of scope'', and all that malarkey.

Because we are speaking of logic and how logic operates. This stuff is important.

It says ''everything'', and I'm sure you can comprehend what that means without bringing in nonsense.

You need to go reread the premise. It is not, "everything", it is, "Everything that begins to exist".

"Everything that is orange" is not "everything".

There is no inconsistency, I'm interested in using the right definition of terms, so that we can slot them in their respective genres. Taken at face value, and respecting the accepted definitions of terms, the KCA is an airtight argument.

No, there is an inconsistency: you say that god is not a thing and you say that god is a thing.

I am forced to agree with others that you are merely deceitfully claiming that the KCA is something that it is not.

 

[CptBork]

We can understand the phrase "beginning of time", but it implies that time somehow bootstrapped itself; in order to begin anything, time has to pre-exist.

I wouldn't say that's necessarily true; according to the conventional Big Bang theory, time began to exist at exactly the same moment that time began to exist.

 

[Syne]

Enough with the self-righteous attitude, for Pete's sake!
If you have nothing to say on a point that actually furthers the discussion, please don't bother saying it, especially if your only purpose in saying it is to express a self-perceived superiority.

If you don't mind I'll brush over the veracity of options (1) and (2), neither of which I think can be proven as true (and with the first it is the matter of sufficiency that is more in question, I think), as I'd initially like to focus on validity.

On that matter, (3) appears valid from (1) and (2) - given your definition of "require" (although personally I'd prefer a more unambiguous phrase that does not involve a word that could be used with the alternate, more general, meaning during discussion).

If X is necessary for Y, then X is required for Y.
If Y is sufficient to assume X, then Y requires the assumption of X.

Hopefully this shorthand is fully understood now. Sorry if my impatience seems condescending, but harping on a point already raised and addressed seems an unnecessary attempt to poison the well, or something. If it wasn't, so be it, but you cannot expect a criticism to go unanswered just because you may not like the tone.

'Proven as true'? Premises do not need to be 'proven true'. You keep asserting this as if you think it is somehow relevant. Premises are simply assumed to be true. Axioms are self-evident or well-established. 'Proven true' would fall into the latter category. So we can either dispense with continuing to rehash that, or I can be justifiably condescending.

1. Physical existence requires a cause.

• This is an assertion of causality. 'Causality is one of the most fundamental and essential notions of physics. Causal efficacy cannot propagate faster than light. Otherwise, reference coordinate systems could be constructed (using the Lorentz transform of special relativity) in which an observer would see an effect precede its cause (i.e. the postulate of causality would be violated).' - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Physics
• It assumes causality extends to initial cause.

If this is a controversial assumption, please explain how.

2. God is not physical.

• This is simply the assumption that god does not provide physical evidence, and together with the assumption of causality, implies god is not physical (otherwise we'd expect to find some evidence).

If this is a controversial assumption, please explain how.

But I contend that (4) is still an invalid conclusion that god exists for 2 reasons.
The "only available" assumes that God is the only non-physical entity, an assumption not stated within the premises, thus one can not logically conclude "only".
At best one can conclude that God is a possible uncaused cause.
Yet even if you amended 2 to state that God is the only non-physical entity, and that the non-physical can have causal power, you could only validly conclude that God is the only available uncaused cause, but not that God is necessarily the cause of the physical.
To do that you have to logically exclude the possibility of infinite causality / causal loops by the physical etc.
I'm not suggesting that either is possible or impossible, only that they remain logical possibilities until you rule them out, and as such you could not validly conclude on a specific solution as being valid.
To preach back to you: a valid argument is only such if it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
As such, positing a single solution, as you are doing, where multiple solutions might logically exist, is invalid as the solution selected might be the wrong one.

I've already addressed your 'only' criticism. Infinite regress, in this case, is effectively circular reasoning. Trying to explain the ultimate cause of the universe utilizing causes within the universe is logically invalid. And there is no evidence that our universe has a closed timelike worldline. These require more support than the premises I've given, thus parsimony favors mine.

