Do we have freewill ? is it biblical ?

[Baldeee]

Only because you keep moving the goalposts of what was initially simply "knowing what will happen".

How have I moved the goalposts??
Please don't just make accusations.
Support them.
If I am guilty I will hold my hands up and admit such, but you will need to demonstrate it.
So, please, show where you think the goalposts have been moved.
Otherwise please address the issues as raised.

How, exactly? What mechanism?

Omniscience means to know all: past, present, future.
At any point in the time-frame, the next moment is known.
If it is known beforehand then it can not be anything else.
An action today was as set in stone a billion years ago as it was at the very start.
If it can not be anything else then... any colour as long as it is black, etc.
That is constraint.
At least to the incompatibilist.
That is the mechanism by which constraint arises out of omniscience: implication of the meaning of the terms.
If you have/use different meanings then ymmv.

 

[DaveC426913]

How have I moved the goalposts??

I did not mean you, specifically, alone.

If it is known beforehand then it can not be anything else.
An action today was as set in stone a billion years ago as it was at the very start.
If it can not be anything else then... any colour as long as it is black, etc.
That is constraint.

No, you keep jumping over the bit.

Just because the future is known does not mean it can causally affect actions.
God observes three thousand universes in each of which I choose one of three flavors of ice cream. He knows what I chose. How does that actually result in any given universe where I am literally incapable of choosing chocolate or strawberry over vanilla? I become a zombie?

 

[Baldeee]

I did not mean you, specifically, alone.

Whether you meant me, specifically, alone, or not, you have accused me of it, or at least of the goalposts having been moved.
If you think that, explain where you think they were, and where you think they are now.
Don't just accuse foul play and run, please.

No, you keep jumping over the bit.

I have explained why I think it irrelevant.
We have posited X.
It does matter how X is achieved, we must assume it is in play and deal with the implications.
Are there different types of omniscience?
Does the mechanism by which it arises make a difference to the assumption of omniscience itself?
To me, no, it doesn't.
We have posited omniscience, no matter how it is arrived.
I am not relying on any mechanism for my arguments, only omniscience itself.

Just because the future is known does not mean it can causally affect actions.

Why does that matter?
Either God already knows before the future occurs or God does not know.
If omniscient, God knows.
That, ominsicience, is sufficient for your future action to be constrained (i.e. no genuine alternative) from the moment it is foreseen, for reasons already argued.
If there were genuine alternatives then, at the moment of choice, God wouldn't have known beforehand which you would choose.
He does.
There is thus constraint, whether causal or otherwise.
We are just not aware of those constraints and thus consider there to be genuine alternatives.
Neither the mechanism by which omniscience occurs, nor whether it causally affects one's actions, are relevant.
The mechanism of the constraint is mysterious (as is the way God is reported to work ), but by dint of being omniscient those constraints are there.
Requiring a mechanism is thus, as far as I am concerned, a red-herring, and I have explained why.

God observes three thousand universes in each of which I choose one of three flavors of ice cream. He knows what I chose. How does that actually result in any given universe where I am literally incapable of choosing chocolate or strawberry over vanilla? I become a zombie?

We have the illusion of being able to select from between what we believe are genuine alternatives, because we are not omniscient.
We do not know what the constraints are.
We are simply not aware of them.
But omniscience itself, regardless of mechanism, means that there are constraints, for arguments given.

As to whether you consider yourself to become a zombie in light of the conclusion, that is up to you.
Personally, if there is such an omniscient God, it doesn't affect how I live my life, as I am not aware of the constraints.
I operate according to the illusion of the freewill that I have, and I can do nothing else but do that.
But I'm not practically aware of only being able to make the choice I make when I make it.

I would not call that being a zombie, although it would depend on what you consider to be the defining characteristics of the zombie.
Brain-eating?
Shambling gait?

 

[zacariah88]

Multiverse is possible and you have freewill in it exist, God has it. We are amde like his image but not all the freedom like he does. Our destinies can change becuase of a small point in the universe and God can change to how he wants it ? Yes. We can choose to good or evil stay with simple solutions becuase you cannot move th universe and the multiverse only he can ;D. He can do it all.

 

[DaveC426913]

If it is known beforehand then it can not be anything else.
An action today was as set in stone a billion years ago as it was at the very start.
If it can not be anything else then... any colour as long as it is black, etc.
That is constraint.

