The "you cannot prove a negative" argument

[Doreen]

I admittedly avoided responding to the introduction of the theist/atheist angle because it is offtopic. This question is undecidable.

However, if we wish to go beyond the particular scope of the topic at hand, and move into non-proof amenable domains, then that's an entirely different matter. We then would be discussing, not what can be proven, but what can be rationally asserted. Fraggle has addressed this; in this domain, objects may be granted probabilistic degrees of assertion. While we may not definitively assert a denial of 'god', we may, in great confidence, assert such.
Again, outside of the scope of closed systems, there is neither "proof" nor "certainty".

So would I be correct in interpreting the above as saying that when you said

Untestable claims remain philosophical curiosities, interesting from a logical perspective but outside the bounds of reasonable assertion.

you were referring only to closed systems?

 

[glaucon]

you were referring only to closed systems?

No; that would be the complete opposite of what I was saying.
As I said, it is only within closed systems that one can prove. Outside of this, one is left to inductive probability.

 

[Doreen]

No; that would be the complete opposite of what I was saying.
As I said, it is only within closed systems that one can prove. Outside of this, one is left to inductive probability.

Of course. I was asking tongue in cheek. I just can't see how this...

Untestable claims remain philosophical curiosities, interesting from a logical perspective but outside the bounds of reasonable assertion.

holds with...

However, if we wish to go beyond the particular scope of the topic at hand, and move into non-proof amenable domains, then that's an entirely different matter. We then would be discussing, not what can be proven, but what can be rationally asserted. Fraggle has addressed this; in this domain, objects may be granted probabilistic degrees of assertion. While we may not definitively assert a denial of 'god', we may, in great confidence, assert such.
Again, outside of the scope of closed systems, there is neither "proof" nor "certainty".

 

[Doreen]

No; that would be the complete opposite of what I was saying.
As I said, it is only within closed systems that one can prove. Outside of this, one is left to inductive probability.

Of course. I was asking tongue in cheek. I just can't see how this...

Untestable claims remain philosophical curiosities, interesting from a logical perspective but outside the bounds of reasonable assertion.

holds with...

However, if we wish to go beyond the particular scope of the topic at hand, and move into non-proof amenable domains, then that's an entirely different matter. We then would be discussing, not what can be proven, but what can be rationally asserted. Fraggle has addressed this; in this domain, objects may be granted probabilistic degrees of assertion. While we may not definitively assert a denial of 'god', we may, in great confidence, assert such.
Again, outside of the scope of closed systems, there is neither "proof" nor "certainty".

 

[glaucon]

I just can't see how this...

holds with...

I have to say, I can't see the issue.
It's completely clear.

"Provable" obtains to the domain of closed systems.
Else, only rational assertion obtains.

That's it.

 

[Fraggle Rocker]

I don't understand the issue either. In science, which is the domain we operate in here at SciForums, every hypothesis must be testable. That follows directly from the scientific method: you can't prove something false or prove it true beyond a reasonable doubt if you can't test it. An untestable claim, therefore, is not a reasonable assertion. If it's a hunch, then it has to be elaborated into testable form before it's really science.

Glaucon does not use my legal language in his discussion of "non-proof amenable domains," and perhaps your confusion illustrates why I think the language of the law is better than the language of science. He's just saying in his own words that in science (as opposed to mathematics or police work) a theory can only be proven "true beyond a reasonable doubt," not "absolutely true."

 

[Nunayer Beezwax]

But of course, not completely clear, as "closed system" is a concept from physics meaning "isolated from the surrounding environment". Most familiar from thermodynamic entropy laws...

I think you mean to say "formal systems" such as those of math and formal logic. Both are idealizations, the only truly closed system might be the universe, and the only truly formal system might be quantum physics.

Don't mind me, just tidying up here....

 

[Fraggle Rocker]

But of course, not completely clear, as "closed system" is a concept from physics meaning "isolated from the surrounding environment". Most familiar from thermodynamic entropy laws.

Yes. I usually put in parentheses (as defined by laymen, not physicists). Nonetheless defining the natural universe as a closed system is a cornerstone of physics. If the natural universe were not a closed system, then by definition:

• A. There must be a "surrounding environment," or as it's usually called, a "supernatural universe" external to it, and
• B. The natural universe is not isolated from the supernatural universe, or as it's usually presented, creatures and/or other forces within the supernatural universe have the ability to affect the operation of the natural universe.