Again, for the umpteenth time, premises are not required to be exhaustive. If you insist on making this assertion, you need to support it. Otherwise, quit pretending you understand logic. You don't even seem to understand what you are writing. A valid conclusion cannot be false if the premises are true, but that says nothing about any other set of premises. You are making up nonsense.

Secondly, your conclusion in 4 is merely that God is the only available uncaused cause.
For this to be a valid proof of God's existence you would need to actually conclude that God exists, not what God would be if God exists.
You have clarified that your premise 2 means that IF God exists... and as such your conclusion should incorporate this conditionality, and thus "IF God exists then God is the only available uncaused cause."
To conclude that God exists, premise 2 would have to be taken as assuming God does exist, which is clearly question begging.
To avoid that your premise 2 should be "non-physical things exist" and then a (2.1) can follow from (1) and (2): "non-physical things are uncaused."
None of this assumes that God exists.
If, however, you assume that God is the only non-physical thing then you are begging the question as set out in the OP (JamesR detailing Dan Barker's criticism).
With (1), (2), (2.1) and (3) still valid and no mention of God, one can conclude in (4) that the non-physical are available uncaused causes.

Again, already addressed your 'only' criticism. If the premises in an argument are true and support the conclusion, the premises are part of the conclusion. Ergo, if physical existence requires a cause AND there is only one available cause THEN that cause must exist. You seem to have a serious inability to infer anything not explicitly stated. No wonder logic gives you such a hard time.

To limit this to God, or to having attributes that we then can say fits the label/understanding of God, one would need to validly show how there is only one such non-physical entity - not just assume it - and then also show validly how it is not possible for there to be an infinite causal chain of physical causation, or some other explanation that possibly fits the premises.
Ultimately your conclusion would be that the only possible solution is that X, with attributes A, B, C, exists.
By comparison to the understood notion of God, we can then claim that God is shown to validly exist.

And then we can discuss the veracity of the assumptions you have used.

How many times are you going to repeat your 'only' criticism? Infinite regress requires the premise to be the conclusion, since any infinite causality would have to first assert causality as a premise. That is begging the question AND circular reasoning, BOTH logically invalid.

Find me one credible reference on logic that says anything akin to ' show[ing] how it is not possible for ... some other explanation that possibly fits the premises'. You know, that a logical conclusion must be exhaustive. This is what you keep asserting.

So you believe, although I contend that it is controversial.
For example, how can it be meaningful for nothingness to be considered an entity at all?
Or to possibly be said to exist?
I'm not putting this forward as my case but merely to show that it is far from an uncontroversial position to take.

Did I assert nothingness to be an entity? No. Is it controversial that an empty hand is holding nothing? It has a phenomenologically ontological existence because you can recognize it. Do you refute Alan Guth's inflationary model of cosmology and its supposition of the universe as the ultimate free lunch? Do you refute virtual particles or the Casimir effect? Then explain exactly why you find nothingness a controversial assumption. You cannot make the assertion 'that it is controversial' and then immediately claim you are 'not putting this forward'. As Tiassa has grown fond of saying, make a positive statement and argue it.

 

[Syne]

Just to pull you up on why you need to change the phrasing of "requires" in premise 1 to indicate sufficiency as well as nothingness: you have used "requires" again in premise 7.
Using the definition as per premise 1 you are thus seem to be stating that an uncaused cause necessarily has volition, but also that volition is sufficient to conclude an uncaused cause.
Are you not able to exercise free-will?
Or do you see yourself as an uncaused cause?

1. Physical existence necessitates a cause, thus a cause is sufficient to assume physical existence.

7. An uncaused cause necessitates volition, thus volition is sufficient to assume an uncaused cause.
​

These are equivalent usages. Free will is, by definition, volitional. The only alternative to free will is determinism (physical causation), which expressly excludes volition.

​

As to the actual argument above, is this an argument that is aiming to validly conclude that God exists, or simply to show the equivalence of God and nothingness?
A solution might be somewhat trivial, though: what is the difference between an apple that doesn't exist and an orange that doesn't exist?
No difference: neither exist.
Also, how does 5 follow from 4?

