Mystery of Self-Consciousness?

Bhagavad Gita 2; 13

As the embodied soul continuously passes, in this body, from boyhood to youth to old age, the soul similarly passes into another body at death. A sober person is not bewildered by such a change.

I see this as a practical definition of consciousness.
So I guess my thoughts on this issue is that consciousness is proof for
the soul.

jan.

Consciousness is being aware of yourself and the world around you. If your quote is true, then why do newborns have no awareness of themselves and the world around them if they have the soul of someone who just died, who was before they were dead quite self-aware?
 
(Q),


If your quote is true, then why do newborns have no awareness of themselves and the world around them.

They have awareness, but it is undeveloped.

if they have the soul of someone who just died, who was before they were dead quite self-aware?

You misunderstand.
The soul is the person (newborn).

jan.
 
(Q),They have awareness, but it is undeveloped.

That makes no sense. You either are aware or not.

You misunderstand.
The soul is the person (newborn).

Then, it stands to reason even more so that the newborn should become that other person, fully aware with all their memories and life experiences intact.
 
(Q),

That makes no sense. You either are aware or not.

They are aware, but their awareness is not yet developed,but given time....

Then, it stands to reason even more so that the newborn should become that other person, fully aware with all their memories and life experiences intact.

Why does it?

jan.
 
But we are slowly learning about what consciousness is.

Imagine you're at the controls of a train. Your "consciousness" determines which direction the next piece of track is laid in front of you for you to follow.
This seems like you are making a choice at a conscious level. Free-will?
But what if your body has actually already (subconsciously) determined which way, and has already laid the track ahead? Your consciousness is then only giving you the illusion of free-will, right at the last moment. But is it really free-will at the point of being conscious of it, given that your body has already determined it for you?


Anyhoo - enough rambling.

I find this quite a common position within philosophy departments now. It's as if dualism proper has been replaced by a kind of physical dualism - 'the body' and 'the brain' as two distinct things with not much to do with each other. I think the first problem that crops up when you conceptualise consciousness this way (and you already outlined it very nicely) is that you immediately feel as though you dont have any free-will atall - the body is doing things, that you (the brain) dont particularly want to do.

But this is all based upon the assumption that your body has nothing atall to do with who you are, or how you perceive yourself, and that everything that's tangibly 'you' is stored inside the brain - Something which ive never found particularly convincing. Assuming for example, that it were possible to keep me alive as a 'brain in a vat', I think my sense of self would be so radically altered that it would be meaningless to say i was the same person as when i was in possession of a body.

Eastern/zen philosophers always got this. A zen philosopher wouldnt say: "i hear a bird tweeting" theyd just say "bird tweeting" because that's all there is at that particular time - experiential content. There's no 'subject' and therefore no reason to posit an 'object' that's facilitating the experience.

So there's never really a need to for dualism in zen philosophy (physical, immaterial, or otherwise) because subject/object distinctions are seen for the linguistic contrivances they always are. It's taken western philosophy about 300 years to get to grips with that, and even now you still find endless varieties of dualism knocking round analytic philosophy departments.
 
I see the brain as the processor and the body as the input/output mechanism.
If you swap the mechanism for an artificial one that provides exactly the same inputs and outputs to the brain, do you really think "you" would be any different. You would still feel the same, see the same things, hear the same things - all of which are interpreted (as far as we know) within the brain. So if you can provide the same input but from an artificial mechanism (e.g. Brain in a vat) - I would say you would still be you.

But can you differentiate "you" from the relationship between your inputs and outputs - i.e. the mechanism that is your brain?
 
Sarkus,

I see the brain as the processor and the body as the input/output mechanism.
If you swap the mechanism for an artificial one that provides exactly the same inputs and outputs to the brain, do you really think "you" would be any different.

Mechanically, probably not.
But during the developement of the new body, you would have new experiences.

You would still feeel the same, see the same things, hear the same things - all of which are interpreted (as far as we know) within the brain. So if you can provide the same input but from an artificial mechanism (e.g. Brain in a vat) - I would say you would still be you.

I agree, you would still be you.
But the "you" in this context, is the sum total of its experience.
That is the point the BG text, you are always you, dispite the change of experience.

But can you differentiate "you" from the relationship between your inputs and outputs - i.e. the mechanism that is your brain?

Yes, because although the mechanicm undergoes continuos changes, the
"you" is always recognisable as you.

jan.
 
I see the brain as the processor and the body as the input/output mechanism.
If you swap the mechanism for an artificial one that provides exactly the same inputs and outputs to the brain, do you really think "you" would be any different.
I think people like Daniel Dennett would certaintly believe so, or state that it's 'logically possible' or something. Empirically its still a very contentious idea though.



But can you differentiate "you" from the relationship between your inputs and outputs - i.e. the mechanism that is your brain?

I think so. Or at least, i think its something we do quite naturally anyway. "I" (whether you want to say its illusionary or not) is an emergent property of the whole system, you cant really reduce it down to its parts. Much in the same way that you couldnt reduce say the colour 'green' that a plant has to its individual cells - go down that far and 'greeness' disappears altogether.
 
sure

IT explains why the dead ones in circuses don't perform tricks anywhere near as well as the living ones.
lol

anyway, i guess it'll boil down to that there's no self consiousness because there are no souls..

i mean, selfconsiousness is unprovable, in the same way souls are.



um, you can add god to them too eh?:confused:
 
Did you know that you become conscious of an action or thought a fraction of a moment after the brain starts to react to the thought.

So basically we act and think before we are conscious of those actions and thoughts.

Kind of makes you wonder.
 
i mean, selfconsiousness is unprovable, in the same way souls are.


And, you are certain of this how?

If you are asking about the self-consciousness portion of the statement, the other person is correct. You cannot prove self-consciousness. Others with self-consciousness tend to think it is likely because they have it, but it is an absolutely private phenomenon. One cannot provide evidence of it.
 
Consciousness is being aware of yourself and the world around you. If your quote is true, then why do newborns have no awareness of themselves and the world around them if they have the soul of someone who just died, who was before they were dead quite self-aware?
Newborns have awareness of the world around them. It is tricky to answer whether they have self-awareness, but to say they have no awareness of themselves is not correct. They are certainly aware of their emotions, pain, etc. These being 'parts of themselves'.
 
Newborns have awareness of the world around them. It is tricky to answer whether they have self-awareness, but to say they have no awareness of themselves is not correct. They are certainly aware of their emotions, pain, etc. These being 'parts of themselves'.


Children become self aware after a couple years. I'll have to look it up when I get home to find out the normal age.

But there is a spot test that psychologist do, where they put a spot on the childs face while the child is asleep, then when they wake up they put a mirror in front of them, if they wipe the spot off it shows that they are aware of themselves and that they know they have a spot on them.

Also great apes are the only other animal that has ever passed this test.

There's a lot of discussion on this within developmental psychology. It's really interesting stuff.
 
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