It is part B. that claims to falsify all of science. Part A. without Part B. cannot be disproved, but because if it never makes itself known to us it cannot even be tested, it is not a proper scientific hypothesis in the first place.

I think you mean to say "formal systems" such as those of math and formal logic. Both are idealizations, the only truly closed system might be the universe, and the only truly formal system might be quantum physics.

No, that is absolutely not what I mean. I mean that science postulates that the natural universe is not acted upon by supernatural forces--forces external to the natural universe. If it were, then predicting the future behavior of the natural universe from theories based on empirical observation of its present and past behavior would be pointless.

One could say, "But what if those supernatural forces are logical and predictable?" I would answer that in that case they don't seem very supernatural, especially within the framework of discourse that virtually all supernaturalists use. Their god does absolutely unpredictable shit all the time. Or at least he did before we had cameras. If they are logical and predictable, then we can study them and add them to the scientific canon.

The whole purpose of religion is to explain things that we can't find a way to explain at our current level of ignorance, without going to all the expense and trouble of inventing science and finding the truth the hard way.

Or, as my wife puts it, "Religions are always invented by men, so you guys never have to say, 'I don't know'."

 

[glaucon]

I don't understand the issue either. In science, which is the domain we operate in here at SciForums, every hypothesis must be testable. That follows directly from the scientific method: you can't prove something false or prove it true beyond a reasonable doubt if you can't test it. An untestable claim, therefore, is not a reasonable assertion. If it's a hunch, then it has to be elaborated into testable form before it's really science.

Precisely.

...
Glaucon does not use my legal language in his discussion of "non-proof amenable domains," and perhaps your confusion illustrates why I think the language of the law is better than the language of science. He's just saying in his own words that in science (as opposed to mathematics or police work) a theory can only be proven "true beyond a reasonable doubt," not "absolutely true."

Quite correct.

Thanks for the [re-]clarification Fraggle.

 

[Bishadi]

Yes. I usually put in parentheses (as defined by laymen, not physicists). Nonetheless defining the natural universe as a closed system is a cornerstone of physics. If the natural universe were not a closed system, then by definition:

• A. There must be a "surrounding environment," or as it's usually called, a "supernatural universe" external to it, and
• B. The natural universe is not isolated from the supernatural universe, or as it's usually presented, creatures and/or other forces within the supernatural universe have the ability to affect the operation of the natural universe.

It is part B. that claims to falsify all of science. Part A. without Part B. cannot be disproved, but because if it never makes itself known to us it cannot even be tested, it is not a proper scientific hypothesis in the first place.No, that is absolutely not what I mean. I mean that science postulates that the natural universe is not acted upon by supernatural forces--forces external to the natural universe. If it were, then predicting the future behavior of the natural universe from theories based on empirical observation of its present and past behavior would be pointless.

One could say, "But what if those supernatural forces are logical and predictable?" I would answer that in that case they don't seem very supernatural, especially within the framework of discourse that virtually all supernaturalists use. Their god does absolutely unpredictable shit all the time. Or at least he did before we had cameras. If they are logical and predictable, then we can study them and add them to the scientific canon.

The whole purpose of religion is to explain things that we can't find a way to explain at our current level of ignorance, without going to all the expense and trouble of inventing science and finding the truth the hard way.

Or, as my wife puts it, "Religions are always invented by men, so you guys never have to say, 'I don't know'."

Great stuff.

can i add?

 

[stateofmind]

I don't understand the issue either. In science, which is the domain we operate in here at SciForums, every hypothesis must be testable. That follows directly from the scientific method: you can't prove something false or prove it true beyond a reasonable doubt if you can't test it. An untestable claim, therefore, is not a reasonable assertion. If it's a hunch, then it has to be elaborated into testable form before it's really science.

Do you think it's possible that some phenomena can exist that are only testable and provable to the individual?

 

[Doreen]

I do hope both you and Fraggle will not read what I am writing her thinking you know where I am going. Please read it as simply trying to reconcile two assertions you made that to me do not fit together.

I have to say, I can't see the issue.
It's completely clear.

"Provable" obtains to the domain of closed systems.
Else, only rational assertion obtains.

That's it.

OK.