Whether you meant me, specifically, alone, or not, you have accused me of it, or at least of the goalposts having been moved.
If you think that, explain where you think they were, and where you think they are now.
Don't just accuse foul play and run, please.
I have explained why I think it irrelevant.
We have posited X.
It does matter how X is achieved, we must assume it is in play and deal with the implications.
Are there different types of omniscience?
Does the mechanism by which it arises make a difference to the assumption of omniscience itself?
To me, no, it doesn't.
We have posited omniscience, no matter how it is arrived.
I am not relying on any mechanism for my arguments, only omniscience itself.
Why does that matter?
Either God already knows before the future occurs or God does not know.
If omniscient, God knows.
That, ominsicience, is sufficient for your future action to be constrained (i.e. no genuine alternative) from the moment it is foreseen, for reasons already argued.
If there were genuine alternatives then, at the moment of choice, God wouldn't have known beforehand which you would choose.
He does.
There is thus constraint, whether causal or otherwise.
We are just not aware of those constraints and thus consider there to be genuine alternatives.
Neither the mechanism by which omniscience occurs, nor whether it causally affects one's actions, are relevant.
The mechanism of the constraint is mysterious (as is the way God is reported to work ), but by dint of being omniscient those constraints are there.
Requiring a mechanism is thus, as far as I am concerned, a red-herring, and I have explained why.
We have the illusion of being able to select from between what we believe are genuine alternatives, because we are not omniscient.
We do not know what the constraints are.
We are simply not aware of them.
But omniscience itself, regardless of mechanism, means that there are constraints, for arguments given.

As to whether you consider yourself to become a zombie in light of the conclusion, that is up to you.
Personally, if there is such an omniscient God, it doesn't affect how I live my life, as I am not aware of the constraints.
I operate according to the illusion of the freewill that I have, and I can do nothing else but do that.
But I'm not practically aware of only being able to make the choice I make when I make it.

I would not call that being a zombie, although it would depend on what you consider to be the defining characteristics of the zombie.
Brain-eating?
Shambling gait?

I think you know what I mean by zombie, but for the record: there are three flavours of ice cream available, but I am UNABLE to choose vanilla or strawberry due to some mechanism you have yet to specify. I try, but .... I guess I am silent unless I choose chocolate?

 

[cluelusshusbund]

Multiverse is possible and you have freewill in it exist, God has it. We are amde like his image but not all the freedom like he does. Our destinies can change becuase of a small point in the universe and God can change to how he wants it ? Yes. We can choose to good or evil stay with simple solutions becuase you cannot move th universe and the multiverse only he can ;D. He can do it all.

PSA --->(Public Service Anouncement)

The vast majority ant negatively affected by ther lack of free will… unfortunately… the very few that are turn Zombie… just moanin/groanin an shamblin along… not even able to choose which brain to eat next… sad

However… for the rest of us its very important that we learn to quickly spot a Zombie - even in large crowds

No worries… below is a test i have devised (much like “Find Waldo”) to practice wit… an if you can find the Zombie in less than 1 minute you pass an shoud no longer Fear The Walkin Dead

Spoiler: YOU HAVE 60 SECONDS

 

[Baldeee]

I think you know what I mean by zombie,

I tend toward the notion of p-zombie when I hear/see the word, especially in philosophical discussions, so your clarification was useful, thanks.

but for the record: there are three flavours of ice cream available, but I am UNABLE to choose vanilla or strawberry due to some mechanism you have yet to specify. I try, but .... I guess I am silent unless I choose chocolate?

The answer to whether you would be such a zombie: no.

The difference here is between what the compatibilist (or at least some) and incompatibilist are referring to.

Imagine that there is omniscience and as such the output of our choice is already fixed before we are even aware that there is a decision to be made.
Imagine the process by which the inputs are converted to the output as a black box.
The incompatibilist sees the inputs, sees the fact (from omniscience) that the output is fixed, and says that there is therefore no freedom within that black box.
This is their sense of the word "free".
It looks at the meta picture, if you will.

The compatibilist sees the same black box but looks not at the overall picture of the fixed output but more at our conscious sense of what is going on within the black box.
That conscious sense pulls in alternatives that are considered/believed to be genuine (but aren't), and it goes through the process of establishing which one to conclude on, using memory, analysis, rationality, desire, all these wonderful techniques.
And the output is the one that it was destined / predetermined to be from long before the choice was required.
The compatibilist sees that black box working unhindered as it should, the consciousness not sensing any coercion, and deems it therefore to be working freely.

It is a different perspective, and hence a different conclusion: one says there is no freedom, there are constraints from the omniscience; the other says the process is working as it should, that it believes it is operating free of coercion, and thus there is freedom.
The incompatibilist still has that same black box process going on, and their conscious awareness of the constraints is as non-existent as for the compatibilist.
It is just a difference in their perspective, not necessarily in what they are actually looking at.

I can, and do, accept that the incompatibilist notion of free will does not exist, while accepting that the/some compatibilist notion does also exist.


In simpler terms, perhaps: if you could only do what someone else told you to do, would you consider yourself to be free?
No.
What if they had control but you weren't aware of that control, weren't aware of what they told you to do, and you believed/felt that what you were doing was because you wanted to, that you felt/believed you could decide to do anything, that you believed there were genuine alternatives, would you then consider yourself to be free, ignorant of the actual control that someone had over you, ignorant of you still only actually doing what the other person was telling you to do?