Really? In a logical argument, all previous premises and conclusions can be utilized to form new conclusions. It is only in a syllogism that the argument to constrained to two premises and a single conclusion. So the previous conclusion, that nothingness has no cause, and premise, that the universe can possess a net zero total energy, lead to the new conclusion that nothingness can be cause.

The final conclusion should speak for itself...but apparently you are deaf. The argument concludes that god and nothingness are equivalent AND volitional cause.

Then please drop the confrontational arrogance and the self-perceived superiority.
It is both unwarranted and unhelpful.

So long as you agree to quit repeating things about logic you seem to have made up and have not supported with references.

To repeat what I have said before: if one wishes to conclude on a specific solution then they do need to logically exclude all others.
Otherwise the conclusion is invalid.

Show me one credible reference that supports that oft repeated claim. Or face justified condescension.

Validity as per wiki...

"In logic, an argument is valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false."
I have taken wiki as a simple first step to providing what I understand as the definition, and it seems supported by everywhere else I look.
They all seem to concur: if the premises are taken as true but the conclusion can still be wrong then the conclusion is not valid.
I.e. Unless you can logically exclude all other possibilities than your conclusion, the conclusion is not valid.

You obviously do not understand what you are reading. Here are the possibilities described by that wiki quote:

• All premises are true, thus the conclusion is true.
• Some other premises are true, and this conclusion is also true (it does not rely on these other premises)
• Some other premises are false, and this conclusion is true (it does not rely on these other premises)
  
• At least one premise is false, thus the conclusion is false.

And what is not possible:

• At least one premise is false, and the conclusion is true

The validity of the conclusion in a logical argument is evaluated solely by the given premises. Your only argument seems to be 'I don't like the conclusion'.

Maybe you should assert a logical counter argument, in the form of your own asserted premises and conclusion.

 

[Jan Ardena]

double post

 

[Jan Ardena]

You need to go reread the premise. It is not, "everything", it is, "Everything that begins to exist".

Which is ''everything'', unless you know of something begins to exist without a cause.

You need to go reread the premise. It is not, "everything", it is, "Everything that begins to exist".

"Everything that is orange" is not "everything".

''Everything that begins to exist'' is a description of everything (unless you can show otherwise).
''Everything that is orange'' pertains to everything that is the colour orange, excluding all other colours. We know there are alternative colours, and can make the distinction. We do not know of things that begin to exist without the need for a cause, so there is no alternative.

No, there is an inconsistency: you say that god is not a thing and you say that god is a thing.

I maintain that God is a non thing in relation to things.

I am forced to agree with others that you are merely deceitfully claiming that the KCA is something that it is not.

I think it could be that you are simply forced to agree with others.

jan.

 

[James R]

Jan Ardena:

1a. Everything has a cause.
1b. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.

Either things begin to exist, or things exist eternally. That is the distinction you're making.

There's a third possibility, of course: things that don't ever exist at all. So, if we want to be very careful we should really write:
1a. Everything that exists has a cause.
1b. Everything that exists that begins to exist has a cause.

For (1b) this isn't a big problem because I think it's safe to assume that anything that begins to exist exists, at least until such time as it no longer exists. So, let's not add unnecessary complexity. I think we can agree to take it as given that the KCA is only talking about things that putatively exist (universe, God, etc.) and not about things that never existed.

Things don't exist eternally. That is our common experience. Unless you have any information of any thing that exists eternally.

Ok. Here's the KCA one more time:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.

It sounds like you would be content to replace (1) with this:

1. All items that do not exist eternally have a cause.

To avoid possible confusion on your part, I use the words "all items" rather than "everything", on the understanding that "all items" includes both items that exist eternally and those that exist for a finite time only.

It is possible that you will object that "all items" does not include God, but rather than "all items" is equivalent to God. That is, "all items" includes the universe and everything in it, as well as anything eternal that exists. But that is unworkable because then the term "all items that do not exist eternally" would be rendered meaningless in the case that God turns out to be eternal. That is, "All items that do not exist eternally" would be an empty set if God is eternal, and (1) would then become "Nothing (no item) has a cause."

So, hopefully we agree that "all items" includes the universe, which is not eternal, and potentially God as a separate "item", which may or may not be eternal.