I think it might be helpful if you gave an example that fits the first quote of yours below.

1) I ask if this relates to closed systems....

Untestable claims remain philosophical curiosities, interesting from a logical perspective but outside the bounds of reasonable assertion.

2) you respond No. So, therefore, I conclude it relates to not closed systems, as I assumed, actually. Not closed systems = not proof amenable domains. IOW relates to what we generally work with along probablistic lines.
3) you said....

However, if we wish to go beyond the particular scope of the topic at hand, and move into non-proof amenable domains, then that's an entirely different matter. We then would be discussing, not what can be proven, but what can be rationally asserted. Fraggle has addressed this; in this domain, objects may be granted probabilistic degrees of assertion. While we may not definitively assert a denial of 'god', we may, in great confidence, assert such.
Again, outside of the scope of closed systems, there is neither "proof" nor "certainty".

Here saying that one can assert with great confidence there is no God.

Why is this not 'outside the bounds of reasonable assertion, given the first statement above?

EDIT: I have now read Fraggle's clarification, which you agreed with. This would mean that this

Untestable claims remain philosophical curiosities, interesting from a logical perspective but outside the bounds of reasonable assertion

relates only to assertions assertions of certainty. But then this is odd since it all non-closed system claims are not assertions of complete certainty so it seems almost tautological.

 

[Nunayer Beezwax]

Mistake!

Oh, bother.

As you will notice if you check the timestamps on my last post, Fraggle posted while I was writing mine, I was replying to glaucon, not to Fraggle. Obviously I should have specifically quoted, but I was under the impression that my response would appear directly under glaucon's post. Fraggle just slipped in there!

And now Fraggle made a big reply to my clarification which was not intended for him at all. What a mess!

 

[glaucon]

1) I ask if this relates to closed systems....

2) you respond No. So, therefore, I conclude it relates to not closed systems, as I assumed, actually. Not closed systems = not proof amenable domains. IOW relates to what we generally work with along probablistic lines.
3) you said....

Correct.

Here saying that one can assert with great confidence there is no God.

Correct.

Why is this not 'outside the bounds of reasonable assertion, given the first statement above?

Simply due to the nature of the object in question.
If the the object lies within a closed system, then it is amenable to proof. If not, then merely an inductive rational assertion.

Clearly, 'god' is a member of the second class, ergo....

EDIT: I have now read Fraggle's clarification, which you agreed with. This would mean that this

relates only to assertions assertions of certainty. But then this is odd since it all non-closed system claims are not assertions of complete certainty so it seems almost tautological.

Right.
Which is why we can say with confidence, that an assertion of 'god' is ridiculous.

 

[Doreen]

Simply due to the nature of the object in question.
If the the object lies within a closed system, then it is amenable to proof. If not, then merely an inductive rational assertion.

Hm. Is 'there is no God' a testable assertion?

(And Glaucon, I do understand the distinctions between open and closed systems and the difference between drawing probablistic conclusions based on inductive reasoning and drawing conclusions based on deduction, for example. It just seems to me, however, that

Untestable claims remain philosophical curiosities, interesting from a logical perspective but outside the bounds of reasonable assertion

passes judgment on both the positive and negative assertions. So to me either this statement needs to be qualified or even the negative goes out of bounds.) IOW: I understand exactly what you mean when you describe how you have decided thinking there is no God is rational and how this relates to probabilities in an open system. I just don't see how it fits with the above statement.

EDIT: I'm actually finding this kind of weird, so I am going to drop it.

 

[parmalee]

glaucon:

i have to ask, are you being deliberately obtuse, or have you allofasuddenlike embraced heidegger's notions of "thinking"? if the latter, fine; obviously, i'm all for that--except i clearly have issues with the "apposable" thumb bit.

but as re: the former. there is no confusion regarding "closed systems," nor matters of provability, probability, certainty, or any such thing. and fraggle was indeed "misdirecting the discourse" by decontextualizing, spewing some of the usual trite ad homs (yawn), and going on about something about which noone, so far's i could tell, seemed to be suffering any "confusion." (yawn yawn)
it's a quite simple matter really:

you said:

Untestable claims remain philosophical curiosities, interesting from a logical perspective but outside the bounds of reasonable assertion.

but then you said:

However, if we wish to go beyond the particular scope of the topic at hand, and move into non-proof amenable domains, then that's an entirely different matter. We then would be discussing, not what can be proven, but what can be rationally asserted. Fraggle has addressed this; in this domain, objects may be granted probabilistic degrees of assertion. While we may not definitively assert a denial of 'god', we may, in great confidence, assert such.
Again, outside of the scope of closed systems, there is neither "proof" nor "certainty".

and then:

Simply due to the nature of the object in question.
If the the object lies within a closed system, then it is amenable to proof. If not, then merely an inductive rational assertion.

so, "rational assertion," but NOT "reasonable assertion"--huh? and "testable"?