The former is the incompatibilist position, irrespective of the latter.
The latter, if while accepting the control of the former they say that in such a situation they yet have freedom, would be the compatibilist.
(And no, there needs to be no detailing of the mechanism, physical or otherwise, by which the person controls you.
It is sufficient to know that there is the control.)

 

[Baldeee]

PSA --->(Public Service Anouncement)
...

Aren't they all mindless zombies, working for the Corporation?

 

[cluelusshusbund]

Aren't they all mindless zombies, working for the Corporation?

Yes… but mums the word.!!!

If they found out they had no free-will all those smiles woud turn upside-down

 

[mathman]

Looking at Genesis, god seems to allow free will. Adam and Eve ate forbidden fruit, Cain killed Abel. God got fed up with the mess and created the flood. Later on god decided to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah. etc.

 

[C C]

Looking at Genesis, god seems to allow free will. Adam and Eve ate forbidden fruit, Cain killed Abel. God got fed up with the mess and created the flood. Later on god decided to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah. etc.

Yah, it would have been the processes and structural configurations of their own brains outputting those decisions, not an external intelligent agency like God. (Though in theory, such a speculative entity or even a demon would have the capacity to possess a body and derail it from conforming to its personal preferences.)

It can be a characteristic of an individual to intermittently do impulsive or random things (especially if they're mentally ill or extremely bored), and that also count as part of the tendencies of their current identity.

But there's nothing wrong with being perfectly predictable -- i.e., who wants to eat food they don't like, pursue activities they hate, etc, apart from those who have become destabilized or choose to do _X_ to for survival reasons (life's not a freebie paradise)?

And total randomness would mean a lack of organization and a functioning body/brain to begin with. Internal governance and autonomy is necessary for legit organisms and degrees of intelligence -- not anarchy and remote puppeteers.
_

 

[Beer w/Straw]

Has the question been asked, and or, answered if the dinosaurs had free will?

 

[cluelusshusbund]

Has the question been asked, and or, answered if the dinosaurs had free will?

In a quick Googgle search i found one that was gonna have free-will but it got ate by a terracoptus jus before it hatched... sad

 

[zacariah88]

That's how democrats are borned ! sad democrats ! ;D.

 

[cluelusshusbund]

But do babies have free will.???

 

[DaveC426913]

But do babies have free will.???

Sure. Why not?

 

[James R]

Huh?

Really?

Sure, whatever, I guess that makes sense.

Not true. If someone knows then you don't have a choice.

But - despite the use of the word - you didn't know.
It was an infomed "guess" but it wasn't factual knowledge.
If chocolate had been chosen you'd have been surprised but it wouldn't have been an earth-shattering phenomenon.
Knowledge (i.e. factual, true) prior to events is in itself constraining.
For it to be true and factual then no other "choice" is possible.

The issue, in both cases, lies in what you decide "free" means in "free will".

If you insist that "free" must mean that one has a magical ability to act in a way that is completely independent of past influences (thus potentially, at least, breaking the laws of physics), then you're both probably right.

My view of free will is a compatibilist position.

 

[Tiassa]

The issue, in both cases, lies in what you decide "free" means in "free will".

Yes, but that's completely useless. Insofar as I might point out that your version of "knowing" isn't actually knowing, you might simply respond that you already know that, but if that somehow makes your point about the definition of "free", you're being too complicated about it.

 

[Baldeee]

The issue, in both cases, lies in what you decide "free" means in "free will".

If you insist that "free" must mean that one has a magical ability to act in a way that is completely independent of past influences (thus potentially, at least, breaking the laws of physics), then you're both probably right.

This is a disingenuous representation of the incompatibilist position.
But I guess whatever it takes for you to get in to their position what you see as the pejorative "magical", right.

The meaning of the word "free" for the incompatibilist is "having no constraint", much as it is for the compatibilist, but it is to what that descriptor is applied to that makes the difference.
Not the meaning.
If the application of that to the notion of omniscience results in us not being considered "free", so be it.
No magic need apply, thanks.

My view of free will is a compatibilist position.

Let me ask you: if you could only do what someone else said you could, would you consider yourself free?
If you were oblivious to what they were asking you, or of how they controlled you, but nonetheless could only do what they said, would you consider yourself free?
If your answer to the second is different to the first, what is it in the second scenario that causes this?

 

[DaveC426913]

Let me ask you: if you could only do what someone else said you could, would you consider yourself free?
If you were oblivious to what they were asking you, or of how they controlled you, but nonetheless could only do what they said, would you consider yourself free?
If your answer to the second is different to the first, what is it in the second scenario that causes this?

How, exactly, can you 'only do what someone said'?

It's not about whether you know you're being constrained or not, it's about how can there be a constraint by an imaginary acausal phenomenon?

As far as I can tell, your argument is: is I can see the future, therefore, "ipso facto", you merely are constrained to do what I saw. And that's simply a non sequitur. It isn't necessarily false, but you've made no case that must be true. You must connect those dots.