Now, let's look again. Premise 1, as re-written, talks of "All items that do not exist eternally". This is obviously a subset of "all items" because the description "all items" contemplates some non-eternal items, such as the universe (made clear in premise 2).

Following your usage, we might choose to use the label "things" as a synonym for "All items that do not exist eternally". With this understood, the KCA becomes:

1. All things (i.e. all items that do not exist eternally) have a cause.
2. The universe is a thing.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause.

This is clearly a valid logical argument, although it still remains to examine the soundness of premises (1) and (2).

The problem is that the argument in this form does not help us to determine whether any "non-thing" (such as God) exists, where a "non-thing" is understood to be an "item that exists eternally". There is no argument here that shows that any eternal item (such as God) can or must act as a cause for a "thing" (a non-eternal item). In short, the argument does nothing to support the existence of God.

Again, the question arises as to whether there are any "eternal items" other than God. If such items do exist, then one or more of them could conceivably cause the universe. If, on the other hand, no other such items exist then our latest version of premise (1), above, can be re-written as:

1. All items other than God have a cause.

And we're back to begging the question - assuming from the start that God is the only eternal item and thus the only possible "uncaused cause". But this argument is supposed to prove the necessity of the existence of God, not assume it.

Generally we accept that things which begin to exist, has a cause. Would you say that is correct?

This is a question about the soundness of the premise rather than the validity of the argument as a whole. However, I have raised some objections to this in a previous post, here:

http://sciforums.com/threads/kalam-...-existence-of-god.154797/page-14#post-3356498

The reason for 1b premise I think would be to respond to those who are not prepared to differentiate between God, and things.
It further serves to highlight the difference between the nature of God, and the nature of things. Not that it presupposes God, or some being like God (if you don't want to use that term). It categorises all things as everything that begins to exist, just in case it was missed in 1a.

So I think they say the same thing in essence, with added information on the nature of things.

I have tried to put your argument more fully above. I hope you will reply to what I have written there.

My point is, it doesn't have to be called God. You could call it the totality, but it would be the same thing.

See my comments above. If "God" and "the totality" refer to the same thing, then let's just use the term "God" from now on.

Yes, but God, or the totality, is not a thing, and in that descriptive regard, it is a non thing.
You must see that by now.

I agree with you that God or "the totality", by your definition, includes both things that are not eternal (things that begin to exist) and at least one thing that is eternal (that portion or aspect of God that is eternal). Whether it also includes other eternal things is an open question because you have not specified. I agree that according to your usage, eternal items such as God are not "things". That is an idiosyncratic usage of yours, but I can work with it. In my opinion, it would be more convenient to use the word "everything" in its conventional sense to mean "all that exists", which would include all eternal and non-eternal items and thus would include God. But we can go with your usage if you want to insist on making the distinction.

God, is a word that is used as a general description of a Supreme Being, which is the source of everything. You don't like that word so I'll replace with a word that is more palatable. The ''totality''. It means the same thing to me, and if you being honest, you'd admit it does for you as well.

I have no objection to the use of the word "God". Please do not make assumptions about what I do or do not like. I would prefer that you use the word "God" rather than a newly-coined term that hides what you are talking about.

Is there something other than God that does not begin to exist?

I've answered you twice now. The totality, and matter.

We have agreed that "the totality" is just another word for God, so that doesn't count.

You mention "matter" as something that does not begin to exist. Do you agree, then, that the Kalam Cosmological Argument does not require a cause for matter?

Do you also agree that it is open for us to conclude that matter caused the universe?

When is your big moment? My neighbours are complaining about the drum roll.

My big moment was the opening post of this thread, which remains unchallenged and unrefuted.

That drum roll you think you hear is the last reverberations of the cymbal crash that heralded the end of the Kalam Cosmological Argument.

 

[James R]

if one wishes to conclude on a specific solution then they do need to logically exclude all others.
Otherwise the conclusion is invalid.

Show me one credible reference that supports that oft repeated claim. Or face justified condescension.

How about an example?

1. All quadrupedal animals have four legs.
2. This table has four legs.
3. Therefore, this table is a quadrupedal animal.