 

[glaucon]

Hm. Is 'there is no God' a testable assertion?

Semantically, yes.
But I'm sure that's not what you meant.
In short, no [as previously mentioned].

However:

passes judgment on both the positive and negative assertions.

now I see where the confusion between us lies.


You're implicitly applying a bivalent relationship where there is none.
A positive assertion, contingent on type [closed or open system] is an entirely different creature from the correlate negative 'assertion'.

So, while the assertion of 'god' cannot be "within the bounds of reasonable assertion", this does not entail that the denial of said assertion is similarly restricted. Thus [in a rewording of what I've said] 'god exists' is both untestable and outside the bounds of reasonable assertion, while 'god does not exist' is untestable, but not outside of the bounds of reasonable assertion.

 

[glaucon]

glaucon:


but as re: the former. there is no confusion regarding "closed systems," nor matters of provability, probability, certainty, or any such thing. and fraggle was indeed "misdirecting the discourse" by decontextualizing, spewing some of the usual trite ad homs (yawn), and going on about something about which noone, so far's i could tell, seemed to be suffering any "confusion." (yawn yawn)

Not at all.
The fact is that the term "proof" is properly understood by very few people. Talk to a mathematician and ask them about it.

so, "rational assertion," but NOT "reasonable assertion"--huh? and "testable"?

You've made the same mistake Doreen has.

See above.

 

[parmalee]

Not at all.
The fact is that the term "proof" is properly understood by very few people. Talk to a mathematician and ask them about it.

the second part, sure; but as to the "not at all," what specifically were you referring to? to be clear, i am alluding to post #73. are you suggesting that fraggle did not take the quote out of context to make an unrelated point, and thus "misdirect the discourse"--a claim, which either in his failure to read or his failure to understand, he falsely attributed to Doreen? or that he did not spew his usual trite ad homs? (heh. in this place of "science and scholarship." i could make a little joke here about "testable claims," but instead i'll just give you a hint: this oft-cited fellow makes lacan look positively scientific (or mathematical, as the case may be). hope that was enough of a "hint.")

You've made the same mistake Doreen has.

See above.

given the above qualification, this seems to make sense; though in the absence of the qualification, it would seem odd to simply assume that the "denial of an assertion" does not constitute a claim.

 

[glaucon]

the second part, sure; but as to the "not at all," what specifically were you referring to? to be clear, i am alluding to post #73. are you suggesting that fraggle did not take the quote out of context to make an unrelated point, and thus "misdirect the discourse"-- ...

I was merely attempting to indicate that to dismiss Fraggle's comments out of hand was not appropriate. I was paying more attention to the 'spirit' of what he said, as opposed to any particular interpretation. To wit: that people often make use of terms incorrectly.

given the above qualification, this seems to make sense; ...

Glad to see I've made myself understood [somewhat..].

...
though in the absence of the qualification, it would seem odd to simply assume that the "denial of an assertion" does not constitute a claim.

I hate to say this but, yes and no.
It does indeed constitute a claim, but the claim is entirely contingent upon a preceding claim [that of the (positive) assertion].

Or, put in other words, one can posit an object, but one cannot posit the denial of an object [without the precedent assertive posit].


... Clearly, I've been reading too much Frege as of late...




Speaking more generally on the topic at hand, and in particular on this distinction between classes of proof-amenable systems, it should be noted that there is the notion of supervenience to consider.

This is to say, the domain of formal logic [and other closed systems...] will always also be rational [ the notions of "inductive rational assertions", "reasonable", and other of this ilk that have been used here.]. However, the converse is not the case: the domain of rational, does not necessarily have to be logical.
Thus, the distinctions I've mentioned throughout this thread.

Supervenience