The aim here is prove that this table is a quadupedal animal. However, the logic fails because the possible existence of things with four legs that are not quadrupedal animals has not been logically excluded in the argument.

The argument as presented doesn't exclude the possibility that this table is a quadupedal animal, but neither does it converge on that possibility as the only available solution. Therefore, the argument is logically invalid.

 

[Baldeee]

Syne, as stated previously, I'm concentrating on matters of validity, not soundness, so any issue you have with responses I have given to the acceptability or otherwise of your assumptions can wait until we have concluded the question of validity and start addressing those matters.

I'm going to concentrate on this part of your response, Syne, as it is about what validity actually means, and until that can be addressed there is little point continuing with any actual argument you might put forward, as you will claim it is valid while I will possibly not.
To requote wiki:
"In logic, an argument is valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to nevertheless be false"
To me this quite clearly means that if you conclude on one consistent possibility only then the argument is invalid, as the conclusion could be false while the premises are true.

You obviously do not understand what you are reading. Here are the possibilities described by that wiki quote:

• All premises are true, thus the conclusion is true.
• Some other premises are true, and this conclusion is also true (it does not rely on these other premises)
• Some other premises are false, and this conclusion is true (it does not rely on these other premises)
  
• At least one premise is false, thus the conclusion is false.

And what is not possible:

• At least one premise is false, and the conclusion is true

The validity of the conclusion in a logical argument is evaluated solely by the given premises. Your only argument seems to be 'I don't like the conclusion'.

Whereas I interpret it to means that what is not possible is that all the premises are true and the conclusion could be false.
I.e. If the conclusion could be false then it is not impossible that the premises are true and the conclusion false, which is the exception that the wiki quote explicitly states.

So let's see what your understanding says about the following:
1. If it is raining then the streets will be wet.
2. The streets are wet.
3. Therefore it is raining.

You have looked outside and seen that it is indeed raining, and the streets are indeed wet, okay.
(A) So, all premises are true and the conclusion is true [tick]
(B) Let's assume that other premises are indeed irrelevant [tick]
(C) If 1 is false then 3 would be false; if 2 is false then 3 also would be false, so this satisfies that requirement [tick]

You would think this argument invalid if either 1 or 2 were false and the conclusion still true, but per (C) above this is not the case. [tick]

Thus, per your understanding, this argument is valid.

Yet this a well-used example of an invalid argument (affirmation of the consequent).
The logic is invalid because (as per the wording of wiki) the premises are true but it is possible for the conclusion to be false: i.e. just because it is not raining does not mean the streets might not be wet - they are wet immediately after it has stopped raining, for example.

So to be a valid argument you must logically eliminate every possibility other than what you are concluding.
If you don't then at best you can arrive at a conclusion that is consistent with the premises.
And no, parsimony does not determine a valid conclusion from a range of possibilities, it merely aids rational thought.

Please tell me you understand now?
Or are you going to stick to your misunderstanding?

Simply put, for a given set of premises, if there exists a solution other than the one you have concluded then it is not a valid argument.
If the premises are true and the conclusion can at the same time be false then it is invalid.
Any source that explains what validity entails will explain this to you, far better than I have, but it will be to the same end.

At the moment your argument is invalid as it does not exclude other possibilities - i.e. the conclusion could be false while the premises true.
Your conclusion is consistent with the premises, perhaps, but it is not a valid argument.

No obnoxious attitude, please, Syne.
No belligerence.
No trying to score points.
If we can't resolve this issue then there is little point continuing, and if we can't do it civilly then that is disappointing.

 

[Baldeee]

How about an example?

1. All quadrupedal animals have four legs.
2. This table has four legs.
3. Therefore, this table is a quadrupedal animal.

The aim here is prove that this table is a quadupedal animal. However, the logic fails because the possible existence of things with four legs that are not quadrupedal animals has not been logically excluded in the argument.

The argument as presented doesn't exclude the possibility that this table is a quadupedal animal, but neither does it converge on that possibility as the only available solution. Therefore, the argument is logically invalid.

So much more succinct than my own response.
Thank you.